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Abstract	  	  
As	  the	  European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme	  (EU	  ETS)	  has	  grown	  in	  size	  and	  value,	   it	  
has	  become	  an	   increasingly	  attractive	  playground	   for	   fraudsters.	  The	  past	   two	  years	  have	  
seen	  value-­‐added-­‐tax	  (VAT)	  fraud	  and	  emissions	  allowance	  thefts	  emerge	  as	  major	  threats	  
to	  the	  EU	  ETS	  market.	  This	  study	  explores	  the	  effects	  that	  these	  forms	  of	  fraud	  have	  had	  on	  
parts	  of	   the	  EU	   carbon	  market;	   uncovers	   vulnerabilities	   in	   the	   regulation	  of	   the	   registries	  
(the	  “banks”	  of	  accounts	   in	  which	  emissions	  allowances	  are	  kept	  and	  from	  which	  they	  are	  
traded)	   and	   the	   oversight	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS	   market;	   and	   analyses	   the	   adequacy	   and	   wider	  
implications	  of	   the	   regulatory	   reforms	   recently	  proposed	  by	   the	  European	  Commission.	  A	  
series	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  conducted	  for	  this	  study	  exposes	  a	  significant	  amount	  
of	   discomfort	   amongst	   stakeholders	   regarding	   the	   proposed	   reforms	   to	   the	   regulation	   of	  
the	   registries	   system,	  which	   is	   felt	   could	   still	   leave	   the	   system	  vulnerable	   to	   fraud	  and	   its	  
effects.	  The	  potential	  extension	  of	   the	  EU	   financial	  markets	  oversight	   regulations	  has	  also	  
led	  to	  fear	  that	  the	  future	  regulatory	  framework	  may	  be	  disproportionately	  burdensome	  for	  
some	   market	   participants,	   potentially	   compromising	   the	   cost-­‐efficiency	   of	   this	   emissions	  
abatement	  tool.	  Moreover,	  the	  paper	  highlights	  the	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  the	  investigation	  
and	   prosecution	   of	   fraud	   in	   the	   carbon	  markets	   and	   assesses	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   recent	  
developments	  in	  EU	  criminal	  law,	  in	  particular	  since	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  in	  
2009,	  hold	  the	  potential	  to	  overcome	  some	  of	  the	  existing	  barriers	  to	  the	  effective	  criminal	  
law	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
I.	  Introduction	  	  
The	   European	   Union	   Emissions	   Trading	   Scheme	   (EU	   ETS)	   is	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   EU’s	  
climate	  change	  policy.	  Introduced	  in	  2005,1	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  this	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system	  is	  the	  
cost-­‐efficient	  delivery	  of	  predictable	  carbon	  dioxide	  (CO2)	  emissions	  reductions.	  By	  limiting	  
the	   overall	   amount	   of	   permitted	   emissions,	   apportioning	   this	   overall	   limit	   amongst	  
installations	  via	   the	  allocation	  of	   ‘emissions	  allowances’,	  and	  allowing	  these	  allowances	  to	  
be	  traded	  between	  installations,	  this	  market-­‐based	  instrument	  aims	  to	  apportion	  emissions	  
abatement	  to	  where	  it	  is	  can	  be	  achieved	  at	  the	  lowest	  cost.	  	  
	  
Currently	  in	  its	  second	  phase,	  the	  EU	  ETS	  is	  being	  implemented	  in	  three	  main	  stages.	  Phase	  I	  
ran	   from	  2005	   to	  2007,	  and	  acted	  as	  a	   test	  phase	   to	  ensure	  effective	  emissions	   reporting	  
and	   verification	   systems.	   Phase	   II	   saw	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	   industrial	   sectors,	   such	   as	  
glass	  and	  petrochemical	  production,	  and	  runs	  from	  2008	  to	  2012.	  Phase	  III,	  due	  to	  start	   in	  
2013,	  will	  run	  until	  2020	  and,	  building	  on	  lessons	  learnt	  from	  the	  previous	  two	  phases,	  will	  
require	   an	   increased	   proportion	   of	   installations	   to	   buy	   emissions	   allowances	   via	   auction	  
rather	   than	  receive	   free	  allocations.	  Moreover,	  Phase	   III	   is	  marked	  by	   the	  abolition	  of	   the	  
national	  allocation	  plans	  and	  adoption	  instead	  of	  a	  more	  centralised	  emissions	  cap.	  	  
	  	  
The	   EU	   ETS	   has	   grown	   rapidly	   since	   its	   inception.	   Now	   the	   largest	   carbon	  market	   in	   the	  
world,	   it	   covers	   over	   11,000	   installations	   in	   30	   different	   countries,2	  and	   was	   worth	   an	  
estimated	  €103 billion	  in	  2009.3	  The	  sophistication	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  associated	  market	  
for	   tradable	   allowances	   has	   mirrored	   this	   growth,	   with	   market	   participation	   extending	  
beyond	   those	   interested	   purely	   in	   the	   emissions	   compliance	   use	   of	   the	   underlying	  
commodities	   (‘compliance	   entities’).	   Financial	   intermediaries4	  quickly	   joined	   the	   EU	   ETS	  
market,	  both	  to	  profit	  from	  buying	  and	  selling	  emissions	  allowances	  on	  their	  own	  accounts	  
(known	   as	   ‘financial	   trading’)	   and	   to	   provide	   trading	   and	   risk	   management	   services	   for	  
compliance	   firms	   (‘brokering’).5	  Sophisticated	   trading	   platforms	  have	   also	   emerged	   as	   the	  
market	   has	   matured,	   with	   the	   majority	   of	   trade	   now	   carried	   out	   on	   electronic	   trading	  
platforms	  (‘exchanges’),	  through	  which	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  can	  enter	  their	  orders	  and	  carry	  
out	  trades	  anonymously	  and	  rapidly.6	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On	   top	  of	  more	  basic	   contracts	   for	   the	   immediate	   delivery	   of	   emissions	   allowances	   (spot	  
contracts)	   financial	   intermediaries	   have	   developed	   a	   variety	   of	   more	   complex	   derivative	  
products	  with	  different	  delivery	  dates	  and	  options	  to	  help	  appropriately	  manage	  price	  risk	  
for	  their	  clients.	  ‘Forwards’	  and	  ‘futures’	  for	  example	  represent	  contracts	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  
a	  set	  volume	  of	  a	  commodity	  on	  a	  specified	  future	  delivery	  date.	  These	   instruments	  allow	  
firms	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  the	  price	  they	  will	  be	  paying	  (or	  receiving)	  for	  allowances	  in	  the	  future,	  
and	  to	  hedge	  the	  risk	  of	  fluctuation	  in	  the	  price	  of	  allowances.7	  	  
	  	  
This	  broad	  involvement	  and	  diversity	  of	  products	  within	  the	  market	  has	  been	  important	  in	  
driving	  liquidity	  and	  market	  efficiency8	  and	  has	  itself	  fuelled	  further	  market	  growth.	  But	  as	  
the	   EU	   carbon	   market	   has	   grown	   in	   size	   and	   value,	   it	   has	   also	   become	   an	   increasingly	  
attractive	   playground	   for	   fraudsters.	   As	   such,	   fraud	   has	  materialised	   on	   this	   market	   in	   a	  
variety	  of	  sophisticated	  forms,	  including	  VAT	  carousel	  fraud	  and	  emissions	  allowance	  thefts.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  this	  activity	  has	  raised	  concern	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  
the	  EU	  ETS	  has	  lagged	  behind	  the	  growth	  in	  value	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  scheme.	  	  Although	  
fraud	   is	   of	   course	   present	   on	  many	  other	   functioning	  markets,	   the	   EU	   ETS	   appears	   to	   be	  
uniquely	   vulnerable	   to	   certain	   types	   of	   criminal	   activity.	   According	   to	   a	   senior	  
representative	  of	  a	  leading	  bank	  heavily	  involved	  in	  trading	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  “there	  is	  no	  other	  
market	  in	  the	  world	  that	  is	  more	  open	  to	  misuse”,9	  stating	  that	  criminals	  specifically	  target	  
the	  EU	  carbon	  market	  compared	  to	  others.	  In	  recognition	  of	  this	  vulnerability,	  the	  European	  
Commission	  has	  recently	  proposed	  reforms	  to	  the	  Regulation	  governing	  the	  running	  of	  the	  
system	  of	  accounts	  (‘registries’)	   in	  which	  emissions	  allowances	  are	  kept	  and	  traded	  (in	  the	  
form	  of	  a	  draft	  registries	  Regulation),10	  and	  launched	  a	  stakeholder	  consultation	  to	  explore	  
potential	  reforms	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  emissions	  trading	  market	  is	  regulated.11	  There	  are	  
concerns	   however	   regarding	   the	   appropriateness	   and	   potential	   effectiveness	   of	   these	  
reforms.	   With	   Phase	   III	   approaching,	   it	   is	   essential	   that	   the	   reforms	   put	   in	   place	   to	  
strengthen	   the	   resilience	   of	   the	   system	   against	   fraud	   and	   the	   confidence	   of	   market	  
participants	   are	   both	   effective	   and	   appropriate,	   to	   avoid	   the	   need	   for	   further	   regulatory	  
change	  and	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  
	  
Additional	   to	   the	   governance	   of	   the	   trading	   system	   itself,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   criminal	  
investigations	  and	  prosecutions	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  prevention	  of	  criminal	  activity	  
on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  The	  transnational	  nature	  of	  the	  market	  and	  the	  fraud	  that	  affects	  it	  however	  
creates	  difficulties	  in	  the	  coordination	  of	  these	  activities.	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  et	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  (2010)	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  Springer	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  (07.07.2011).	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  Union	  emissions	  trading	  scheme	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  Directive	  2003/87/EC	  of	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  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	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  Council	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  280/2004/EC	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  European	  Parliament	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  Council	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  (EC)	  No	  2216/2004	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  No	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  Reference	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  an	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market	  oversight	  framework	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  the	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme”	  	  [2010]	  Brussels,	  Belgium.	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This	   research	   paper	   aims	   to	   examine	   the	   major	   forms	   of	   fraud	   on	   the	   European	   Union	  
Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme	  (EU	  ETS);	  assess	  the	  effects	  that	  these	  types	  of	  fraud	  have	  had	  on	  
the	  system;	  analyse	  the	  vulnerabilities	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  that	  leave	  it	  exposed	  
to	  this	  type	  of	  activity;	  and	  assess	  the	  appropriateness	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
reforms	   proposed	   by	   the	   European	   Commission	   aimed	   at	   strengthening	   the	   system	   and	  
addressing	   these	  vulnerabilities.	   This	  paper	  also	  explores	  how	  changes	   to	  EU	  criminal	   law	  
and	  the	  regime	  governing	  the	  coordination	  of	  criminal	  investigations	  laid	  out	  in	  existing	  EU	  
criminal	   legislation	   and	   in	   the	   2009	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   could	   help	   overcome	   the	   existing	  
difficulties	  involved	  with	  the	  prosecution	  of	  cross-­‐border	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  
	  
To	   gain	   qualitative	   data	   and	   help	   guide	   this	   analysis,	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   a	  
variety	  of	   stakeholders	  were	   conducted,	   the	   views	  of	  whom	  are	   included	   throughout	   this	  
article.	  
	  
1.1.	  Overview	  of	  the	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme	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The	  reader	  of	  this	  review	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  well	  versed	  with	  the	  principles	  underlying	  the	  
operation	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  Yet	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  this	  paper	  to	  give	  a	  brief	  general	  outline	  of	  
the	  scheme	  prior	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  specific	  vulnerabilities	  of	  the	  scheme	  to	  fraud.	  	  
	  
The	  European	  Community	  (EC)	  and	  the	  then	  EU-­‐15	  Member	  States	  signed	  the	  Kyoto	  
Protocol	  on	  29	  April	  1998,	  and	  was	  formally	  ratified	  in	  31	  May	  2002	  by	  the	  EC	  and	  its	  
Member	  States.	  Under	  the	  Protocol,	  the	  EU	  and	  Member	  States	  made	  the	  commitment	  to	  
reduce	  CO2e	  emissions	  in	  2008-­‐2012	  by	  8%	  below	  1990	  levels.	  Under	  the	  EU	  Luxembourg	  
‘Burden	  Sharing	  Agreement’	  the	  Kyoto	  target	  for	  the	  EU	  was	  redistributed	  between	  
individual	  Member	  States	  based	  on	  national	  circumstances.12	  	  Presently	  the	  EU	  ETS	  covers	  
all	  the	  EU-­‐27	  Member	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  Norway,	  Iceland	  and	  Liechtenstein,	  who	  are	  part	  of	  
the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  (EEA).	  It	  covers	  about	  50%	  of	  all	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  the	  EU	  (or	  
about	  30%	  of	  its	  total	  Kyoto	  emissions)	  and	  most	  industrial	  sectors	  (around	  11,500	  of	  the	  
EU’s	  major	  emitters).	  The	  scheme	  is	  expanding	  to	  cover	  more	  gases	  (initially	  limited	  to	  CO2)	  
and	  more	  industrial	  sectors.	  
	  
The	  EU	  ETS	  	  is	  a	  “cap	  and	  trade”	  scheme,	  where	  national	  caps	  are	  established	  for	  each	  
industrial	  installation	  by	  individual	  member	  States,	  in	  line	  with	  their	  Kyoto	  target,	  in	  
‘National	  Allocation	  Plans’.	  The	  use	  of	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  policy	  instruments	  have	  been	  favoured	  
by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  which	  regards	  them	  as	  a	  cost-­‐effective	  and	  flexible	  means	  to	  
meet	  environmental	  imperatives.	  Each	  installation	  is	  allocated	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  
‘allowances’,	  or	  emissions	  rights,	  equivalent	  to	  one	  tonne	  CO2e,	  which	  it	  must	  surrender	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  each	  compliance	  year.	  If	  an	  installation	  has	  emitted	  more	  than	  the	  number	  of	  
allowances	  it	  holds	  in	  the	  registry,	  it	  must	  purchase	  more	  allowances	  from	  the	  market.	  	  
Conversely,	  if	  an	  installation,	  due	  to	  lower	  production	  or	  improved	  processes	  has	  more	  
allowances	  than	  enough	  to	  cover	  for	  its	  actual	  emissions,	  it	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  sell.	  It	  
therefore	  enables	  the	  Kyoto	  targets	  to	  be	  achieved	  at	  least	  cost	  overall	  by	  using	  the	  market.	  
As	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	  these	  type	  of	  transactions	  are	  normally	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  spot	  
and	  derivatives	  markets	  by	  firms	  which	  have	  compliance	  obligations	  under	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  	  
	  
To	  ensure	  its	  robustness,	  effectiveness	  and	  environmental	  integrity,	  the	  trading	  scheme	  
needs	  a	  high	  standard	  of	  compliance	  across	  Europe,	  with	  enforcement	  sanctions	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  financial	  penalties	  to	  operators.13	  The	  scheme	  is	  underpinned	  by	  a	  solid	  registries	  system	  
to	  track	  allowances	  between	  installations	  and	  between	  countries.	  Each	  allowance	  is	  subject	  
to	  a	  verification	  trail	  by	  independent	  third	  parties.	  The	  scheme	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  strict	  
monitoring	  and	  reporting	  requirements	  for	  operators,	  using	  a	  hierarchical	  tier	  system	  of	  
methodologies	  applicable	  to	  specific	  industrial	  processes.14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  	  Since	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  in	  2004,	  the	  new	  Member	  States	  (except	  Malta	  and	  Cyprus)	  ratified	  the	  Kyoto	  
Protocol	  (their	  individual	  targets	  range	  from	  6-­‐8%	  individual	  reductions,	  but	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  burden	  sharing	  
agreement).	  Under	  the	  Burden	  Sharing	  Agreement,	  while	  some	  countries	  have	  accepted	  tough	  reduction	  
targets	  (e.g.	  Austria	  (-­‐13%),	  Denmark	  (-­‐21%)),	  others,	  such	  as	  Portugal,	  Ireland	  and	  Greece	  have	  been	  allowed	  
to	  increase	  their	  emissions	  (e.g.	  Greece	  (+25%)	  and	  Ireland	  (+13)),	  taking	  into	  account	  economic	  growth	  
projections.	  France,	  because	  of	  the	  high	  reliance	  on	  nuclear	  power	  and	  hydro,	  was	  given	  a	  stabilisation	  target	  
(the	  same	  applied	  for	  Finland).	  	  
13	  M	  Pohlmann,	  ‘The	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme’,	  in	  Freestone	  and	  Streck	  (eds.),	  Legal	  Aspects	  of	  Carbon	  
Trading	  (OUP,	  2009	  )	  
14	  Ibid.	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The	  mechanism	  whereby	  allowances	  were	  allocated	  (i.e.	  grandfathered,	  so	  allocated	  for	  
free	  to	  operators	  based	  on	  historical	  emissions)15	  and	  the	  lenient	  caps	  set	  by	  the	  Member	  
States	  have	  led	  to	  the	  over-­‐allocated	  allowances	  to	  operators	  in	  Phase	  I	  (which	  ran	  between	  
2005-­‐2007),	  and	  consequently	  to	  a	  sharp	  fall	  in	  the	  carbon	  prices.16	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  
problem	  of	  over-­‐allocation	  of	  allowances	  from	  re-­‐occurring	  in	  Phase	  II	  (2008-­‐2012)	  -­‐	  which	  
coincides	  with	  Kyoto’s	  first	  commitment	  period	  -­‐	  the	  European	  Commission	  adopted	  a	  much	  
more	  stringent	  approach	  to	  caps	  in	  Phase	  II.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  aggregate	  cap	  for	  the	  second	  
trading	  period	  is	  below	  business	  as	  usual	  emissions,	  rather	  than	  historical	  emissions.17	  	  
	  
As	  part	  of	  the	  third	  climate	  and	  energy	  package	  agreed	  by	  the	  EU	  Council	  in	  December	  
2008,	  the	  EU	  adopted	  a	  Directive	  to	  amend	  the	  ETS	  Directive	  2009/29/EC18,	  with	  the	  view	  of	  
strengthening	  the	  ETS	  rules	  in	  the	  period	  between	  2013-­‐2020.	  The	  EU	  Member	  States	  are	  
the	  only	  countries	  to	  have	  set	  binding	  2020	  targets	  for	  GHG	  emissions	  reductions,	  with	  an	  
overall	  goal	  of	  slashing	  GHG	  emissions	  by	  20%	  by	  2020.	  Moreover,	  the	  EU	  Aviation	  Directive	  
was	  adopted	  in	  November	  2008,	  requiring	  civil	  aviation	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  as	  of	  
January	  2012.19	  	  
	  
The	  EU	  ETS	  amending	  directive	  2009	  abolishes	  the	  notion	  of	  national	  allocation	  plans	  
(NAPs).	  Instead,	  the	  Commission	  sets	  a	  EU-­‐wide	  cap	  for	  particular	  sectors,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  
calculated	  for	  the	  year	  2013	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  average	  annual	  EUA	  allocations	  during	  
Phase	  II.	  Moreover,	  auctioning	  becomes	  the	  main	  allocation	  method	  in	  Phase	  III,	  although	  it	  
will	  be	  introduced	  gradually.20	  Yet,	  in	  recognition	  that	  some	  industries	  might	  be	  in	  risk	  of	  
relocation	  to	  other	  countries	  outside	  the	  EU	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  auctioning	  as	  the	  main	  
method	  of	  allocation,	  allowances	  will	  be	  allocated	  free	  of	  charge	  (i.e.	  grandfathered)	  to	  the	  
installations	  which	  are	  exposed	  to	  serious	  risk	  of	  carbon	  leakage	  (i.e.	  relocation)	  –	  this	  
possibility	  is	  however	  not	  available	  to	  the	  power	  section.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Although	  the	  Directive	  allowed	  in	  principle	  up	  to	  5%	  auctioning	  in	  Phase	  I,	  only	  three	  Member	  States	  have	  
done	  so.	  16	  The	  EU	  ETS	  Directive	  2003/87/EC	  did	  not	  indicate	  how	  many	  emissions	  should	  ultimately	  be	  reduced	  by	  
sector	  in	  each	  Member,	  which	  was	  left	  to	  the	  National	  Allocations	  Plans	  (NAPs).	  It	  thus	  left	  Member	  States	  
with	  ample	  regulatory	  discretion	  in	  setting	  a	  cap	  that	  applies	  to	  their	  industries	  (Art.	  9).	  17Moreover,	  the	  Commission	  allows	  Member	  States’	  operators	  of	  covered	  installations	  to	  form	  a	  pool	  from	  the	  
same	  activity	  and	  to	  jointly	  surrender	  EUAs	  for	  its	  combined	  verified	  emissions	  in	  the	  preceding	  year	  In	  
principle,	  up	  to	  10%	  of	  allowances	  could	  be	  allocated	  through	  auctioning	  in	  Phase	  II	  (Ibid)	  18	  DIRECTIVE	  2009/29/EC	  OF	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  PARLIAMENT	  AND	  OF	  THE	  COUNCIL	  of	  23	  April	  2009	  amending	  
Directive	  2003/87/EC	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  and	  extend	  the	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  allowance	  trading	  scheme	  of	  
the	  Community	  19	  The	  US	  brought	  a	  case	  before	  the	  WTO	  Panels	  against	  the	  Aviation	  Directive	  arguing	  that	  its	  ‘extraterritorial’	  
application	  breaches	  WTO	  law,	  in	  particular	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  most	  favourite	  nation	  (MFN)	  principle.	  
The	  legality	  of	  the	  Directive	  is	  also	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  under	  review	  before	  the	  ECJ.	  On	  the	  WTO	  law	  
principles,	  see	  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm	  (accessed	  on	  13/06/11).	  20	  It	  starts	  in	  2013	  with	  the	  power	  sector	  (electricity	  producers	  and	  CCS	  plants),	  due	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  that	  
sector	  to	  pass	  costs	  on	  to	  energy	  consumers.	  Thus,	  for	  the	  power	  sector	  all	  allowances	  will	  be	  auctioned	  (the	  
Commission	  estimates	  that	  60%	  of	  total	  allowances	  will	  auctioned	  by	  2013).	  This	  is	  to	  gradually	  increased	  to	  
include	  other	  sectors	  (70%	  of	  the	  installations	  covered	  by	  the	  scheme	  in	  2020),	  ‘with	  view	  of	  reaching’	  full	  
auctioning	  in	  2027.	  The	  Commission	  sets	  a	  cap	  on	  the	  total	  allowances	  to	  be	  auctioned	  in	  the	  Member	  States,	  
in	  line	  with	  the	  burden	  sharing	  agreement.	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II.	  Fraud	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  (I):	  Value-­‐added-­‐tax	  (VAT)	  fraud	  	  
2.1.	  Introduction	  
	  
The	  VAT	  regime	  that	  currently	  applies	  to	  the	  trade	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  has	  left	  the	  EU	  
ETS	  open	  to	  exploitation	  by	  criminals	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  VAT	  fraud.	  The	  precise	  domestic	  
rules	  dictating	   the	  amount	  of	  VAT	   that	  allowance	   transfers	  are	   subject	   to,	  as	  well	   as	  how	  
and	  from	  whom	  this	  tax	  is	  collected,	  are	  not	  harmonized	  across	  the	  EU	  and	  therefore	  vary	  
from	   State	   to	   State.	   Many	   European	   countries	   therefore	   currently	   treat	   the	   domestic	  
transfer	   of	   emission	   allowances	   as	   a	   taxable	   supply	   of	   services,	   subject	   to	  VAT.	   All	   cross-­‐
border	   transactions	  between	   EU	   countries	  however	  are	   subject	   to	  0%	  VAT	   (i.e.	   are	   “zero-­‐
rated”).21	  Although	   criminals	   have	   found	  many	   sophisticated	  ways	   to	   exploit	   this	   system,	  
the	  basic	  premise	  behind	  this	  class	  of	  fraud	  is	  the	  same.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  carbon	  trading,	  by	  
buying	  emissions	  allowances	  from	  a	  company	  in	  another	  country	  at	  a	  price	  non-­‐inclusive	  of	  
VAT	  (since	  cross-­‐border	  transactions	  are	  zero-­‐rated),	  selling	  them	  on	  domestically	  at	  a	  price	  
that	   is	   inclusive	   of	   VAT	   and	   disappearing	   before	   surrendering	   this	   VAT	   “profit”	   to	   the	  
treasury	   of	   the	   country	   in	   which	   the	   sale	   was	   made,	   large	   amounts	   of	   money	   can	   be	  
fraudulently	  raised.	  This	  type	  of	  activity	  is	  more	  commonly	  known	  as	  “missing	  trader	  intra-­‐
community”	  (MTIC)	  fraud,	  as	  the	  trader	  (or	  company)	  goes	  missing	  before	  being	  traced	  by	  
the	  authorities	  to	  surrender	  the	  VAT	  that	  they	  owe.	  
	  
Carousel	  fraud	  is	  a	  form	  of	  MTIC	  fraud	  involving	  an	  organized	  group	  of	  fraudulent	  traders	  or	  
companies	   acting	   in	   concert	   to	   augment	   the	   VAT	   that	   can	   be	   fraudulently	   acquired.	   By	  
trading	  emissions	  allowances	  via	  a	  series	  of	  “carousels”	   (see	   figure	  1),	   the	  amount	  of	  VAT	  
that	   can	   be	   fraudulently	   acquired	   is	   multiplied	   each	   time	   the	   allowances	   are	   circulated	  
between	  this	  carousel	  of	  conspirator	  companies.22	  
2.2.	  The	  emergence	  of	  VAT	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS	  
	  
“Missing	   trader	   intra-­‐community”	   (MTIC)	   and	   carousel	   fraud	   have	   historically	   focused	   on	  
mobile	   telephones,	   computer	   chips	  and	  other	  high	  value,	   low	  volume	  goods,	   due	   to	   their	  
ease	  of	   transportation	  and	  the	  high	  VAT	  revenues	  that	  can	  be	  generated	   from	  them.23	  EU	  
emissions	  allowances	  also	  satisfy	  these	  characteristics,	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  this	  
type	  of	  fraud.	  With	  a	  high	  value	  (generally	  reaching	  €10-­‐30)	  and	  no	  physical	  volume	  (being	  
entirely	   electronic),	   emissions	   allowance	   transfers	   can	   be	   completed	   rapidly	   on	   the	   spot	  
market	   (in	   as	   little	   as	   15	  minutes)	  whilst	   avoiding	   the	   cost	   and	  delay	   involved	   in	   physical	  
delivery.24	  As	   a	   result,	   fraudulent	   traders	   can	   transfer	   large	   volumes	   of	   allowances,	   and	  
conduct	   multiple	   “carousels”	   before	   being	   traced	   by	   the	   authorities;	   allowing	   them	   to	  
maximize	  the	  amount	  of	  VAT	  they	  cash	  out.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Keen,	  M.	  and	  S.	  Smith,	  “VAT	  fraud	  and	  evasion:	  what	  do	  we	  know	  and	  what	  can	  be	  done?”	  [2007],	  IMF	  
working	  paper	  WP/07/31,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  New	  York,	  USA.	  	  
22	  ibid	  
23Eurojust,	  “Fraud”	  [2011]	  Eurojust	  News,	  Issue	  No.4,	  July	  2011,	  Eurojust,	  The	  Hague,	  The	  Netherlands.	  
24	  Ainsworth,	  R.,“CO2	  MTIC	  fraud	  –	  technologically	  exploiting	  the	  EU	  VAT	  (again)”,	  [2010],	  Boston	  School	  of	  
Law	  Working	  Paper	  10(01),	  Boston,	  USA	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Figure	  1:	  VAT	  carousel	  fraud	  (adapted	  from	  Keen	  and	  Smith	  2007)	  
	  















	  	  	  
	  









	  	  	  
	  






Buys	  allowances	  at	  VAT-­‐
inclusive	  price	  and	  sells	  them	  on	  
to	  D.	  	  
This	  is	  a	  “buffer	  company”	  that	  




Charges	  VAT	  on	  onward	  
sale	  to	  company	  B,	  and	  
disappears	  before	  having	  
to	  surrender	  it	  to	  national	  
authorities.	  
Company	  D	  
Buys	  allowances	  from	  C	  (or	  
another	  buffer	  company),	  at	  
price	  inclusive	  of	  VAT.	  
Exports	  allowances	  back	  to	  A,	  
at	  a	  VAT-­‐free	  price.	  
D	  then	  claims	  refund	  from	  the	  
national	  treasury	  of	  the	  VAT	  it	  
paid	  on	  purchase,	  but	  did	  not	  
receive	  on	  sale.	  
Company	  A	  
Exports	  allowances	  to	  another	  
Member	  State.	  This	  transaction	  
is	  zero-­‐rated,	  and	  therefore	  
exempt	  from	  VAT.	  
via	  multiple	  buffer	  
companies	  
Member	  State	  A	  (e.g.	  France)	  	  
Member	  State	  B	  (e.g.	  UK)	  	  






VAT	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS	  was	  first	  suspected	  due	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  rise	  in	  EU	  emissions	  
allowance	   (EUA)	   spot	   trading	   volumes	   towards	   the	   end	  of	   2008.	   This	   peaked	  on	   June	  2nd	  
2009,	   when	   a	   record	   19.8	   million	   metric	   tons	   of	   CO2e	   was	   traded	   on	   the	   Bluenext	   spot	  
exchange	  (the	  largest	  carbon	  spot	  exchange	  in	  Europe).25	  Rumours	  that	  these	  volumes	  were	  
being	  driven	  by	  VAT	  carousel	  fraud	  prompted	  Bluenext	  to	  close	  its	  spot	  exchange.26	  Before	  
allowing	  the	  exchange	  to	  reopen,	  the	  French	  authorities	  imposed	  a	  zero-­‐rated	  VAT	  status	  on	  
domestic	   trades	   of	   emissions	   allowances,	   effectively	   blocking	   the	   ability	   of	   fraudsters	   to	  
conduct	  MTIC	  fraud	  in	  France.	  Upon	  reopening	  the	  exchange,	  Bluenext’s	  daily	  spot	  trading	  
volumes	   had	   plummeted	   by	   over	   85%,	   leveling	   out	   at	   roughly	   2.5	  million	   tons	   CO2e	   (see	  
figure	  2.).	  	  
2.3.	  Effects	  of	  VAT	  fraud	  	  
The	   most	   evident	   effects	   of	   VAT	   fraud	   are	   the	   losses	   suffered	   by	   tax	   revenues	   in	   the	  
countries	   in	  which	  goods	  are	  “carouseled”.	   In	   total,	  across	  all	  EU	  Member	  States,	  Europol	  
estimated	   in	   2009	   that	   VAT	   fraud	   on	   the	   EU	   ETS	   had	   thus	   far	   cost	   taxpayers	   roughly	   €5	  
billion. 27 	  This	   figure	   is	   disputed,	   and	   may	   even	   be	   an	   underestimation. 28 	  Although	  
heightened	  spot	  trading	  volumes	  are	  also	  evident	  from	  looking	  at	  pure	  trading	  volume	  data	  
(see	  figure	  2),	  these	  volumes	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  directly	  attributed	  to	  VAT	  fraud.	  Forensic	  
econometric	  techniques	  employed	  by	  Frunza	  et	  al.	   (2010)	  however	  do	  suggest	  that	  during	  
its	  peak	  in	  2009,	  VAT	  carousel	  fraud	  was	  driving	  spot	  trading	  volumes	  as	  much	  as	  ten	  times	  
higher	   than	   would	   have	   normally	   occurred.29	  Their	   research	   found	   that	   these	   inflated	  
trading	   volumes	  were	   having	   a	   distorting	   effect	   on	   the	   carbon	  price	   signal,	  which	   in	   turn	  
could	   have	   compromised	   the	   market’s	   efficiency	   and	   ability	   to	   incentivise	   emissions	  
abatement.	   This	   price-­‐distorting	   effect	   has	   also	   been	   seen	   on	   the	   Italian	   spot	   exchange	  
(GME)	   that,	   during	   suspicious	   surges	   in	   trading	   volume	   in	   2010,	   was	   trading	   EUAs	   at	   a	  
significant	  price	  discount.30	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Rise	  in	  Bluenext	  EUA	  spot	  volume	  driven	  by	  VAT-­‐fraud31	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Bluenext,	  Bluenext	  spot	  volume	  data,	  [2011],	  Bluenext	  exchange	  website,	  [online],	  available	  at:	  
http://data.bluenext.fr/downloads/20110831_BNS_STATS.xls	  
26	  Frunza,	  M.,	  D.	  Guegan	  and	  A.	  Lassoudiere,	  “Missing	  trader	  fraud	  on	  the	  emissions	  market”,	  [2010],	  Journal	  
of	  Financial	  Crime,	  18(2)	  at	  p183	  
27	  Europol,	  “Carbon	  credit	  fraud	  causes	  more	  than	  5	  billions	  euros	  damage	  for	  European	  tax	  payer”,	  [2009],	  
Europol	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr091209.htm	  	  28	  Ainsworth	  [2010],	  above	  n.	  24.	  	  29	  Frunza	  et	  al.	  [2010],	  above	  n.	  27.	  
30	  Reuters,	  “Italian	  bourse	  sees	  surge	  in	  spot	  EU	  carbon	  trades”,	  [2010],	  Reuters	  news	  website,	  [online]	  
available	  at:	  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/11/24/carbon-­‐gme-­‐idUKLDE6AN1VM20101124	  (accessed	  on	  
19	  October	  2011)	  
31	  Data	  from	  Bluenext	  (2011),above	  n.26	  




2.4.	  The	  Reverse	  Charge	  Mechanism	  	  	  
Since	  France’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  zero-­‐rating	  mechanism	  following	  the	  initial	  VAT	  fraud	  scare,	  a	  
number	   of	   other	   Member	   States	   have	   also	   altered	   their	   domestic	   VAT	   treatment	   of	  
emissions	  allowances	  in	  order	  to	  similarly	  block	  VAT	  fraud	  within	  their	  own	  jurisdictions.	  In	  
2009,	  the	  UK	  imposed	  zero-­‐rating	  rules	  on	  domestically	  traded	  emissions	  allowances.32	  The	  
Netherlands	  has	  introduced	  a	  “reverse-­‐charge”	  mechanism,	  whereby	  the	  buyer	  and	  not	  the	  
seller	   is	   responsible	   for	   surrendering	   VAT	   on	   domestically	   traded	   emissions	   allowances.	  	  
Thus,	  a	  reverse	  charge	  system	  obligates	  the	  buyer	  to	  pay	  the	  VAT	  on	  purchased	  allowances	  
directly	  to	  the	  authorities,	  rather	  than	  including	  the	  VAT	  in	  the	  purchase	  price	  and	  leaving	  
the	  seller	  responsible	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  this	  amount	  to	  the	  authorities.	  These	  changes	   in	  
domestic	  VAT	  rules	  have	  effectively	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  VAT	  fraud	  within	  jurisdictions	  containing	  
three	   of	   the	   largest	   emissions	   trading	   exchanges	   in	   Europe;	   Bluenext	   (France),	   Climex	  
(Netherlands)	  and	  ICE	  ECX	  (UK).	  	  
	  
The	  EU	  itself	  has	  also	  taken	  centralized	  action.	  In	  2010,	  revisions	  to	  the	  2006	  VAT	  Directive	  
were	   adopted.	   33 	  These	   revisions	   enabled	   Member	   States	   to	   apply	   a	   reverse	   charge	  
mechanism	   to	   the	   VAT	   treatment	   of	   emissions	   allowances	   (as	   well	   as	   other	   VAT-­‐fraud	  
susceptible	   goods),	   a	   measure	   that,	   if	   implemented	   consistently	   across	   the	   EU,	   would	  
prevent	  the	  possibility	  of	  VAT	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.34	  However,	  this	  Directive	  only	  imposed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  HMRC,	  Revenue	  and	  Customs	  Brief	  46/09,	  [2009],	  HM	  Revenue	  and	  Customs	  website,	  London,	  UK,	  [online]	  
available	  at:	  http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/briefs/vat/brief4609.htm	  
33	  Council	  Directive	  2010/23/EU	  of	  16	  March	  2010	  amending	  Directive	  2006/112/EC	  as	  regards	  an	  optional	  and	  
temporary	  application	  of	  the	  reverse	  charge	  mechanism	  in	  relation	  to	  supplies	  of	  certain	  services	  susceptible	  
to	  fraud.	  
34	  HMRC,	  Reverse	  charge	  on	  specified	  goods	  and	  services,	  [2011],	  HMRC	  manuals,	  VATF44200,	  HM	  Revenue	  
and	  Customs	  website,	  London,	  UK	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals	  
Period	  of	  high	  VAT	  fraud	  	  
Closure	  of	  the	  Bluenext	  exchange	  and	  
Introduction	  of	  zero-­‐rating	  in	  France	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the	  option	  for	  Member	  States	  to	  temporarily	  adopt	  this	  regime.	  Since	  it	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  
April	  2010,	  many	  Member	  States	  have	  failed	  to	  implement	  this	  reverse-­‐charge	  system,	  with	  
Estonia	   flatly	   refusing	   to	   do	   so,	   claiming	   that	   it	   wants	   to	   retain	   simplicity	   in	   its	   taxation	  
system.35	  Many	  other	  Member	  States	  are	  still	  exposed	  to	  the	  use	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  as	  
vehicles	  for	  MTIC	  and	  carousel	  fraud	  within	  their	   jurisdictions	  due	  their	  existing	  VAT	  rules.	  
This	   leaves	   parts	   of	   the	   EU	   carbon	  market	   exposed	   to	   VAT	   fraud,	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   many	  
interviewees	  suggested	  that	  this	  type	  of	  fraud	  is	  still	  viewed	  as	  a	  significant	  problem	  on	  the	  
EU	   ETS. 36 	  The	   Italian	   spot	   exchange	   (Gestore	   Mercati	   Energetici	   (GME))	   for	   example	  
experienced	  a	  suspicious	  surge	  in	  spot	  trading	  volume	  as	  recently	  as	  December	  2010,	  when	  
weekly	   trading	   volumes	   reached	   nearly	   2.8	   million	   compared	   to	   only	   10,000	   the	   year	  
before.37,38	  	  
	  
Although	   it	   is	   tax	   rules	   that	   ultimately	   allow	   for	   MTIC	   fraud	   on	   the	   EU	   ETS,	   there	   are	  
additional	  characteristics	  of	  the	  way	  that	  the	  market	  and	  the	  registries	  are	  run	  that	  facilitate	  
the	  EU	  ETS’s	  vulnerability	   to	  VAT	   fraud.	  Although	  an	   in-­‐depth	  analysis	   of	  VAT	   rules	   is	   not	  
within	  the	  remit	  of	  this	  research,	  this	  paper	  further	  discuss	  how	  reforms	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  
the	  registries	  and	  market	  oversight	  mechanisms	  could	  help	  decrease	  this	  vulnerability	  while	  
we	  wait	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  VAT	  solution	  to	  be	  reached.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Tax	  News,	  “Estonia	  Rejects	  Reverse	  Charge	  Mechanism”,	  [2011],	  Tax	  news	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.tax-­‐news.com/news/Estonia_Rejects_Reverse_Charge_Mechanism____50723.html	  
36	  Stig	  Schjolset,	  Point	  Carbon	  (Norway),	  phone	  interview	  (16.6.2011);	  36	  Anonymous,	  senior	  representative	  of	  
leading	  carbon	  trading	  bank,	  interview	  (07.07.2011)	  
37	  Bloomberg,	  “GME	  Exchange	  in	  Italy	  Halts	  EU	  Carbon	  Trading,	  Cites	  `Abnormal'	  Activity”,	  [2010],	  Bloomberg	  
news	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-­‐12-­‐02/gme-­‐exchange-­‐in-­‐italy-­‐
halts-­‐eu-­‐carbon-­‐trading-­‐cites-­‐abnormal-­‐activity.html	  
38	  Reuters,	  “Italian	  bourse	  sees	  surge	  in	  spot	  EU	  carbon	  trades”,	  [2010],	  Reuters	  news	  website,	  [online]	  
available	  at:	  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/11/24/carbon-­‐gme-­‐idUKLDE6AN1VM20101124	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“Account	   or	   facility	   takeover”	   is	   a	   form	   of	   fraud,	   prevalent	   in	   the	   banking	   and	   credit	  
industries,	   which	   occurs	   when	   a	   fraudster,	   posing	   as	   the	   genuine	   account	   holder,	   gains	  
control	  of	  that	  account	  and	  initiates	  unauthorised	  transactions.	  Access	  is	  usually	  gained	  by	  
“phishing”	   for	   account	   identity	   and	   password	   information,	   this	   can	   be	   done	   by	   simple	  
deceptive	   email	   requests,	   or	   by	   more	   aggressive	   cyber-­‐hacking	   methods39.	   This	   form	   of	  
fraud	  has	  recently	  extended	  to	  facilitate	  the	  fraudulent	  theft	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  from	  
companies’	  EU	  ETS	  registry	  accounts.	  The	   first	   instance	  of	   thefts	  occurred	  on	  28th	   January	  
2010,	   when	   a	   widespread	   phishing	   attack	   hit	   emission	   traders	   in	   Germany.	   “Phishers”	  
posing	   as	   registry	   administrators	   sent	   emails	   to	   thousands	   of	   firms,	   instructing	   registry	  
account	   holders	   to	   disclose	   their	   user	   identification	   numbers	   and	   passwords	   on	   a	   fake	  
registry	  website	  infected	  with	  a	  phishing	  virus.	  The	  fraudsters	  subsequently	  used	  this	  access	  
information	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  accounts	  and	  authorise	  the	  transfer	  of	  emission	  allowances	  to	  
their	  own	  accounts	  from	  which	  they	  could	  be	  traded.	  250,000	  allowances,	  worth	  over	  three	  
million	  euros,	  were	  allegedly	  stolen	  from	  six	  German	  companies	  in	  this	  way.40	  41	  
	  
A	  second	  instance	  of	  more	  sophisticated	  hacking	  attempts	  followed	  in	  late	  2010-­‐early	  2011	  
(see	   table	   1).	   In	   November	   2010,	   allowances	   were	   stolen	   from	   accounts	   in	   both	   the	  
Romanian	  and	  Italian	  registries.	  In	  January	  2011,	  accounts	  in	  the	  Austrian,	  Czech	  and	  Greek	  
registries	   were	   also	   fraudulently	   accessed,	   resulting	   in	   the	   theft	   of	   over	   two	   million	  
allowances.	  The	  European	  Commission	  reacted	  by	  suspending	  spot-­‐trading	  from	  accounts	  in	  
all	   national	   registries	   on	   19th	   January	   2011. 42 	  Registries	   were	   then	   only	   permitted	   to	  
reactivate	  once	  they	  were	  able	  to	  prove	  that	  they	  met	  minimum	  security	  standards.	  Some	  
registries	  took	  months	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  only	  opened	  again	  in	  mid-­‐April	  2011.	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Allowances	  stolen	  via	  registry	  hacks	  (late	  2010/	  early	  2011)	  
National	   registry	  
targeted	  






Date	  	   Number	   of	  
allowances	  
returned	   or	  
traced*	  






Lichtenstein)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Serious	  Fraud	  Office	  (2011)	  Taxonomy	  of	  Fraud,	  Serious	  Fraud	  Office	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
www.sfo.gov.uk/taxonomy	  .swf	  
40	  BBC	  news,	  “Phishing	  attack	  nets	  three	  million	  euros	  of	  carbon	  permits”,	  [2010],	  BBC	  news	  website,	  [online]	  
available	  at:	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/8497129.stm	  
41	  The	  Guardian,	  “Carbon	  trading	  fraudsters	  steal	  permits	  worth	  £2.7m	  in	  'phishing'	  scam”,	  [2010],	  The	  
Guardian	  news	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/04/carbon-­‐trading-­‐fraudsters-­‐steal-­‐permits	  
42	  European	  Commission,	  “Announcement	  of	  transitional	  measures:	  the	  EU	  ETS	  registry	  system”,	  [2011],	  
European	  Commission	  Climate	  Action	  News	  Archive,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011011901_en.htm	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Italy	   267,911	   TCEI	   24th	  
November	  
2010	  
[figures	   not	  
available]	  





















Greece	   300,000	   Halyps	   18th	   January	  
2011	  
[figures	   not	  
available]	  
*	  Indicates	  that	  figures	  may	  not	  be	  exact.	  	  
The	  figures	  are	  according	  to	  lists	  published	  by:	  the	  Greek	  registry	  (2011),	  (Czech	  registry,	  
2011);	  (Italian	  registry,	  2011);	  (Austrian	  registry,	  2011);	  and	  	  (Dutch	  emissions	  authority	  
(NEA,	  2011).	  
3.2.	  Direct	  financial	  impacts	  and	  risks	  of	  allowance	  thefts	  	  
The	  number	  of	  emissions	  allowances	   stolen	   (approx.	  3	  million)	   represents	  only	  0.003%	  of	  
the	  total	  number	  allocated	  (approx.	  2	  billion),	  and	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  accounts	  of	  only	  a	  
handful	   of	   companies.	   Thus,	   the	   direct	   financial	   implications	   of	   the	   thefts	   were	   not	   very	  
significant	   to	   the	   market	   as	   a	   whole,	   but	   localised	   to	   a	   few	   unfortunate	   individuals.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  financial	  effects	  of	  the	  thefts	  have	  been	  ameliorated	  for	  some	  of	  the	  firms	  
targeted,	   as	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   allowances	   have	   been	   identified	   and	   returned	   to	   their	  
original	  owners	  (see	  table	  1).	  This	  was	  the	  case	  for	  the	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  allowances	  
stolen	   from	   the	   Austrian	   registry,	   all	   of	   which	   were	   quickly	   traced	   to	   accounts	   in	  
Lichtenstein	   and	   Sweden,	   and	   frozen	  within	   these	   accounts	   before	   being	   returned	   to	   the	  
Austrian	   registry.43	  44	  Tracing	   and	   returning	   stolen	   allowances	   has	   been	   difficult	   in	   many	  
other	  cases	  however	  due	  to	  the	  elaborate	  onward	  transfers	  used	  by	  the	  criminals	  involved.	  
By	   splitting	   up	   blocks	   of	   stolen	   allowances	   and	   subjecting	   them	   to	   a	   chain	   of	   complex	  
transactions,	  these	  goods	  can	  become	  infiltrated	  within	  the	  system	  and	  thus	  very	  difficult	  to	  
trace.45	  Although	  the	  publication	  of	   lists	  of	  serial	  numbers	   (the	  unique	  numeric	  unit	  codes	  
associated	   with	   individual	   allowances)	   of	   supposedly	   stolen	   allowances	   by	   both	   victim	  
companies46	  and	  national	  registries	  47	  48	  has	  helped	  efforts	  to	  trace	  and	  return	  them	  to	  their	  
original	  owners,	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  remain	  unaccounted	  for	  and	  are	  still	  in	  circulation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Bloomberg,	  “Austria	  asks	  Sweden	  to	  return	  carbon	  permits	  worth	  $3.9	  million”,	  [2011],	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-­‐02-­‐02/austria-­‐asks-­‐sweden-­‐to-­‐help-­‐return-­‐3-­‐9-­‐million-­‐of-­‐stolen-­‐
carbon-­‐permits.html	  
44	  Emissions	  Handels	  Register,	  [2011],	  website,	  	  [online}	  available	  at:	  
http://en.emissionshandelsregister.at/register/	  
45	  ibid	  
46	  Holcim,	  “List	  of	  stolen	  allowances”,	  [2010],	  Holcim	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.holcim.ro/fileadmin/templates/RO/doc/EUA_identification_numbers.pdf	  
47	  OTE,	  List	  of	  allowances	  from	  illegal	  transactions	  on	  18th	  January	  2011,	  [2011],	  OTE	  website,	  [online]	  available	  
at:	  http://www.ote-­‐cr.cz/about-­‐ote/file-­‐news/blocks-­‐cz-­‐20110118-­‐public.pdf	  
48	  Note	  that	  these	  are	  lists	  of	  allegedly	  stolen	  allowances,	  and	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  comprehensive	  or	  reliable.	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There	   is	   currently	   no	   comprehensive	   compensation	   regime	   for	   allowances	   stolen	   from	  
registry	   accounts,49	  and	   the	   location	   of	   liability	   for	   the	   consequences	   of	   registry	   security	  
breaches	  remains	  unclear50	  as	  many	  national	  registries	  have	  disclaimers	  freeing	  them	  from	  
any	   liability	   for	   loss	  or	  damage	  that	  might	  be	  suffered	  by	  their	  account	  holders.51	  There	   is	  
therefore	   in	  many	   cases	   currently	  no	  available	   formal	  method	  of	   redress	   for	   the	   financial	  
loss	  suffered	  by	  victims	  of	  security	  breaches.	  	  
	  
In	   addition,	   there	   are	   systemic	  market	   risks	   associated	   with	   stolen	   allowances.	   As	   stolen	  
allowances	   remain	   in	   circulation	   on	   the	   market,	   participants	   are	   at	   risk	   of	   inadvertently	  
purchasing	  them.	  Although	  on	  the	  surface	  this	  risk	  of	  accidental	  purchase	  may	  not	  seem	  like	  
a	   significant	   issue	   as	   the	   European	  Commission	  has	   confirmed	   that	   stolen	   allowances	   are	  
still	  valid	  for	  compliance	  with	  EU	  ETS	  emissions	  obligations;52	  there	  are	  legal	  complications	  
that	  result	   in	  buyers	  of	  these	  allowances	  risking	  both	  financial	   loss	  and	  criminal	  charges	  in	  
certain	   jurisdictions.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   systemic	   risks,	   the	   most	   significant	   impacts	   of	  
allowance	  thefts	  extend	  beyond	  those	  companies	  directly	  targeted	  by	  the	  attacks.	  	  	  
	  
The	  purchase	  of	  stolen	  goods	  can	  result	   in	  the	  purchaser	  not	  having	   legitimate	  ownership	  
rights	   (“good	   title”)	   over	   these	   goods.	   Buying	   on	   a	   market	   in	   which	   stolen	   emissions	  
allowances	   are	   in	   circulation	   carries	   the	   risk	   of	   paying	   for	   allowances	   to	  which	   the	   buyer	  
does	  not	  gain	  good	  title,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  sell	  on.	  As	  a	  result,	  purchasers	  risk	  financial	  
loss	   of	   the	   face	   value	  of	   the	   allowances	   they	  buy	   that	   are	   not	   used	   for	   compliance.	   	   The	  
nature	   of	   these	   risks	   varies	   however	   between	   Member	   States,	   as	   the	   law	   applicable	   to	  
stolen	  goods,	  emissions	  allowances	  (see	  table	  2)	  and	  the	  acquisition	  of	  good	  title	  is	  complex	  
and	  is	  not	  harmonised	  across	  the	  EU.	  In	  the	  UK	  for	  example,	  laws	  surrounding	  the	  handling	  
of	  stolen	  goods	  mean	  that	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  purchase	  has	  been	  made	  in	  good	  faith	  
with	   no	   knowledge	   of	   the	   stolen	   nature	   of	   that	   purchased	   good,	   good	   title	   cannot	   be	  
acquired	   if	   it	   is	   found	   to	   be	   stolen,	   and	   also	   risk	   facing	   criminal	   charges.53	  54	  In	   contrast,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Although	  victims	  of	  the	  attack	  on	  the	  Czech	  Registry	  have	  been	  demanding	  compensation	  from	  the	  company	  
responsible	  for	  the	  administration	  of	  this	  registry	  for	  their	  negligence	  in	  implementing	  security	  measures:	  
Bloomberg,	  “CEZ,	  Blackstone	  may	  get	  Czech	  paybacks	  for	  stolen	  CO2	  permits”,	  [2011],	  Bloomberg	  news	  
website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-­‐02-­‐16/cez-­‐blackstone-­‐may-­‐get-­‐czech-­‐
compensation-­‐for-­‐stolen-­‐emission-­‐permits.html	  
50	  Wemaeres,	  M.,	  “Fraud	  in	  the	  EU	  emissions	  trading	  scheme:	  a	  number	  of	  legal	  questions	  are	  still	  pending”,	  
[2011],	  Tendances	  Carbone,	  No57	  
51	  For	  example	  the	  UK	  Registry’s	  disclaimer	  includes	  the	  statement:	  “In	  no	  event	  do	  we	  accept	  any	  liability	  
whatsoever	  for	  any	  loss	  or	  damage	  (financial	  or	  otherwise)	  including,	  without	  limitation,	  indirect	  or	  
consequential	  loss	  or	  damage,	  or	  any	  loss	  or	  damages	  whatsoever	  arising	  from	  use	  of	  data	  derived	  from	  this	  
website.	  It	  is	  always	  wise	  for	  you	  to	  run	  an	  anti-­‐virus	  program	  on	  all	  material	  downloaded	  from	  the	  Internet.	  
We	  cannot	  accept	  any	  responsibility	  for	  any	  loss,	  disruption	  or	  damage	  to	  your	  data	  or	  computer	  system	  which	  
may	  occur	  whilst	  using	  material	  derived	  from	  this	  website.”	  [available	  at	  
http://etr.defra.gov.uk/Web_TsAndCs.asp].	  
52	  Delbeke,	  J.,	  “Statement	  on	  the	  recent	  incident	  of	  unauthorised	  access	  to	  EU	  ETS	  registry	  accounts	  in	  
Romania,	  Statement	  made	  by	  Director-­‐General,	  DG	  Climate	  Action”,	  [2011],	  European	  Commission	  website,	  
[online]	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/	  
53	  Holman	  Fenwick	  Willan,	  “Are	  you	  a	  victim	  of	  stolen	  carbon	  credits?”,	  [2011],	  Client	  Briefings,	  Holman	  
Fenwick	  Willan	  website,	  London,	  UK,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.hfw.com/publications/client-­‐
briefings/are-­‐you-­‐a-­‐victim-­‐of-­‐stolen-­‐carbon-­‐credits	  
54	  IETA,	  “IETA	  position	  paper	  on	  Registry	  Security	  as	  response	  to	  EU	  stakeholder	  meeting	  on	  15th	  March	  2011	  
on	  registry	  security”,	  [2011],	  IETA	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  	  https://ieta.org	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German	   law	   recognises	   the	   acquisition	  of	   good	   title	   to	   stolen	   goods	   if	   purchased	   in	   good	  
faith.	  Due	   to	   these	  discrepancies,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  examine	   the	   individual	  Member	  State	  
jurisdiction	  in	  which	  the	  transaction	  is	  being	  made	  when	  determining	  the	  specific	  status	  of	  
stolen	   allowances	   and	   the	   liabilities	   attached	   with	   inadvertently	   handling	   them.	   Many	  
Member	  States’	  national	   laws	  however	  do	  not	  directly	  address	  the	  specific	   legal	  nature	  of	  
emissions	   allowances	   (see	   table	   2).55	  This	   leaves	   the	   accurate	   assessment	   of	   the	   risks	  
involved	  in	  market	  participation	  a	  difficult	  one	  to	  make.	  	  
	  
The	   legal	   implications	  of	  buying	  stolen	  allowances	  would	  of	  course	  be	  avoidable	   if	   it	  were	  
possible	   to	   affirm	   that	   allowances	   have	   not	   been	   stolen	   prior	   to	   their	   purchase.	  Multiple	  
decentralised	   lists	   exist	   identifying	  allegedly	   stolen	   allowances.	   These	   have	   been	   used	   by	  
some	   exchanges	   and	   services	   companies	   to	   create	   short-­‐term	   solutions	   to	   help	   market	  
participants	   protect	   themselves	   from	   the	   legal	   risks	   involved	  with	   participating	   in	   the	   EU	  
ETS.	  For	  example	  in	  May	  2011	  the	  BlueNext	  exchange	  opened	  a	  ‘safe	  trading	  zone’,	  in	  which	  
only	  allowances	  that	  have	  had	  their	  chain	  of	  title	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  source	  of	  issuance	  and	  
verified	   not	   to	   have	   been	   stolen	   can	   be	   traded.56	  The	   creation	   of	   this	   “verified	   spot”	   has	  
helped	   the	   recovery	   of	   confidence	   in	   the	   spot	   market	   to	   some	   extent.57	  58	  The	   market	  
analyst	  company	  Tschach	  Solutions	  also	  offer	  an	  ‘allocation	  identifier	  tool’	  which	  claims	  to	  
enable	   companies	   to	   identify	   allowances	   that	   were	   part	   of	   their	   counterparty’s	   initial	  
allocation	   (if	   trading	   with	   a	   firm	   with	   compliance	   obligations).	   These	   allowances	   carry	   a	  
greatly	  reduced	  risk	  of	  having	  been	  stolen	  as,	  if	  they	  are	  still	  in	  the	  account	  of	  the	  firm	  they	  
were	  initially	  allocated	  to,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  they	  have	  ever	  been	  traded.59	  Although	  these	  tools	  
provide	  useful	  ways	  in	  which	  trading	  entities	  can	  manage	  their	  market	  participation	  risks	  to	  
some	   extent,	   they	   come	   at	   a	   cost	   and	   by	   no	  means	   represent	   long-­‐term	   comprehensive	  
solutions	  to	  protect	  the	  market	  from	  the	  confidence-­‐disabling	  impacts	  of	  allowance	  thefts.	  	  
	  
The	  disclaimers	  surrounding	  lists	  of	  allegedly	  stolen	  allowances	  and	  associated	  tools	  suggest	  
that	   they	  are	  not	  entirely	   reliable.	  As	  criminal	   investigations	  are	  yet	   to	  be	  completed,	   the	  
European	   Commission	   itself	   has	   not	   published	   a	   central	   and	   official	   resource	  with	   which	  
participants	   can	   easily	   and	   assuredly	   identify	   stolen	   allowances.	   Furthermore,	   as	   there	   is	  
currently	   no	   comprehensive	   regime	   in	   place	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	   losses	   suffered	   by	  
inadvertent	   purchasers	   of	   stolen	   allowances,	   this	   anonymity	   of	   stolen	   allowances,	  means	  
that,	  as	  recognised	  by	  the	  International	  Emissions	  Trading	  Association	  (IETA)	  ‘the	  law	  does	  
not	  protect	  you	  and	  you	  can	  not	  protect	  yourself’.60	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  IETA,	  “IETA	  position	  on	  market	  disruptive	  impacts	  of	  stolen	  allowances	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS”,	  [2011],	  IETA	  website,	  
[online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.ieta.org/	  
56	  BlueNext,	  [2011],	  The	  Safe	  Harbour	  InitiativeTM	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://safe-­‐harbour-­‐
initiative.com	  
57	  Point	  Carbon,	  “Spot	  EUA	  discount	  to	  futures	  plummets	  on	  new	  safeguards”,	  [2011],	  Point	  Carbon	  news	  
website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1533192	  
58	  Point	  Carbon,	  “Five	  Firms	  pledge	  to	  kickstart	  BlueNext	  spot	  trade”,	  [2011],	  Point	  Carbon	  news	  website,	  
[online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1529373	  
59	  Tschach	  Solutions,	  “Allocation	  Identifier	  –	  Enable	  your	  company	  for	  Spot	  Trading	  by	  reducing	  your	  risk	  to	  
accept	  stolen	  EUAs”,	  	  [2011],	  Tschach	  Solutions	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.tschach-­‐
solutions.com/products/tools/allocation-­‐identifier/	  
60	  ibid	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In	  addition,	  there	  are	  reputational	  risks	  which	  may	  ensue	  from	  participating	  in	  a	  
market	  in	  which	  stolen	  allowances	  are	  circulating.	  Firms	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  
possession	  of	  stolen	  allowances,	  as	  this	  could	  taint	  their	  corporate	  image.	  This	  
reputational	  effect	  is	  arguably	  more	  important	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany,	  in	  
which	  there	  are	  no	  well	  defined	  criminal	  liabilities	  and	  financial	  risks	  attached	  to	  the	  
purchase	  of	  stolen	  allowances.61	  
	  



















3.3.	  Impacts	  of	  allowance	  thefts	  on	  market	  confidence,	  trading	  volumes	  and	  
liquidity	  	  
	  
The	  inability	  of	  market	  players	  to	  accurately	  evaluate	  or	  avoid	  the	  risks	  of	  trading	  on	  the	  EU	  
ETS	   has	   had	   a	   crippling	   effect	   on	   market	   confidence	   and	   trading	   volumes	   on	   the	   spot	  
market.63	  Following	  the	  allowance	  thefts	  of	  early	  2011,	  the	  closure	  of	  national	  registries	  and	  
spot	  exchanges	  inhibited	  all	  spot	  transactions	  from	  taking	  place.	  But	  even	  after	  all	  registries	  
had	   re-­‐opened,	   trading	  volumes	   failed	   to	   recover	   fully.	   In	  August	  2011,	   four	  months	  after	  
the	   complete	   reopening	  of	   the	   registries,	   the	  BlueNext	   spot	   exchange	  daily	   trade	   volume	  
had	   levelled	   out	   to	   roughly	   200	   KT/day	   (after	   a	   peak	   in	   volume	   around	   the	   April	   30th	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011);	  And	  anonymous,	  Associate,	  Leading	  London	  law	  firm,	  
interview	  (21.07.2011)	  
62	  Data	  sourced	  from:	  Prada,	  M.,	  “The	  regulation	  of	  CO2	  markets:	  Assignment	  report	  by	  Michel	  Prada,	  Emeritus	  
General	  Inspector	  of	  Finance”,	  [2010],	  Paris,	  France.	  
63	  Anonymous,	  senior	  representative	  of	  leading	  carbon	  trading	  bank,	  interview	  (07.07.2011)	  
Country	   Allowance	  definition	  
UK	   Undefined	  	  
Germany	   Undefined,	  	  
but	  specified	  as	  not	  being	  securities	  
Bulgaria	   Undefined	  
Estonia	   Undefined	  
Finland	   Undefined	  
Ireland	   Undefined	  
Italy	   Undefined	  
Lithuania	   Undefined	  
Poland	   Undefined	  
Slovakia	   Undefined	  
Slovenia	   Undefined	  
Sweden	   Undefined	  
Belgium	   Administrative	  rights	  
Greece	   Administrative	  rights	  
Romania	   Financial	  instruments	  
Austria	   Property	  
Denmark	   Property	  
Spain	   Property	  
Netherlands	   Property	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compliance	  date),	  compared	  to	  the	  near	  800KT/day	  figure	  the	  exchange	  was	  functioning	  at	  
prior	   to	   the	   thefts	   (see	   figure	   3).64	  This	   decreased	   liquidity	   is	   estimated	   to	   have	   cost	   the	  
market	  €110	  million.65	  
	  
The	  blow	  to	  spot	  market	  confidence	  is	  suspected	  to	  have	  been	  most	  marked	  in	  the	  trading	  
behaviour	   of	   firms	   that	   participate	   for	   purely	   financial	   rather	   than	   compliance	   reasons.	  
Compliance	   firms	   could	   still	   use	   purchased	   stolen	   allowances	   for	   compliance	   purposes,	  66	  	  
and	   therefore	   are	   less	   at	   risk	   of	   financial	   loss.	   Some	   banks,	   such	   as	   Barclays	   Capital,	  
withdrew	   completely	   from	   spot	  market	   trading	   following	   the	   allowance	   thefts	   of	   January	  
2011.67	  When	   they	   re-­‐joined	   the	   market,	   Barclays	   limited	   their	   spot	   trading	   activity	   to	  
bilateral	   trades	   with	   compliance	   companies	   of	   initially	   allocated	   allowances,	   and	   did	   not	  
take	  delivery	   from	  any	   intermediaries	  or	  exchanges.	  Allowances	   from	  these	  sources	  could	  
be	  sure	  to	  have	  never	  entered	  the	  market	  since	  allocation	  and	  it	  could	  be	  certain	  therefore	  
that	  they	  carried	  no	  liability	  risks.68	  Although	  some	  other	  financial	  trading	  bodies	  continued	  
trading	   spot	   contracts	   in	   a	   similar	   way	   to	   Barclays,	   many	   withdrew	   from	   trading	   spot	  
altogether.69	  	   This	   had	   a	   severe	   impact	   on	   the	   trading	   volume	   and	   liquidity	   of	   the	   spot	  
market.	  
	  
Although	   the	   spot	  market	   only	   accounts	   for	   a	   small	   proportion	   of	   overall	   trading	   volume	  
(approx.	   10-­‐20%)	   on	   the	   EU	   carbon	  market,	   its	   importance	  must	   not	   be	   underestimated.	  
According	   to	   Konrad	   Handschmidt,	   analyst	   at	   Bloomberg	   New	   Energy	   Finance,	   the	   spot	  
market	   is	   an	   important	   tool	   for	   firms	   with	   compliance	   obligations	   under	   the	   EU	   ETS,	  
especially	   small	   industrial	   players.	   Trading	   spot	   allows	   these	   firms	   to	   quickly	   sell	   or	   buy	  
emissions	  allowances	  to	  meet	  their	  compliance	  obligations,	  or	  cash	  in	  excess	  allowances.70	  
71	  	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   risks	   within	   the	   spot	   market	   threaten	   to	   spill	   over	   into	   other	   market	  
segments.	   The	   spot	   market	   is	   not	   completely	   isolated	   from	   the	   futures	   market.	   Futures	  
contracts	  are	  settled	  by	  spot	  transactions	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  delivery	  dates	  specified	  in	  the	  
contract	  (these	  delivery	  dates	  tend	  to	  be	  in	  March	  or	  December).	  If	  the	  systemic	  risks	  within	  
the	  spot	  market	  are	  not	  resolved	  by	  the	  approaching	  December	  2011	  delivery	  date,	  market	  
confidence	   effects	  may	   be	   seen	   to	   spread	   onto	   the	   futures	  market.72	  73	  This	   spillover	   has	  
already	   become	   apparent	   in	   the	   uneconomic	   spread	   between	   December	   2011	   and	  
December	  2012	  contracts.	  Out	  of	  concern	  about	  the	  residual	   liability	  risks	  associated	  with	  
stolen	  allowances	  that	  may	  still	  be	   in	  circulation	   in	  December	  2011,	  traders	  are	   looking	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Stig	  Schjolset,	  Point	  Carbon	  (Norway),	  phone	  interview	  (16.6.2011)	  
65	  Point	  Carbon,	  “EU	  carbon	  registries	  reopen	  after	  recent	  hacking	  attacks”,	  [2011],	  Point	  Carbon	  news	  
website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.1503820	  
66	  As	  confirmed	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  see	  Delbeke	  (2011),	  above	  n.55	  
67	  Financial	  Times,	  “EU	  spot	  carbon	  market	  set	  for	  partial	  restart”,	  [2011],	  Financial	  Times	  website,	  [online]	  
available	  at	  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c5d1392e-­‐2efa-­‐11e0-­‐88ec-­‐00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1P9fZ5h9t	  
68	  Anonymous,	  senior	  representative	  of	  leading	  carbon	  trading	  bank,	  interview	  (07.07.2011)	  
69	  ibid	  
70	  Ellerman,	  2010,	  supra	  n.	  5.	  
71	  Konrad	  Hanschmidt,	  Bloomberg	  New	  Energy	  Finance,	  interview	  (15.06.2011)	  
72	  Reuters,	  “Slim	  pickings	  in	  ‘dead’	  carbon	  market”,	  [2011],	  Reuters	  news	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/02/us-­‐carbon-­‐eu-­‐idUSTRE7214JK20110302	  
73	  Anonymous,	  Emissions	  exchange	  representative,	  interview	  (05.07.2011)	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sell	  these	  futures	  contracts	  and	  in	  turn	  buy	  December	  2012	  contracts.	  This	  shift	  in	  demand	  
has	   caused	   the	   spread	  between	  December	   2011	   and	  December	   2012	   contracts	   to	  widen,	  
with	  the	  value	  of	  the	  former	  depreciating	  due	  to	  the	  fear	  of	  remaining	  legal	  risks.74	  As	  trade	  
in	  futures	  contracts	  represents	  approximately	  80-­‐90%	  of	  market	  trading	  volume	  on	  the	  EU	  
ETS,	   this	   spill-­‐over	   effect	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   result	   in	   wider	   reaching	   impacts	   than	  
experienced	  so	  far.	  
	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Anonymous,	  Senior	  representative	  of	  leading	  carbon	  trading	  bank,	  interview	  (07.07.2011)	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Figure	  3:	  Decreased	  spot	  market	  volume	  on	  the	  Bluenext	  spot	  exchange	  following	  allowance	  
thefts75	  	  
3.4.	  Common	  impacts	  of	  VAT	  fraud	  and	  allowances	  theft	  on	  the	  EU	  carbon	  markets	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Data	  sourced	  from:	  Bluenext,	  Bluenext	  spot	  volume	  data,	  [2011],	  Bluenext	  exchange	  website,	  [online],	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The	  impacts	  of	  both	  VAT	  fraud	  and	  emissions	  allowance	  thefts	  have	  extended	  beyond	  those	  
directly	  involved	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  market.	  General	  public	  confidence	  in	  emissions	  trading	  as	  an	  
efficient	   and	   appropriate	   policy	   tool	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   elsewhere	   has	   also	   suffered.	   Stig	  
Schjolset,	   of	   Point	   Carbon,	   stated	   that	   recent	   allowance	   thefts	   ‘have	   had	   an	   extremely	  
negative	  impact	  on	  the	  public	  perception	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS’.76	  Similarly,	  referring	  to	  the	  effects	  
of	   VAT	   fraud,	  Mr	  Wainright,	   Director	   of	   Europol	   suggests	   that	   ‘[t]hese	   criminal	   activities	  
endanger	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  Emission	  Trading	  System…’.77	  	  
	  
Although	   neither	   VAT	   fraud,	   nor	   emissions	   allowance	   thefts	   have	   directly	   affected	   the	  
environmental	   integrity	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS,	   as	   they	   have	   not	   changed	   the	   total	   number	   of	  
emissions	  allowances	  in	  the	  system,	  they	  have	  had	  negative	  impacts	  both	  on	  the	  functioning	  
of	  the	  trading	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  general	  confidence	  in	  it	  as	  an	  appropriate	  emissions	  
reduction	  tool.	  It	  is	  therefore	  integral	  to	  the	  future	  functioning	  and	  public	  support	  of	  the	  EU	  
ETS	  that	  the	  weaknesses	  that	   leave	  this	  market	  open	  to	  fraud	  are	  appropriately	  tackled	   in	  
regulation.	  	  
IV.	  EU	  ETS	  Fraud	  (III)	  -­‐	  CER	  Recycling	  and	  Market	  Abuse	  	  
Another	  major	  instance	  of	  fraud	  to	  have	  hit	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market	  over	  the	  past	  two	  years	  
was	  the	  recycling	  of	  Certified	  Emission	  Reduction	  units	  (CERs).78	  This	  occurred	  in	  March	  
2010	  when	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  converted	  1.7	  million	  tonnes	  worth	  of	  CERs	  that	  had	  
already	  been	  surrendered	  for	  compliance	  by	  Hungarian	  installations,	  into	  Assigned	  Amount	  
Units	  (AAUs).79	  They	  then	  legitimately	  sold	  these	  AAUs	  on	  the	  international	  market.	  
Although	  these	  “resold”	  credits	  were	  valid	  for	  use	  internationally	  for	  Kyoto	  compliance,	  they	  
remained	  invalid	  when	  subsequently	  re-­‐sold	  onto	  the	  EU	  market	  as	  they	  had	  already	  been	  
surrendered	  for	  EU	  ETS	  compliance.80	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  sale	  by	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  achieved	  legitimately	  under	  EU	  ETS	  
legislation,	  and	  is	  itself	  not	  technically	  a	  form	  of	  fraud,	  these	  surrendered	  credits	  were	  not	  
supposed	  to	  re-­‐enter	  the	  market.	  There	  was	  nothing	  physically	  stopping	  them	  doing	  so	  
however	  and	  when	  they	  did,	  EU	  market	  players	  were	  put	  at	  risk	  of	  inadvertently	  buying	  
worthless	  “recycled”	  CERs	  that	  would	  be	  invalid	  for	  compliance	  use.81	  The	  presence	  of	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Stig	  Schjolset,	  Point	  Carbon	  (Norway),	  phone	  interview	  (16.06.2011)	  
77	  Europol,	  “Carbon	  credit	  fraud	  causes	  more	  than	  5	  billions	  euros	  damage	  for	  European	  tax	  payer”,	  [2009],	  
Europol	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr091209.htm	  	  
78	  Certified	  Emission	  Reductions	  (CERs)	  are	  a	  type	  of	  emissions	  unit	  (or	  carbon	  credits)	  issued	  by	  the	  Clean	  
Development	  Mechanism	  (CDM)	  Executive	  Board	  for	  emission	  reductions	  achieved	  by	  CDM	  projects	  in	  non-­‐
Annex	  I	  countries,	  and	  verified	  by	  a	  DOE	  under	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  CERs	  can	  be	  used	  by	  Annex	  1	  
countries	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  their	  emission	  limitation	  targets	  or	  by	  operators	  of	  installations	  covered	  by	  
the	  European	  Union	  Emission	  Trading	  Scheme	  (EU	  ETS)	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  their	  obligations	  to	  surrender	  
EU	  Allowances,	  CERs	  or	  Emission	  Reduction	  Units	  (ERUs)	  for	  the	  CO2	  emissions	  of	  their	  installations.	  
79An	  Assigned	  Amount	  Unit	  (AAU)	  is	  a	  tradable	  'Kyoto	  unit'	  or	  'carbon	  credit'	  representing	  an	  allowance	  to	  
emit	  greenhouse	  gases	  comprising	  one	  metric	  tonne	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  equivalents	  calculated	  using	  their	  
Global	  Warming	  Potential.	  Assigned	  Amount	  Units	  are	  issued	  up	  to	  the	  level	  of	  initial	  "assigned	  amount"	  of	  an	  
Annex	  1	  Party	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  
80	  Prada,	  2010;	  above	  n.	  65	  	  81	  Ibid	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risk	  had	  a	  damaging	  effect	  on	  market	  confidence,	  and	  the	  “double-­‐counting”	  of	  emissions	  
damaged	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  as	  an	  emissions	  reduction	  tool.82	  	  
	  
To	  block	  a	  repeat	  of	  this	  type	  of	  activity,	  the	  European	  Commission	  reacted	  quickly,	  
amending	  the	  Registries	  Regulation	  to	  include	  provisions	  that	  required	  surrendered	  CERs	  be	  
immediately	  retired	  and	  prevented	  their	  sale	  outside	  of	  the	  EU.	  This	  in	  turn	  prevented	  the	  
recycling	  of	  CERs	  back	  into	  the	  EU	  market.	  CER	  recycling	  is	  therefore	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  a	  
major	  risk	  to	  the	  EU	  ETS.83	  	  
	  
Another	  common	  form	  of	  fraud	  on	  many	  markets	  is	  market	  abuse,	  specifically	  defined	  in	  the	  
Market	  Abuse	  Directive	  (Directive	  2003/6/EC)	  as	  including	  market	  manipulation	  and	  insider	  
dealing.	  Market	  manipulation	  occurs	  when	  a	  market	  player	  acts	  to	  control	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
market’s	  perception	  of	  the	  state	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,	  and	  then	  takes	  a	  position	  to	  exploit	  
the	  resulting	  effect	  on	  price.	  For	  example,	  it	  could	  happen	  by	  a	  market	  participant	  
“squeezing”	  the	  market	  by	  buying	  off	  and	  retaining	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  allowances	  to	  give	  a	  
false	  impression	  of	  scarcity,	  waiting	  for	  prices	  to	  rise	  as	  a	  result,	  and	  selling	  them	  on	  at	  this	  
inflated	  price).84	  According	  to	  Stig	  Schjolset,	  Senior	  Analyst	  at	  Point	  Carbon,	  despite	  initial	  
worries	  when	  the	  market	  was	  set	  up,	  market	  manipulation	  has	  not	  materialised	  as	  a	  major	  
issue	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  Unlike	  in	  the	  electricity	  market,	  no	  operators	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  market	  find	  
themselves	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  from	  which	  to	  easily	  manipulate	  the	  market.	  This	  is	  partly	  
due	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  financials	  in	  the	  market	  greatly	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  market	  
players.	  	  
	  
Another	  type	  of	  market	  abuse	  is	  insider	  dealing,	  which	  happens	  when	  a	  trader	  makes	  
trading	  decisions	  or	  deals	  based	  on	  “inside	  information”.85	  “Inside	  information”	  includes	  
information	  that	  is	  not	  publically	  available	  but	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  an	  affect	  on	  price.86	  John	  
Herbst,	  financial	  services	  Partner	  at	  the	  law	  firm	  Norton	  Rose	  LLP,	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  
what	  would	  actually	  constitute	  inside	  information	  on	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market.	  Compared	  to	  
the	  oil	  market,	  in	  which	  the	  non-­‐public	  knowledge	  of	  the	  shutting	  down	  of	  an	  oil	  rig	  for	  
example	  be	  classified	  as	  inside	  information,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  equivalent	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  
	  
Market	  abuse	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  currently	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	  assess	  the	  real	  risk	  of	  market	  abuse	  in	  a	  market.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  ETS	  has	  not	  yet	  
been	  subject	  to	  significant	  market	  abuse	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  this	  happening	  in	  
the	  future	  is	  not	  real.	  As	  the	  market	  grows	  in	  value,	  and	  attracts	  larger	  financial	  players	  such	  
as	  hedge	  funds	  and	  pension	  funds,	  the	  risk	  of	  these	  market	  participants	  being	  able	  to	  gain	  
dominance	  and	  market	  manipulation	  power	  increases.87	  Although	  difficult	  to	  assess,	  the	  
market	  should	  be	  appropriately	  protected	  from	  these	  future	  risks.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  The	  Guardian,	  (2010)	  Carbon	  Traders	  Voice	  Fears	  Over	  Recycled	  Carbon	  Credits,	  18	  March	  2010,	  available	  at	  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/mar/17/carbon-­‐traders-­‐recycled-­‐credits	  	  
83	  European	  Commission,	  2010a,	  above	  n.	  11.	  
84	  Prada	  (2010),	  above	  n.65.	  	  
85	  Serious	  Fraud	  Office	  (2011),	  above	  n.41	  
86	  Prada	  (2010),	  above	  n.64.	  
87	  Ibid.	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Since	   neither	   CER	   recycling	   nor	   market	   abuse	   are	   considered	   to	   presently	   pose	   a	   major	  
threat	  to	  the	  EU	  carbon	  markets,	  this	  paper	  will	  not	  discuss	  them	  in	  further	  detail.88	  	  





The	   EU-­‐ETS	   Registries	   keep	   account	   of	   the	   ownership	   of	   emissions	   allowances,	   track	  
allowance	   trade	   transactions,	   as	   well	   as	   record	   the	   verified	   emission	   levels	   of	   individual	  
installations.	  In	  this	  way	  these	  ‘standardised	  electronic	  databases’89	  keep	  track	  of	  both	  the	  
emissions	   compliance	   of	   installations	   covered	   by	   the	   scheme,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   trading	  
activities	   of	   all	   those	   involved	   in	   the	   EU-­‐ETS	   market	   (regardless	   of	   whether	   they	   are	  
compliance,	  financial	  or	  individual	  traders).	  In	  order	  to	  trade	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  a	  
company	   or	   individual	   must	   open	   a	   Registry	   account.90	  The	   rules	   governing	   how	   these	  
Registries	  operate	  are	  therefore	  integral	  in	  determining	  how	  the	  market	  itself	  functions,	  as	  
they	   not	   only	   determine	   who	   can	   gain	   access	   to	   and	   participate	   in	   the	  market,	   but	   also	  
govern	   the	  way	   in	  which	   allowances	   are	   transferred	   between	   accounts.	   Furthermore	   the	  
level	  of	  security	  surrounding	  access	  to	  these	  registry	  accounts	   is	   important	   in	  determining	  
the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  whole	  market	  to	  fraudulent	  activities,	  in	  particular	  allowance	  thefts.	  
These	  rules	  and	  security	  requirements	  are	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  ‘Registries	  Regulation’.91	  This	  piece	  
of	   EU	   legislation	   has	   been	   frequently	   amended,	   and	   there	   is	   currently	   a	   new	  draft	   under	  
scrutiny	  by	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  Council.92	  This	  section	  outlines	  the	  vulnerabilities	  
in	   the	  way	   the	   Registries	   are	   run	   and	   discusses	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   past	   changes	   to	   the	  
Registries	  Regulation.	  
5.2.	  Registry	  account	  open-­‐access:	  fostering	  liquidity	  and	  attracting	  fraud	  in	  the	  
early	  market	  	  
Emissions	   allowances	   are	   not	   real	   physical	   goods,	   but	   represent	   tradable	   dematerialised	  
permits	   that	   exist	   electronically	   and	  have	  been	   created	   entirely	   by	   policy.	  As	   a	   result	   the	  
market	  is	  a	  contained	  one,	  as	  in	  order	  to	  own	  EU	  emissions	  allowances	  one	  needs	  to	  have	  a	  
registry	   account	   in	   which	   to	   electronically	   store	   them.	   Unlike	   other	   commodity	  markets,	  
such	  as	  gold	  or	  cotton,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  that	  emissions	  allowances	  can	  escape	  the	  system,	  as	  
they	  only	  exist	  as	  codes	  within	  registry	  accounts	  and	  can	  only	  be	  traded	  from	  one	  registry	  
account	  to	  another.	  It	  is	  therefore	  impossible	  to	  steal	  emissions	  allowances,	  or	  conduct	  VAT	  
fraud	   without	   a	   registry	   account.	   The	   restrictions	   determining	   those	   who	   can	   open	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  The	  EU	  Market	  Abuse	  Directive	  is	  discussed	  in	  section	  VII	  below,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  financial	  
regulations	  reform.	  
89	  Commission	  Regulation	  920/2010	  of	  7	  October	  2010	  for	  a	  standardised	  and	  secured	  system	  of	  registries	  
pursuant	  to	  Directive	  2003/87/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  Decision	  No	  
280/2004/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council;	  Art	  3.1	  
90	  Unless	  no	  actual	  physical	  delivery	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  occurs	  –	  as	  for	  onward	  traded	  futures	  contracts	  
(see	  box	  4.1.),	  in	  which	  case	  a	  Registry	  account	  is	  not	  required	  (see	  Ellerman	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  above	  n.	  5).	  
91	  Regulation	  920/2010	  
92	  Commission	  DRAFT	  Regulation,	  above	  note	  10.	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account	   are	   therefore	   an	   important	   level	   of	   upstream	   control	   to	   prevent	   fraudsters	   or	  
thieves	  accessing	  the	  market.	  
	  
There	  were	  initially	  very	  few	  barriers	  to	  opening	  a	  registry	  account	  and	  entering	  the	  EU	  ETS	  
market.	  In	  fact,	  Article	  19	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  Directive	  explicitly	  states	  that	  “any	  person	  may	  hold	  
allowances”.93	  An	  account	  can	  easily	  be	  opened	  online	  via	  any	  national	  registry’s	  website.94	  
Under	   the	   2008	   registries	   Regulation,95 	  the	   only	   information	   required	   by	   the	   registry	  
administrator	   was	   the	   name,	   address,	   email	   and	   telephone	   number	   of	   the	   person	  
requesting	  to	  open	  the	  account,	  as	  well	  as	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  identity	  of	  that	  person	  –	  
although	   the	   type	   of	   evidence	   needed	   was	   not	   specified.96	  This	   open-­‐access	   regime	   was	  
initially	   aimed	   at	   fostering	   liquidity	   and	   growth	   in	   the	   nascent	   market,	   unfortunately	  
however,	   the	   associated	   low-­‐level	   minimum	   access	   requirements	   left	   room	   for	   some	  
national	   registries	   to	   be	   particularly	   lax	   in	   the	   “know-­‐your-­‐customer”	   (KYC)	   checks	   they	  
carried	   out	   before	   approving	   account	   applications,	   allowing	   anyone,	   including	   criminals,	  
easy	  access	  to	  the	  market.	  	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  fraud	  over	  the	  past	  couple	  of	  years,	  some	  national	  registries	  have	  
independently	  taken	  action	  to	  improve	  the	  checks	  carried	  out	  on	  their	  account	  holders.	  For	  
example,	  following	  the	  peak	  of	  VAT	  fraud	  activity	  in	  2009,	  the	  Danish	  Registry	  introduced	  a	  
basic	  but	  effective	  check	  by	  asking	  all	  registry	  account	  holders	  the	  simple	  question:	  “what	  is	  
the	   purpose	   of	   you	   holding	   this	   account?”	   They	   only	   received	   answers	   from	   10%	   of	   all	  
account	   holders,	   and	   closed	   down	   the	   accounts	   of	   the	   remaining	   90%.	   Some	   of	   these	  
accounts	  were	  even	   registered	  under	   suspicious	  email	   addresses	   linked	   to	  establishments	  
such	  as	  Chinese	  fast	  food	  restaurants	  and	  Spanish	  garages.97	  Due	  to	  the	  unlikely	  chance	  that	  
such	   outfits	   had	   genuine	   legitimate	   interests	   in	   participating	   in	   the	   EU	   ETS,	   it	   may	   be	  
assumed	  that	  they	  were	  acting	  as	  fronts	  for	  criminal	  activities.	  	  	  
	  
Central	   EU	   action	   to	   tighten	   access	   to	   the	  market	   has	   also	   been	   taken.	   In	   April	   2010	   the	  
registries	  Regulation	  was	  amended	  following	  the	  inclusion	  of	  aviation	  into	  the	  EU	  ETS.98	  The	  
European	  Commission	  used	  this	  revision	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	   introduce	  additional	  registry	  
account	   access	   measures	   within	   the	   registries	   Regulation.	   The	   amendments	   included	  
additional	  minimum	  KYC	   checks,	   requiring	  applicants	   to	  provide	   specific	   types	  of	  proof	  of	  
identity	   in	  order	   to	  open	  an	  account	   (see	   table	  3.),99	  and	  gave	   registry	   administrators	   the	  
power	   to	   close	   accounts	   if	   they	   believed	   account	   holders	   to	   be	   engaging	   in	   suspicious	  
activities,	   or	   if	   they	   failed	   to	   provide	   appropriate	   documentation.100	  These	   new	  minimum	  
access	  requirements	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  October	  2010,	  but	  by	  January	  2011	  they	  had	  been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Commission	  Directive	  2003/87/EC	  of	  13	  October	  2003	  establishing	  a	  scheme	  for	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  
allowance	  trading	  within	  the	  Community	  and	  amending	  Council	  Directive	  96/61/EC	  
94	  European	  Commission,	  “Market	  Oversight,	  Ensuring	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  European	  Carbon	  Market”,	  [2011],	  
European	  Commission	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/oversight_en.htm.	  
95	  Commission	  Regulation	  994/2008	  of	  8	  October	  2008	  for	  a	  standardised	  and	  secured	  system	  of	  registries	  
pursuant	  to	  Directive	  2003/87/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  Decision	  No	  
280/2004/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  
96	  Regulation	  994/2008,	  Annex	  I	  
97	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011)	  
98	  Regulation	  920/2010	  	  
99	  ibid,	  Article	  13	  and	  Annex	  IV	  
100	  ibid,	  Article	  27	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implemented	   by	   only	   half	   of	   the	   national	   registries. 101 	  At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   emissions	  
allowance	  thefts	  of	  2010/11	  it	  was	  therefore	  still	  relatively	  easy	  for	  anyone	  with	  fraudulent	  
motives	  to	  open	  and	  start	  trading	  from	  a	  registry	  account,	  especially	  in	  countries	  with	  more	  
lenient	  requirements.	  
	  
Table	  3.	   :	  Additional	  “know-­‐your-­‐customer”	  checks	  and	  security	   requirements	   introduced	  by	   the	  
2010	  Registries	  Regulation	  (Regulation	  920/2010)	  
5.3.	  Low	  level	  of	  account	  security	  	  
	  
Under	   the	   2008	   registries	   Regulation,	   account	   holders	   or	   authorised	   representatives	   only	  
required	  one	  username	  and	  password	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  their	  registry	  account.102	  No	  further	  
authentication	   was	   required	   to	   initiate	   allowance	   transfers	   to	   other	   accounts.	   When	  
compared	   to	   the	   substantial	   security	   requirements	   on	   financial	   markets,	   or	   even	   online	  
personal	   banking,	   this	   single	   level	   of	   security	   is	   shockingly	   low,	   and	   represented	   a	   small	  
hurdle	   for	   cyber	   hackers	   to	   overcome	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   and	   transfer	   allowances	  
from	  other	  individuals’	  accounts.	  	  	  
	  
Although	   the	   2010	   registries	   Regulation	   amendments	   introduced	   requirements	   for	  
secondary	   authentication	   for	   account	   access	   and	   transaction	   approval,103	  these	   security	  
improvements	  were	  not	  made	  obligatory	  for	  all	  member	  states.	  According	  to	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  
European	  Policy	  Director	  at IETA,	  many	  states	  were	  reluctant	  to	  implement	  the	  security	  up-­‐
scaling,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  costs	  involved.	  	  Some	  further	  justified	  their	  refusal	  to	  implement	  
changes	  by	  claiming	  that	  at	  that	  stage	  only	  Germany	  had	  suffered	  security	  breaches,	  and	  as	  
a	  result	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  all	  states	  to	  implement	  improvements	  if	  they	  were	  not	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Cdc	  climat	  Research,	  “Closing	  the	  door	  to	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU-­‐ETS”,	  [2011],	  Climate	  Brief	  No.	  4	  
102	  Regulation	  994/2008,	  Article	  80(3)	  
103	  Regulation	  920/2010,	  Article	  63.3	  
	  
Additional	  account-­‐holder	  information	  required:	  
VAT	  registration	  number	  and	  country	  code	  (Annex	  IV)	  
	  
Proof	  that	  the	  person	  requesting	  the	  account	  opening	  has	  an	  open	  bank	  account	  in	  
a	  member	  state	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  (Annex	  IV)	  
	  
Evidence	   to	  support	   the	   identity	  of	   the	  person	   requesting	   the	  account	  opening	  –	  
this	  could	  be	  a	  passport	  or	   ID	  card	   issued	  by	  an	  EEA	  state,	  or	  validated	  by	  an	  EU	  
embassy	  (Annex	  IV)	  
	  
Evidence	  to	  support	  address	  of	  permanent	  residence	  of	  account	  holder	  (Annex	  IV)	  	  
	  
The	   Member	   State	   of	   the	   national	   administrator	   may	   also	   require	   that	   those	  
requesting	  the	  account	  opening	  have	  their	  permanent	  residence	  or	  registration	  in	  
the	   member	   state	   of	   the	   national	   administrator	   administering	   the	   account	   (Art	  
13.2.)	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vulnerable. 104 	  However,	   the	   widespread	   vulnerability	   of	   registries	   that	   had	   failed	   to	  
implement	  these	  changes	  was	  soon	  exposed	  during	  the	  run	  of	  allowance	  thefts	  in	  2010/11.	  
	  
Following	   these	   security	   breaches,	   on	   January	   18th	   2011,	   the	   Commission	   suspended	  
transactions	  from	  all	  national	  registries.	  Individual	  registries	  were	  only	  permitted	  to	  re-­‐open	  
once	  they	  had	  proven	  that	  their	  security	  systems	  met	  minimum	  standards.105	  Although	  the	  
precise	   criteria	   of	   these	   standards	  were	   not	  made	   publically	   available,	   it	   is	   known	   that	   a	  
compulsory	  double	  layer	  of	  authentication	  was	  introduced,	  as	  included	  as	  a	  non-­‐compulsory	  
requirement	  in	  the	  2010	  registries	  regulation.106	  Some	  registries	  took	  over	  three	  months	  to	  
come	   back	   on	   line,	   both	   due	   to	   the	   large	   costs	   involved,	   and	   the	   difficulties	   of	   finding	  
appropriate	   auditors	   to	   verify	   compliance	   with	   these	   standards.107 	   108 	  This	   emergency	  
measure	  only	  represents	  a	  short-­‐term	  solution	  and	  official	  legislative	  security	  improvements	  
are	  urgently	  required.	  
5.4.	  A	  decentralised	  system	  
Under	  the	  current	  system,	  each	  Member	  State	  has	  a	  separate	  registry	  run	  and	  administered	  
by	  that	  Member	  State.	  The	  national	  registries	  play	  an	   important	  role	   in	  the	  governance	  of	  
the	   EU	   ETS	   market,	   including	   for	   the	   prevention	   and	   detection	   of	   fraudulent	   activities.	  
Although	   each	   registry	   could	   be	   a	   separate	   target	   for	   criminals,	   fraudulent	   activities	  
conducted	  through	  each	  can	  have	  impacts	  across	  the	  whole	  market.	  	  As	  a	  result	  the	  whole	  
EU	  ETS	  system	  is	  currently	  only	  as	  strong	  as	  its	  weakest	  registry	  link.	  
	  
This	  system	  is	  due	  to	  change	  however.	  The	  revised	  2009	  EU	  ETS	  Directive	  provides	  for	  the	  
centralisation	   of	   national	   Registries	   into	   a	   single	   Union	   Registry	   -­‐	   the	   European	   Union	  
Transaction	  Log	  (EUTL)	  -­‐	  operated	  by	  the	  Commission,	  and	  which	  will	  replace	  the	  individual	  
Member	   States	   registries.109	  This	   revision	   is	   due	   to	   come	   into	   force	   on	   1st	   January	   2013,	  
from	  which	  time	  all	  issued	  allowances	  will	  be	  held	  in	  accounts	  in	  the	  central	  Union	  registry.	  
The	  general	  consensus	  amongst	  interviewees	  is	  that	  this	  will	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  
security	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS.	   According	   to	  Mr	   Schjolset,	   the	  movement	   away	   from	   the	   current	  
decentralised	   system	   will	   prevent	   implementation	   problems	   exemplified	   by	   ‘the	  
cumbersome	   and	   time-­‐consuming	   process	   of	   security	   improvements	   following	   the	  
registries’	  closure	  in	  early	  2011’,	  and	  avoid	  the	  existence	  of	  individual	  registries	  with	  lower	  
security	  levels:	  the	  weak	  links	  that	  have	  so	  far	  been	  the	  main	  targets	  of	  security	  breaches.110	  
	  
Although	  a	  central	  registry	  would	  avoid	  individual	  national	  security	  weaknesses,	  it	  must	  not	  
be	   forgotten	   that	   the	   Union	   registry	   would	   not	   necessarily	   itself	   be	   immune	   to	   cyber	  
attacks.	   Being	   larger	   than	   individual	   national	   registries,	   it	  may	   even	   be	   a	  more	   attractive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011)	  
105	  European	  Commission,	  “Announcement	  of	  transitional	  measures:	  the	  EU	  ETS	  registry	  system”,	  [2011],	  
European	  Commission	  Climate	  Action	  News	  Archive,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011011901_en.htm	  
106	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011)	  
107	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011)	  
108	  Cyprus,	  Lichtenstein,	  Hungary,	  Lithuania	  and	  Malta	  only	  reopened	  on	  the	  20th	  April.	  
109	  Directive	  2009/29/EC	  of	  23	  April	  2009	  amending	  Directive	  2003/87/EC	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  and	  extend	  the	  
greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  allowance	  trading	  scheme	  of	  the	  Community	  
110	  Stig	  Schjolset,	  Point	  Carbon	  (Norway),	  phone	  interview	  (16.06.2011)	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target	  for	  criminals.	  It	  is	  important	  therefore	  that	  high	  security	  standards	  are	  implemented	  
in	  the	  Union	  Registry	  upon	  its	  creation.	  	  
5.5.	  Speed	  of	  allowance	  transfers	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  dematerialised	  nature	  of	  emissions	  allowances,	  transactions	  on	  the	  spot	  market	  
are	   virtually	   immediate	   as	   they	   are	   entirely	   electronic	   and	   there	   is	   no	   need	   for	   actual	  
physical	  transportation.111	  Allowances	  are	  quickly	  transferred	  from	  one	  account	  to	  another,	  
and	  under	  current	  legislation	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  additional	  delay,	  with	  spot	  transactions	  
on	  the	  Bluenext	  exchange	  taking	  roughly	  15	  minutes.112	  Although	  this	  speed	  allows	  for	  rapid	  
and	  liquid	  trade,	  it	  also	  leaves	  the	  spot	  market	  open	  to	  illegitimate	  use.	  Allowances	  can	  be	  
quickly	  stolen	  and	  cashed-­‐out	  before	  the	  theft	  is	  detected,	  and	  transactions	  facilitating	  VAT	  
fraud	   can	   be	   rapidly	   conducted,	   allowing	   multiple	   carousels	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   before	   it	  
comes	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  authorities	  or	  account	  holders.	  	  
5.6.	  Uncoordinated	  response	  to	  security	  breaches	  
The	  sooner	  it	  is	  flagged	  up	  that	  allowances	  have	  been	  stolen,	  their	  serial	  numbers	  identified	  
and	   their	   movement	   frozen,	   the	   shorter	   and	   less	   complex	   the	   chain	   of	   onward	   trades	  
through	  which	   stolen	   allowances	   can	   infiltrate	   the	  market.	  Many	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS	   national	  
registries	  however	  lack	  a	  comprehensive	  protocol	  to	  appropriately	  respond	  to	  the	  detection	  
of	   allowance	   thefts.	   This	   is	   exemplified	   by	   the	   reaction	   to	   the	   theft	   of	   allowances	   from	  
Holcim’s	   account	   in	   the	   Romanian	   registry	   in	   2010.	   Although	   the	   security	   breach	   was	  
identified	  within	   two	  hours,	   it	   took	   a	   long	   time	   for	   the	   authorities	   to	   subsequently	   react.	  
Holcim	   was	   not	   able	   to	   immediately	   contact	   the	   Romanian	   registry,	   as	   the	   registry	  
administrators	  were	  only	  contactable	  between	  9am	  and	  1pm,	  with	  no	  available	  emergency	  
contact	   phone	   number.113	  114	  The	   Czech	   registry’s	   response	   to	   allowance	   thefts	   was	   also	  
allegedly	  delayed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  hours,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  IT	  mechanisms	  within	  the	  registry	  
with	  which	  the	  stolen	  allowances	  could	  be	  quickly	  identified.115	  
	  
Articles	  83	  and	  84	  of	  the	  2008	  registries	  Regulation	  provide	  that	  registry	  administrators	  may	  
suspend	   access	   to	   the	   registry	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   security	   breach.116	  However,	   obligatory	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	   registry	   administrators	   can	  be	   alerted	   to	   security	   breaches	   are	   not	  
required.	   Although	   Article	   60	   of	   the	   2010	   registries	   Regulation	   introduced	   the	   obligation	  
that	   national	   administrators	   provide	   a	   “help	   desk”	   through	  which	   assistance	   and	   support	  
can	  be	  provided	   to	  account	  holders,	   it	  does	  not	   specify	  how	  or	  when	   this	  desk	   should	  be	  
accessible.117	  These	   details	   are	   left	   to	   the	   discretion	   of	   Member	   States,	   allowing	   some	  
registries	   to	   have	   much	   less	   robust	   response	   mechanisms	   than	   others.	   Given	   the	   wider	  
effects	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   such	   breaches,	   there	   is	   an	   evident	   need	   for	   a	   better	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Stig	  Schjolset,	  Point	  Carbon	  (Norway),	  phone	  interview	  (16.06.2011)	  
112	  Ainsworth	  (2010),	  supra	  n.25.	  
113	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011)	  
114	  Romanian	  Emission	  Trading	  Registry	  Secretariat,	  “The	  Romanian	  Emissions	  Trading	  Registry	  Procedures”,	  
[2007],	  Romanian	  Emission	  Trading	  Registry	  Secretariat	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.anpm.ro/files2/Annex%208.2.6_%20-­‐%20Roxmanian%20procedures%20for%20ERT_20095.pdf.	  
115	  ICIS	  Heren,	  “Stolen	  allowances	  still	  missing,	  Polish	  Police	  alerted”,	  [2011],	  ICIS	  Heren	  website,	  [online]	  
available	  at:	  http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2011/01/19/9427602/emissions/edcm/stolen-­‐euas-­‐still-­‐
missing,-­‐polish-­‐police-­‐alerted.html	  (accessed	  on	  19	  October	  2011)	  
116	  Regulation	  994/2008	  
117	  Regulation	  920/2010	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coordination	  and	  speed	  of	  security	  breach	  responses	  across	  the	  whole	  the	  EU	  ETS	  registry	  
system.	   Yet	   as	   discussed	   above,	   in	   Phase	   III	   the	   centralised	   EU	   registry	   will	   prevent	  
uncoordinated	   responses	   to	   security	  breaches	   from	  posing	  a	  problem	   to	   the	  operation	  of	  
the	  trading	  scheme.	  
	  	  
5.7.	  Lack	  of	  legal	  definition	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  and	  comprehensive	  treatment	  
of	  stolen	  allowances	  
Neither	   the	   EU	   ETS	   Directive,	   nor	   the	   2010	   or	   2008	   registries	   Regulations	   clarify	   how	  
allowances	  should	  be	  treated	   legally	   in	  cases	  of	   theft	   (i.e.	  whether	  a	  buyer	  acting	   in	  good	  
faith	  can	  acquire	  good	  title	  to	  originally	  stolen	  allowances).	  Without	  any	  further	  clarification	  
from	   the	   European	  Commission	   these	   issues	   are	   left	   to	   the	   discretion	   of	  Member	   States’	  
jurisdictions.	   The	   resulting	   discrepancies	   have	   created	   confusion	   as	   to	   the	   legal	   risks	   of	  
involvement	   in	   a	   market	   in	   which	   stolen	   allowances	   are	   still	   in	   circulation,	   therefore	  
augmenting	  impacts	  on	  market	  confidence.	  	  
	  
This	   and	   other	   gaps	   in	   the	   existing	   registries	   regulation	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	   call	   for	  
regulatory	  reform	  –	  a	  question	  which	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper.	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Despite	  improvements	  introduced	  in	  the	  2010	  registries	  Regulation,	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  way	  
that	   registries	   are	   run	   and	   the	   way	   allowances	   are	   treated	   remain.	   Although	   security	  
requirements	  have	   increased,	   implementation	  of	   these	  measures	  has	  been	   relatively	   low.	  
Furthermore	  the	  extent	  of	  information	  required	  for	  individuals	  or	  companies	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
open	   an	   account	   remains	   lenient.	   This	   leaves	   the	  market	   exposed	   to	   fraudulent	   account	  
access	   and	   VAT	   fraud.	   Perhaps	   even	  more	   significantly,	   the	   lack	   of	   harmonisation	   of	   the	  
legal	   status	   of	   stolen	   emissions	   allowance	   transfers	   facilitates	   the	   disruptive	   effects	   of	  
circulating	  stolen	  emissions	  allowances.	  
	  
These	  weaknesses	  were	  brought	  to	  into	  harsh	  light	  during	  the	  registry	  attacks	  in	  early	  2011.	  
In	  response	  to	  these	  events	  and	  following	  lobbying	  from	  industry	  associations	  and	  individual	  
stakeholders,	   the	   Commission	   has	   recently	   published	   a	   draft	   Registries	   Regulation.118	  The	  
proposed	   changes	   aim	   to	   help	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   fraud	  on	   the	   EU	  ETS,	   improve	   response	  
mechanisms	  and	  avoid	   the	  market	  disruptive	  effects	  of	   fraud	   (see	   table	  4).	  This	  draft	  was	  
approved	  on	  June	  17th,	  2011	  by	  the	  EU	  Climate	  Change	  Committee,	  but	  awaits	  endorsement	  
from	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council	  before	  it	  can	  be	  adopted.119	  Although	  in	  its	  
current	   form	   the	   draft	   addresses	   many	   important	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   Registries	   system,	  
significant	   problems	   remain.	   The	   main	   provisions	   of	   the	   proposed	   legislation	   will	   be	  
discussed	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
Table	  4.	  The	  main	  provisions	  of	  the	  2011	  draft	  registries	  regulation120	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Commission	  DRAFT	  Regulation,	  	  above	  n.	  10.	  
119	  European	  Commission,	  “Member	  States	  endorse	  more	  secure	  Registry	  rules”,	  [2011],	  European	  
Commission	  Climate	  Action	  news,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011061702_en.htm	  (accessed	  on	  19	  October	  2011)	  
120	  Adapted	  from:	  Europa,	  “Questions	  and	  Answers	  on	  emissions	  trading:	  new	  Registry	  rules”,	  [2011],	  Europa	  
website,	  [online]	  
	  
Measures	  aimed	  to	  prevent	  fraud	   Article	   	   Date	  of	  application	  	  
Two	  factor	  authentication	  of	  transfers	  
	  
	   	   Early	  2012	  
Out-­‐of-­‐band	  confirmation	  of	  transfer	  
	  
	   	   Early	  2012	  
Introduction	  of	  trusted	  account	  list	  	  
	  
	   	   Mid	  2012	  
Obligatory	  four-­‐eyes	  principle	  	  
	  
	   	   Early	  2012	  
Strengthened	  know-­‐your-­‐customer	  checking	  
procedures	  for	  account	  holders	  and	  
representatives	  	  
	  
	   	   Immediately	  upon	  
entry	  into	  force	  of	  
draft	  regulation	  
New	  account	  categories:	  holding	  accounts	  and	   	   	   Mid	  2012	  
	   29	  
6.2.	  Strengthened	  know-­‐your-­‐customer	  (KYC)	  procedures	  
The	  new	  draft	   regulation	  proposes	   to	   strengthen	   the	  documentation	  and	  checks	   required	  
for	  an	  individual	  or	  company	  to	  open	  an	  account.	  On	  top	  of	  the	  requirements	  introduced	  in	  
the	  2010	  revised	  registries	  Regulation	  (see	  table	  3),	  the	  draft	  regulation,	  if	  adopted,	  would	  
introduce	  the	  obligation	  for	  any	  legal	  person	  wanting	  to	  open	  up	  an	  account	  to	  provide:	  
	  
• bank	  account	  details;	  	  
• confirmation	  of	  VAT	  details;	  
• a	  copy	  of	  the	  company’s	  annual	  report	  of	  latest	  audited	  financial	  statements;	  
• criminal	  records	  of	  the	  company’s	  directors.121	  	  
	  
Administrators	  may	  further	  refuse	  ownership	  of	  an	  account	  if:	  
	  
“the	   account	   holder,	   or	   if	   a	   legal	   person	   [i.e.	   a	   company],	   any	   of	   the	   directors,	   is	  
under	   investigation	   or	   has	   been	   convicted	   in	   the	   preceding	   five	   years	   for	   fraud	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Commission	  DRAFT	  Regulation,	  above	  n.	  10,	  at	  Annex	  III	  (5)	  and	  (7)	  
trading	  accounts	  	  
Measures	  aimed	  to	  respond	  quickly	  and	  
effectively	  in	  response	  to	  fraud	  
	   	   	  
26	  hour	  delay	  of	  transfers	  between	  Registry	  
accounts	  
	  
	   	   Early	  2012	  
National	  administrators’	  ability	  to	  freeze	  
allowances	  and	  Registry	  accounts	  in	  cases	  of	  
suspicion	  of	  fraud	  
	  
	   	   Immediately	  upon	  
entry	  into	  force	  of	  
draft	  regulation	  
Wider	  access	  for	  competent	  national	  authorities	  
to	  confidential	  information	  held	  in	  the	  Union	  
Registry	  	  
	   	   Immediately	  upon	  
entry	  into	  force	  of	  
draft	  regulation	  
Strengthening	  of	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  
provisions	  
	   	   Early	  2012	  
	  
Measures	  aimed	  to	  avoid	  market	  disruption	  
following	  fraud	  outbreaks	  	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Allowances	  defined	  as	  fully	  fungible	  	   	   	   Early	  2012	  
Those	  who	  have	  purchased	  allowances	  in	  good	  
faith	  will	  gain	  full	  entitlement	  to	  them	  	  
	   	   Early	  2012	  
Non-­‐disclosure	  of	  serial	  numbers	  of	  allowances	  	   	   	   Immediately	  upon	  
entry	  into	  force	  of	  
draft	  regulation	  
	  
Non-­‐display	  of	  serial	  numbers	  of	  allowances	  –	  
only	  visible	  to	  registry	  administrators	  (and	  to	  
competent	  national	  authorities	  upon	  request)	  
	   	   Early	  2012	  
	   30	  
involving	  allowances	  or	  Kyoto	  units,	  money	   laundering,	   terrorist	   financing	  or	  other	  
serious	  crime	  for	  which	  the	  account	  may	  be	  an	  instrument”;122	  (emphasis	  added)	  
	  
or	  if	  they	  have	  “reasonable	  grounds”	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  accounts	  may	  be	  being	  used	  
for	  these	  purposes.123	  	  
	  
If	   adopted,	   these	   provisions	   would	   help	   prevent	   access	   to	   the	   market	   by	   convicted	   or	  
suspected	   criminals.	  Moreover,	   requiring	   that	   account	  holder	  details	   are	  disclosed	   should	  
make	  access	  more	  difficult	  for	  companies	  or	  individuals	  who	  aim	  to	  launch	  fraudulent	  acts	  
against	   the	   EU	   ETS.	   The	   mere	   administrative	   burden	   of	   the	   provision	   of	   this	   level	   of	  
documentation	  would	  be	  a	  disincentive	  in	  itself.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  there	  are	  mixed	  views	  among	  stakeholders	  as	  to	  whether	  these	  restrictions	  would	  
sufficiently	  protect	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market	  from	  fraud.	  The	  additional	  ‘know	  your	  customer’	  
(KYC)	  requirements	  would	  not	  drastically	  alter	  the	  general	  open-­‐access	  regime	  of	  previous	  
regulations.	   Barclays	   Capital	   and	   some	   Member	   States	   are	   currently	   proposing	   the	  
restriction	   of	   the	  market	   to	   regulated	   firms	   (i.e.	   financial	   traders	   regulated	   under	   the	   EU	  
financial	   regulation,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  below)	  and	  compliance	  entities,	  claiming	  that	  the	  
related	  licensing	  requirements	  would	  be	  a	  useful	  measure	  to	  restrict	  access	  to	  the	  market	  to	  
those	   with	   legitimate	   interests	   in	   participating	   in	   it.	   According	   to	   one	   interviewee,	   the	  
Commission	  has	  rebuffed	  this	  proposal	  due	  to	  a	  willingness	  to	  maintain	  and	  attract	  further	  
liquidity	   in	  the	  market	   in	  the	  interests	  of	  market	  efficiency.	  124	  This	  reasoning	  exposes	  that	  
this	  conflict	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  technical	  discussion	  on	  how	  to	  maximise	  security,	  and	  prompts	  
more	   fundamental	   political	   questions	   about	  where	   the	   balance	   should	   lie	   between	   open	  
market	   competition	   and	   the	   minimisation	   of	   systemic	   market	   risk.	   One	   interviewee	  	  
suggests	   that	   over	   95%	   of	   legitimate	   trading	   is	   currently	   conducted	   through	   compliance	  
entities	   and	   regulated	   firms	   anyway.	  Hence	   it	   is	   a	   political	   choice	  whether	   restricting	   the	  
remaining	   competition	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   associated	   decrease	   in	   the	   risk	   of	   fraud.	   The	  
Commission	   needs	   to	   further	   consider	   and	   analyse	   the	   security	   and	   competition	  
implications	   of	   tighter	   access	   restrictions,	   so	   that	   the	   choice	   as	   to	   where	   the	   balance	  
between	  the	  two	  interests	  lies	  is	  a	  more	  informed	  one.	  
	  
It	   is	   also	   likely	   that	   procedural	   issues	   contribute	   to	   the	   Commission’s	   rebuttal	   of	   this	  
proposal.	  Introducing	  sectoral	  restrictions	  would	  require	  amendment	  to	  Article	  19	  of	  the	  EU	  
ETS	  Directive.125	  This	  would	  not	  only	  involve	  a	  lengthy	  process,	  but	  would	  open	  the	  Directive	  
to	   further	  unassociated	  changes.126	  The	  Commission	   is	  not	  currently	  willing	  to	  do	  this	  at	  a	  
time	   of	   considerable	   uncertainty	   leading	   up	   to	   Phase	   III.	   Yet	   the	   possibility	   of	   such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  ibid,	  at	  Art	  20,	  2(b);	  emphasis	  added	  
123	  ibid,	  at	  Art	  20,	  2(c);	  The	  regulation	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  further	  clarification	  of	  what	  “reasonable	  grounds”	  
might	  consist	  of	  however,	  and	  what	  level	  of	  suspicion	  or	  evidence	  would	  be	  required	  to	  refuse	  the	  opening	  of	  
an	  account.	  If	  the	  draft	  regulation	  is	  passed,	  it	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  provision	  is	  used	  in	  
different	  Member	  States,	  and	  how	  exactly	  it	  is	  implemented.	  
124	  Anonymous,	  senior	  representative	  of	  leading	  carbon	  trading	  bank,	  interview	  (07.07.2011)	  
125	  Article	  19	  states	  that	  “any	  person	  may	  hold	  allowances”	  
126	  During	  scrutiny	  of	  draft	  Regulations	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Parliament	  can	  either	  accept	  or	  reject	  the	  whole	  
draft;	  scrutiny	  of	  Directives	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  are	  much	  more	  burdensome	  and	  time	  consuming	  as	  all	  original	  
provisions	  are	  open	  to	  scrutiny,	  not	  just	  the	  proposed	  amendments.	  
	   31	  
restrictions	   becoming	   applicable	   under	   future	   legislation	   should	   not	   be	   completely	  
dismissed.	  	  
6.2.	  Strengthened	  account	  security	  	  
Art	   69(3)	   of	   the	   draft	   Regulation	   proposes	   to	   introduce	   the	   requirement	   for	   two-­‐factor	  
authentication	   in	   order	   to	   access	   accounts.	   Although	   this	   secondary	   level	   of	   security	   has	  
already	  been	  introduced	  as	  a	  short-­‐term	  required	  standard	  before	  national	  registries	  could	  
be	   opened	   after	   their	   closure	   in	   early	   2011,	   its	   inclusion	   within	   the	   registries	   regulation	  
would	  introduce	  it	  as	  an	  obligatory	  measure	  that	  would	  also	  be	  subsequently	  applicable	  to	  
the	  Union	  registry	  in	  Phase	  III.	  Art	  36(1)	  further	  requires	  that	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐band	  confirmation	  is	  
needed	   for	   transfers	   between	   accounts	   to	   be	   initiated.	  127	  This	   means	   that	   transactions	  
would	  have	  to	  be	  confirmed	  over	  two	  different	  networks	  (i.e.	  once	  via	  email	  and	  once	  via	  
telephone)	   by	   two	   different	   authorised	   individuals.	   This	   level	   of	   security	   would	   make	  
hacking	   into	  accounts	   and	   stealing	  allowances	  much	  more	  difficult	   as	   two	  account	  holder	  
networks,	   each	  with	  different	   representatives	  and	   therefore	  different	  account	  names	  and	  
passwords,	  would	  have	  to	  be	  illegally	  accessed.	  
	  
Most	   interviewees	   agreed	   that	   these	   measures	   would	   significantly	   and	   adequately	  
strengthen	   the	   security	   of	   the	   registry	   system.	   Furthermore,	  with	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
Union	   registry	   in	   2012,	   implementation	   delays	   previously	   experienced	   with	   past	   security	  
improvements	   would	   no	   longer	   be	   an	   obstacle.	   According	   to	   a	   recent	   report	   by	   the	  
European	  Union	  Committee	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  on	  ‘The	  EU	  Internal	  Security	  Strategy’,	  the	  
sophisticated	   tactics	   used	   by	   cyber	   criminals	   are	   constantly	   evolving.128	  It	   is	   therefore	  
essential	   that	   the	   registry	   security	   system	  evolves	   at	   the	   same	  pace	   and	   the	   Commission	  
periodically	  assesses	  and	  reviews	  measures	  to	  ensure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  scheme.	  
Moreover,	  the	  draft	  regulation	  proposes	  the	  creation	  of	  ‘trusted	  account’	  lists	  which	  would	  
differentiate	  between	  ‘holding	  accounts’	  and	  ‘trading	  accounts’.129	  These	  accounts	  would	  be	  
subject	  to	  different	  controls	  and	  restrictions	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  counterparty	  accounts	  they	  
are	  permitted	  to	  transfer	  allowances	  to.	  Holding	  accounts	  may	  only	  transfer	  allowances	  to	  
accounts	  that	  are	  listed	  under	  the	  “trusted	  accounts”	  of	  the	  account	  holder.	  Accounts	  can	  
be	  added	  to	  the	  trusted	  account	  list	  following	  authorisation	  by	  two	  account	  representatives,	  
and	  a	  seven-­‐day	  delay	  is	  applicable.130	  This	  restriction	  adds	  an	  extra	  level	  of	  safety	  to	  
prevent	  the	  fraudulent	  initiation	  of	  transactions	  by	  cyber	  hackers.	  Trading	  accounts,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  may	  transfer	  allowances	  to	  accounts	  outside	  of	  the	  holder’s	  trusted	  
counterparty	  list.	  Hence	  the	  level	  of	  security	  applicable	  to	  allowance	  transfers	  in	  trading	  
accounts	  is	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  that	  applicable	  to	  holding	  accounts,	  therefore	  requiring	  further	  
regulatory	  oversight	  of	  trade	  between	  ‘trading	  accounts’.	  	  
6.3.	  The	  26	  hours	  delay	  	  
According	  to	  the	  draft	  Regulation,	  the	  different	  transfer	  types	  between	  holding	  and	  trading	  
accounts	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  differential	  time	  delays.	  A	  26-­‐hour	  delay	  would	  apply	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  This	  does	  not	  include	  transfers	  from	  trading	  accounts,	  or	  from	  holding	  accounts	  to	  a	  trusted	  account	  list,	  as	  
discussed	  below.	  
128	  House	  of	  Lords,	  “The	  EU	  Internal	  Security	  Strategy”,	  [2011],	  17th	  Report	  of	  the	  Session	  2010-­‐2012,	  European	  
Union	  Committee,	  House	  of	  Lords,	  London,	  UK.	  
129	  Commission	  DRAFT	  Regulation,	  above	  n.	  10,	  at	  Art	  60;	  Art	  61;	  Annex	  I	  
130	  ibid,	  at	  Art	  24	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initiation	  and	  finalisation	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  allowances	  from	  holding	  accounts,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  
transfers	   from	  trading	  accounts	   to	  accounts	  not	  on	   the	   trusted	  account	   list	  of	   the	   trading	  
account	  holder.131	  Within	  the	  first	  24	  hours	  of	  this	  delay,	  ‘if	  an	  account	  holder	  suspects	  that	  
a	  transfer	  was	  initiated	  fraudulently…they	  may	  request	  the	  national	  administrator	  to	  cancel	  
the	   transfer	   on	   their	   behalf…’.132	  This	   delay	   system	  aims	   to	  overcome	   the	   vulnerability	   of	  
the	  spot	  market	  to	  VAT	  fraud	  and	  allowance	  thefts	  due	  to	  the	  speed	  of	  allowance	  transfers	  
under	   the	   current	   registry	   system.	   However,	   the	   proposed	   legislation	   maintains	   trade	  
flexibility	  by	  enabling	  the	  immediate	  transfer	  of	  allowances	  to	  trusted	  accounts.	  According	  
to	  Simone	  Ruiz,	   if	  such	  a	  delay	  had	  previously	  been	  in	  place,	  some	  of	  the	  allowance	  thefts	  
that	  occurred	  in	  2010/2011	  would	  not	  have	  happened,	  as	  the	  thefts	  would	  have	  likely	  been	  
flagged	  up	  within	   the	  delay	  period	   imposed,	  hence	  before	   the	   completion	  of	   the	   transfer	  
into	  the	  thief’s	  account.133	  
	  
However,	   there	   remains	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	   level	   of	   suspicion	   or	   proof	   of	   fraudulent	  
involvement	  that	  would	  be	  required	  for	  an	  account	  holder	  to	  be	  able	  to	  cancel	  a	  transfer.	  As	  
stated	  by	  an	  associate	  a	  leading	  UK	  law	  firm,	  ‘the	  question	  is:	  what	  is	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  you	  
suspect	  [fraudulent	  initiation	  of	  a	  transfer]?	  Do	  you	  see	  an	  article	  in	  the	  news	  that	  says	  that	  
the	  person	  that	  you	  have	  been	  buying	  from	  has	  stolen	  a	  bunch	  of	  EUAs?	  Is	  this	  suspicion?’	  
Nevertheless,	   according	   to	   one	   interviewee	   ‘most	   people	   seem	   to	   be	   happy	   about	   this	  
[delay],	  and	  26	  hours	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  good	  length	  of	  time	  […]	  to	  give	  people	  confidence	  that	  
there	  will	  be	  a	  window	  in	  which	  to	  flag	  things	  up’.134	  But	  some	  stakeholders	  remain	  sceptical	  
as	  to	  whether	  this	  measure	  would	  significantly	  reduce	  the	  system’s	  vulnerability	  to	  fraud.135	  
	  
There	   are	   also	   potential	   short-­‐term	   implementation	   problems	   given	   the	   discrepancy	  
between	  the	  implementation	  dates	  of	  different	  measures.	  With	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  26-­‐
hour	   delay	   due	   in	   “early	   2012”,	   and	   the	   opportunity	   to	   open	   trading	   accounts	   with	  
associated	   trusted	   account	   lists	   proposed	   to	   be	   introduced	   in	   “mid	   2012”	   (see	   table	   4),	  
there	  is	  potentially	  a	  six	  month	  period	  in	  which	  immediate	  transfers	  would	  not	  be	  possible.	  
This	  is	  so	  because	  there	  would	  be	  no	  mechanism	  within	  that	  period	  of	  potentially	  6	  months	  
in	  which	  allowance	  transfers	  could	  be	  exempt	  from	  delay,	  i.e.	  as	  would	  be	  the	  case	  of	  trade	  
between	   two	   trusted	   accounts.	   Before	   adoption	   of	   this	   draft,	   the	   Commission	   needs	   to	  
specify	  the	  timescale	  for	  these	  changes	  and	  how	  it	  plans	  to	  avoid	  the	  potentially	  disruptive	  
discrepancies	  in	  implementation	  dates.	  	  
6.4.	  Title	  transfer	  rules	  and	  the	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  allowance	  serial	  numbers	  
The	   draft	   regulation	   proposes	   the	   irrevocability	   of	   allowance	   transfers	   and	   the	   non-­‐
disclosure	  of	  the	  serial	  number	  of	  allowances,	  which	  together	  specifically	  aim	  to	  attenuate	  
the	   disruptive	   consequences	   of	   allowance	   thefts	   by	   harmonising	   the	   legal	   status	   of	   the	  
transfer	  of	  stolen	  allowances.	  By	  making	  serial	  numbers	  confidential	  and	  unavailable	  to	  the	  
public	   and	   account	   holders,136	  lists	   of	   stolen	   and	   allegedly	   stolen	   allowances	   cannot	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  ibid,	  at	  Art	  36.	  (3)	  
132	  ibid,	  at	  Art	  36	  (4)	  
133	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011):	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  delay	  would	  definitely	  have	  prevented	  
the	  theft,	  as	  due	  to	  email	  spamming,	  it	  took	  two	  hours	  to	  see	  what	  had	  happened	  as	  the	  email	  notification	  on	  
the	  transfer	  got	  ‘lost’.	  
134	  Anonymous,	  associate,	  leading	  UK	  law	  firm,	  interview	  (21.07.2011)	  
135	  Anonymous,	  senior	  representative	  of	  leading	  carbon	  trading	  bank,	  interview	  (07.07.2011)	  
136	  Commission	  DRAFT	  Regulation,	  above	  n.10,	  at	  Art	  83;	  Annex	  XII	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published,	  making	  it	  impossible	  for	  traders	  to	  undertake	  due	  diligence	  checks	  on	  EUAs	  being	  
purchased.	  
	  
Although	  the	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  serial	  numbers	  as	  an	  isolated	  measure	  would	  in	  fact	  increase	  
market	  participants’	  exposure	  to	  legal	  and	  financial	  risks,	  Article	  37	  of	  the	  draft	  Regulation	  
defines	  emissions	  allowances	  as	  “fungible,	  dematerialised”	   instruments	   (thus	  rendering	  all	  
emissions	  allowances	  completely	  substitutable).	  It	  further	  states	  that	  allowance	  transactions	  
are	  final	  and	  irrevocable,	  and	  that	  “no	  law,	  regulation,	  rule	  or	  practice	  on	  the	  setting	  aside	  
of	  contracts	  or	  transactions	  shall	  lead	  to	  the	  unwinding	  in	  the	  registry	  of	  a	  transaction	  that	  
has	  become	  final	  and	  irrevocable	  under	  this	  Regulation”.	  Importantly,	  Article	  37	  also	  states	  
that	  purchasers	  acting	  in	  good	  faith	  acquire	  good	  title	  to	  purchased	  allowances	  despite	  any	  
defects	  in	  the	  ownership	  title	  of	  the	  seller	  –	  meaning	  that	  inadvertent	  purchasers	  of	  stolen	  
allowances	  would	  retain	  ownership	  of	  those	  purchased	  allowance.	  
	  
By	   confirming	   the	  good	   title	   to	  purchases	   in	   good	   faith,	   and	  preventing	   the	  unwinding	  of	  
transactions	  involving	  stolen	  allowances,	  the	  draft	  Regulation	  evidently	  aims	  to	  remove	  the	  
risks	  of	  financial	  loss	  and	  criminal	  liabilities	  associated	  with	  inadvertently	  purchasing	  stolen	  
allowances.	  Although	   it	   is	   evident	   that	   that	   is	   the	  aim	  of	   the	  Commission,	   vagaries	   in	   the	  
extent	  of	  application	  of	  Article	  37,	  and	  contradictions	  between	  its	  provisions	  and	  domestic	  
law	   in	   some	  Member	   States	   have	   resulted	   in	   a	   lack	   of	   clarity	   in	   the	   consequences	   of	   its	  
potential	   implementation.	  The	   recognition	  of	  good	   title	   to	   inadvertently	  purchased	   stolen	  
allowances	  for	  example	  would	  directly	  contradict	  national	  law	  in	  Member	  States	  such	  as	  the	  
UK.	   UK	   common	   law	   dictates	   that	   good	   title	   of	   stolen	   goods	   cannot	   be	   obtained	   by	  
purchasers	  of	  those	  goods,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  acting	  in	  good	  faith.	  Complete	  implementation	  
of	   Article	   37	   in	   the	   UK	   would	   therefore	   require	   the	   revocation	   of	   hundreds	   of	   years	   of	  
established	   case	   law.	   If	   that	   measure	   did	   not	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   practicable	   or	   easy	   to	  
implement,	  then	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  serial	  numbers	  as	  a	  measure	  on	  
its	  own	  might	  further	  expose	  market	  participants	  to	  legal	  and	  financial	  risks.137	  	  
	  
Article	   37	   is	   the	   most	   contested	   proposal	   within	   the	   draft	   regulation	   and	   many	   legal	  
questions	   crucial	   to	   the	   effectiveness	   its	   provisions	   remain	   unanswered.	   Although	   it	   is	  
rumoured	   that	   a	   QC	   opinion	   is	   currently	   pending;138	  to	   effectively	   reduce	   the	   market	  
disruptive	  effects	  of	  fraud	  the	  Commission	  needs	  to	  clarify	  the	  meaning	  and	  practicalities	  of	  
implementation	  of	  this	  Article	  before	  it	  is	  adopted.	  
6.5.	  A	  compensation	  scheme	  for	  stolen	  allowances	  
If	  title	  transfer	  rules	  cannot	  be	  appropriately	  harmonised	  within	  the	  draft	  Regulation	  due	  to	  
inhibitory	   incompatibilities	   between	   the	   proposed	   EU	   rules	   and	  Member	   States’	   existing	  
rules	  on	  title	  acquisition	  of	  stolen	  goods,	  alternative	  instruments	  could	  be	  used	  to	  prevent	  
the	  market-­‐disruptive	  effects	  of	  allowance	  thefts.	  Market	  participants	  and	   industry	  groups	  
are	   currently	   pushing	   for	   a	   mechanism	   by	   which	   traders	   or	   compliance	   firms	   who	  
inadvertently	   find	   themselves	   in	   possession	   of	   stolen	   allowances	   could	   retire	   stolen	  
emissions	  allowances	  and	  be	  compensated	  either	   financially,	  or	  with	   replacement	   “clean”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  	  Anonymous,	  associate,	  leading	  UK	  law	  firm,	  interview	  (21.07.2011)	  
138	  ibid	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allowances.139	  140	  This	   could	   be	   financed	   by	   a	   “mutual	   pool”	   compensation	   fund,141	  which	  
could	   be	   fed	   by	   levying	   a	   low	   tax	   on	   each	   emissions	   allowance	   transaction.142	  This	  would	  
reduce	   the	   financial	   risks	   of	   participating	   in	   a	   market	   in	   which	   stolen	   allowances	   are	  
circulating.	  However,	   creation	  of	  a	   compensation	   scheme	   is	  not	  presently	   foreseen	   in	   the	  
draft	  registries	  reform	  regulation.	  
6.6.	  Conclusions	  on	  proposed	  Registry	  Reform	  
Implementation	  of	   the	  proposed	  draft	   registries	  Regulation	  would	   successfully	   strengthen	  
security	   weaknesses	   that	   exist	   in	   the	   current	   EU	   ETS	   registry	   system	   and	   the	   imminent	  
creation	   of	   a	   central	   Union	   registry	   will	   also	   avoid	   implementation	   problems	   that	   have	  
previously	   delayed	   security	   improvements.	   However,	   questions	   remain	   concerning	   the	  
appropriateness	   of	   the	   relatively	   open-­‐access	   regime	   that	   the	   proposed	   regulation	  
maintains.	   This	   raises	   broader	   questions	   both	   the	   European	   Commission	   and	   individual	  
Member	   States	   need	   to	   address	   about	   where	   the	   future	   balance	   between	   free-­‐market	  
competition	  and	  systemic	  risk	  should	  lie.	  The	  most	  striking	  gaps	  and	  ambiguities	  in	  the	  draft	  
reforms	  however	  lie	  in	  the	  attempts	  to	  minimise	  the	  market-­‐disruptive	  effects	  of	  allowance	  
thefts.	  How	  proposed	  rules	  regarding	  the	  irrevocability	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  would	  apply	  
within	  certain	  Member	  States’	  jurisdictions,	  including	  the	  UK,	  is	  particularly	  unclear.143	  This	  
in	  turn	  brings	  the	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  emissions	  allowance	  serial	  numbers	  into	  question	  as	  an	  
appropriate	   measure.	   Due	   to	   inherent	   difficulties	   in	   harmonising	   Member	   States’	   title	  
transfer	  rules,	  and	  the	  unlikelihood	  of	  being	  able	  to	  impose	  swift	  changes	  in	  Member	  States’	  
legal	  treatment	  of	  stolen	  goods,	  the	  Commission	  should	  perhaps	  instead	  consider,	  at	  least	  in	  
the	   short	   term,	   to	   establish	   a	   compensation	  mechanism	   as	   an	   alternative	  mechanism	   to	  
reduce	  the	  financial	  risks	  associated	  with	  buying	  stolen	  allowances.	  	  
VII.	  EU	  ETS	  market	  oversight	  and	  financial	  regulations	  
	  
A	   large	   range	   of	   EU-­‐level	   market	   oversight	   regulation	   applies	   to	   commodity	   trading	   in	  
general	   including	   that	   in	   emissions	   allowances.	   The	  main	   purpose	   of	   this	   regulation	   is	   to	  
enable	   fair	   and	   efficient	   trading	   conditions	   for	   all	   participants,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   prevent	   the	  
inappropriate	   use	   of	   markets	   for	   fraudulent	   activities.144	  Yet	   the	   risk	   of	   “unfairness”	   and	  
market	  misuse	  posed	  by	  different	  segments	  of	  commodity	  markets	  can	  differ	  considerably	  
according	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  trading	  product	  (whether	  derivatives	  or	  spot),	  the	  platform	  
through	   which	   the	   trade	   is	   executed	   and	   the	   entity	   carrying	   out	   the	   trade.	   As	   such,	   the	  
weight	   of	   EU	   market	   oversight	   regulation	   applied	   to	   different	   segments	   of	   commodity	  
markets	  vary	  according	  to	  different	  factors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  IETA,	  ”IETA	  position	  on	  Registry	  Security	  as	  response	  to	  EU	  stakeholder	  meeting	  on	  15th	  March	  2011	  on	  
registry	  security”,	  [2011],	  IETA	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  	  https://ieta.org	  
140	  Bloomberg,	  “Carbon	  traders	  seek	  fraud-­‐compensation	  system,	  Norton	  Rose	  says”,	  [2011],	  Bloomberg	  news	  
website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-­‐02-­‐01/emission-­‐traders-­‐seeking-­‐fraud-­‐
compensation-­‐system-­‐norton-­‐rose-­‐says.html	  (accessed	  on	  19	  October	  2011).	  
141	  Above	  note	  119	  
142	  Wemaera	  [2011],	  above	  n.	  53.	  
143	  Commission	  DRAFT	  Regulation,	  above	  n.10,	  at	  Art	  37	  
144	  European	  Commission,	  “Emissions	  trading:	  Questions	  and	  answers	  on	  enhanced	  market	  oversight	  for	  the	  
European	  carbon	  market”,	  [2010],	  European	  Commission	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/697	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This	   differentiation	   in	   weight	   of	   regulation	   also	   applies	   to	   the	   EU	   carbon	   market.	   Yet	  
emission	  allowances	  differ	  significantly	  to	  most	  other	  physical	  commodities	  in	  that	  they	  are	  
dematerialised	  instruments	  with	  a	  high	  value	  and	  zero	  volume.	  The	  extent	  of	  fraud	  on	  the	  
EU	  ETS	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  has	  exposed	  the	  additional	  risks	  of	  market	  misuse	  that	  these	  
features	   create,	   especially	   on	   the	   spot	   market,	   and	   gives	   cause	   for	   concern	   that	   certain	  
market	   segments	   may	   not	   be	   appropriately	   regulated.	   This	   section	   outlines	   the	   current	  
application	  of	  market	  oversight	  regulation	  to	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market	  and	  discusses	  the	  gaps	  
and	  weaknesses	  that	  currently	  exist	  in	  regulation.	  	  
	  
7.1.	  The	  derivatives	  market	  	  
	  
The	  derivatives	  market	  include	  forwards	  and	  futures	  contracts;	  and	  swaps	  and	  Options.	  
Forwards	  and	  futures	  are	  contracts	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  set	  volume	  on	  a	  specified	  future	  
delivery	  date.	  These	  instruments	  allow	  firms	  the	  certainty	  of	  knowing	  the	  price	  they	  will	  be	  
paying	  (or	  receiving)	  for	  allowances	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  allows	  them	  to	  hedge	  the	  risk	  of	  
fluctuation	  in	  the	  price	  of	  allowances.	  The	  date	  for	  which	  the	  future	  physical	  delivery	  is	  
contracted	  is	  called	  the	  “delivery	  date”,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  contract	  “matures”.	  Forward	  
contract	  trades	  are	  traded	  bilaterally	  or	  over-­‐the-­‐counter.	  Those	  that	  result	  in	  physical	  
delivery	  of	  allowances	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “commercial	  forward	  contracts.”	  Futures	  
contracts	  are	  similar	  instruments,	  but	  are	  instead	  traded	  on	  exchanges.	  	  
	  
In	  turn,	  a	  swap	  is	  a	  contract	  through	  which	  one	  asset	  is	  substituted	  for	  another.	  For	  example	  
futures	  contracts	  with	  different	  delivery	  dates	  can	  be	  “swapped”,	  or	  EUA	  and	  CER	  
allowances	  can	  be	  swapped.	  Options	  are	  contracts	  through	  which	  the	  buyer	  is	  granted	  the	  
right	  (but	  not	  the	  obligation)	  to	  purchase	  a	  certain	  volume	  at	  a	  specified	  date	  for	  a	  set	  price.	  
This	  allows	  firms	  to	  manage	  the	  price	  risk	  of	  buying	  allowance	  that	  they	  may	  need	  in	  the	  
future,	  whilst	  giving	  them	  the	  option	  not	  to	  buy	  the	  allowances	  if	  they	  realised	  that	  they	  do	  
not	  need	  them	  at	  the	  time,	  or	  if	  they	  could	  get	  them	  cheaper	  at	  market	  price	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
delivery.	  Both	  these	  more	  sophisticated	  instruments	  allow	  companies	  to	  better	  manage	  
their	  carbon	  price	  risk.145	  
	  	  
The	  trade	  of	  derivatives	  makes	  the	  majority	  of	  market	  activity	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  In	  2009,	  nearly	  
80%	   of	   all	   trading	   activity	   was	   in	   derivative	   products. 146 	  These	   instruments	   play	   an	  
important	  role	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  market,	  as	  they	  provide	  compliance	  entities	  with	  flexible	  ways	  
in	  which	   they	   can	  manage	   their	   carbon	  price	   risks.	   These	  products	   tend	   to	  be	  offered	  by	  
financial	   intermediaries	   (banks	   and	   credit	   institutions)	   who	   are	   capable	   of	   taking	   on	   the	  
price	   risks	   involved.	   Emissions	   allowance	   derivatives,	   as	   with	   all	   other	   commodity-­‐based	  
derivatives,	   are	   classified	   as	   “financial	   instruments”	   and	   as	   such	   their	   trade	   is	   subject	   to	  
substantial	  EU	  financial	  markets	  regulations.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  See	  further	  Ellerman	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  above	  n.	  5,	  p135-­‐137.	  
146	  European	  Commission,	  “Towards	  an	  enhanced	  market	  oversight	  framework	  for	  the	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	  
Scheme”,	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council,	  Brussels,	  
Belgium.	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The	  Markets	   in	   Financial	   Instruments	  Directive	   (MiFID)147	  represents	   the	  main	  body	  of	   EU	  
financial	   regulation	   that	   applies	   to	   derivatives	   markets.	   This	   legislation	   acts	   to	   protect	  
investors	   (particularly	   retail	   investors),	   by	   regulating	   the	   financial	   intermediaries	   that	  
provide	   derivative	   products.	   The	   Directive	   stipulates	   that	   intermediaries	   require	  
authorisation	   before	   they	   can	   offer	   these	   types	   of	   trading	   products.	   Once	   licenced,	   their	  
activities	   are	   then	   closely	   supervised	   by	   the	  Member	   State’s	   financial	   regulator	   (e.g.	   the	  
Financial	  Services	  Authority	  in	  the	  UK)	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  abide	  by	  a	  number	  of	  operational	  
and	  reporting	  requirements	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  transparency	  and	  investor	  protection.	  	  
	  
Products	  defined	  as	  financial	  instruments	  under	  MiFID	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  other	  cross-­‐sector	  
economic	   regulation	   such	   as	   the	   Market	   Abuse	   Directive	   (MAD)148	  and	   the	   anti-­‐money	  
laundering	   Directive. 149 	  The	   MAD	   aims	   to	   prevent	   insider	   dealing 150 	  and	   market	  
manipulation151	  via	   the	   imposition	   of	   measures	   to	   detect	   and	   sanction	   abuse.	   The	   anti-­‐
money	   laundering	  Directive	   introduces	  know-­‐your-­‐customer	   (KYC)	   requirements	   for	   credit	  
institutions	  and	  investment	  firms	  to	  check	  the	  identity	  of	  their	  clients,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nature	  
of	  their	  trading	  activities.	  Further	  related	  financial	  regulations	  include	  the	  settlement	  finality	  
Directive152	  and	  the	  capital	  requirements	  Directives.153	  	  
	  
This	  web	  of	  derivative	  market	  oversight	  regulation	  is	  complex	  and	  burdensome.	  Yet	  certain	  
exemptions	   limit	   the	  extent	  of	   its	  application	   to	  ensure	   that	   regulation	   targets	   those	  who	  
pose	  the	  greatest	  risk	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  market	  (see	  table	  5).	  These	  exclude	  commodity	  
traders	  and	  trading	  entities	  of	  compliance	   firms	   from	  both	  MiFID	  and	  MAD	  requirements.	  
However,	  the	  MiFID	  and	  MAD	  are	  both	  currently	  under	  review	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  
exemptions	   will	   be	   narrowed,	   and	   thus	   the	   reach	   of	   financial	   regulation	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS	  
extended.154	  	  155	  The	  EU	  ETS	  derivatives	  market	  has	  not	  as	  yet	  been	  subject	  to	  any	  significant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Directive	  2004/39/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  21	  April	  2004	  on	  markets	  in	  
financial	  instruments	  amending	  Council	  Directives	  85/611/EEC	  and	  93/6/EEC	  and	  Directive	  2000/12/EC	  of	  the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  repealing	  Council	  Directive	  93/22/EEC	  
148	  Directive	  2003/6/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  28	  January	  2003	  on	  insider	  dealing	  
and	  market	  manipulation	  (market	  abuse)	  
149	  Directive	  2005/60/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  26	  October	  2005	  
on	  the	  prevention	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  
financing	  
150As	  discussed	  above,	  insider	  dealing	  is	  when	  a	  trader	  makes	  trading	  decisions	  or	  deals	  based	  on	  “inside	  
information”	  (Serious	  Fraud	  Office,	  2011).	  “Inside	  information”	  includes	  information	  that	  is	  not	  publically	  
available	  but	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  an	  affect	  on	  price	  (Prada,	  2010,	  above	  n.	  65).	  
151As	  discussed	  above,	  market	  manipulation	  occurs	  when	  a	  market	  player	  acts	  to	  control	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
market’s	  perception	  of	  the	  state	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,	  and	  then	  takes	  a	  position	  to	  exploit	  the	  resulting	  
effect	  on	  price.	  For	  example,	  “squeezing”	  the	  market	  by	  buying	  off	  and	  retaining	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  allowances	  
to	  give	  a	  false	  impression	  of	  scarcity,	  waiting	  for	  prices	  to	  rise	  as	  a	  result,	  and	  selling	  them	  on	  at	  this	  inflated	  
price	  (Prada,	  2010,	  above	  n.	  65).	  
152	  Directive	  2009/44/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  6	  may	  2009	  amending	  directive	  
98/26/ec	  on	  settlement	  finality	  in	  payment	  and	  securities	  settlement	  systems	  and	  directive	  2002/47/ec	  on	  
financial	  collateral	  arrangements	  as	  regards	  linked	  systems	  and	  credit	  claims	  
153Directives	  2006/48/EC	  and	  2006/49/EC	  
154	  European	  Commission,	  Public	  Consultation,	  Review	  on	  the	  Markets	  in	  Financial	  Instruments	  Directive,	  
[2010],	  Directorate	  General	  Internal	  Markets	  and	  Services;	  MiFID	  was	  open	  to	  Stakeholder	  consultation	  from	  
8th	  December	  2010	  to	  2nd	  February	  2011	  
155	  European	  Commission,	  Public	  consultation,	  A	  revision	  of	  the	  Market	  Abuse	  Directive	  (MAD),	  [2010],	  
Directorate	  General	  Internal	  Markets	  and	  Services;	  MAD	  was	  open	  to	  stakeholder	  consultation	  from	  28th	  June	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instances	  of	  fraud,	  and	  as	  discussed	  above,	  market	  abuse	  has	  not	  yet	  emerged	  as	  a	  problem.	  
As	   such,	   the	   current	   level	   of	   regulatory	   oversight	   of	   the	   derivatives	   market	   seems	  
appropriate	  to	  tackle	  fraud	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  
7.2.	  The	  spot	  market	  	  
	  
Spot	  contracts	  account	  for	  trades	  that	  are	  delivered	  between	  24	  and	  48	  hours	  after	  they	  are	  
negotiated.	  The	  spot	  market	  accounts	  for	  10-­‐20%	  of	  trading	  activity	  on	  the	  EU-­‐ETS,156	  157	  
and	  presents	  an	  important	  way	  for	  compliance	  entities	  to	  quickly	  sell	  or	  acquire	  emissions	  
allowances	  to	  meet	  their	  compliance	  obligations.158	  The	  EU	  ETS	  spot	  market,	  like	  any	  other	  
spot	  commodities	  market,	  is	  unregulated	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  This	  leaves	  the	  oversight	  of	  spot	  
trading	  up	  to	  Member	  State	  domestic	  legislation.	  However,	  only	  a	  few	  Member	  States	  have	  
applied	  additional	  regulation	  to	  their	  domestic	  spot	  emissions	  trading	  markets.159	  There	  is	  
therefore	  no	  obligatory	  licencing	  of	  spot	  market	  participants,	  supervision	  of	  their	  activities,	  
or	  reporting	  requirements.	  
	  
Although	   most	   commodity	   spot	   markets	   are	   similarly	   unregulated,	   unlike	   other	  
commodities,	   the	   completion	   of	   spot	   transactions	   of	   emissions	   allowances	   are	   near	  
immediate	   and	   lack	   the	   requirement	   for	   delivery	   of	   any	   physical	   product.	   As	   previously	  
discussed,	   the	   “dematerialised”	   nature	   of	   this	   product	   makes	   the	   market	   particularly	  
vulnerable	  to	  fraud	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  commodity	  spot	  markets.	  Given	  these	  additional	  
vulnerabilities	  and	  the	  evident	  focus	  of	  allowance	  thefts	  and	  VAT	  fraud	  on	  the	  spot	  market,	  
there	   is	   concern	   that	   the	   current	   level	   of	   market	   oversight	   is	   inappropriately	   low	   and	   is	  
leaving	  this	  market	  open	  to	  misuse.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2010	  to	  23rd	  July	  2010.	  Both	  are	  currently	  under	  review.	  MiFID	  consultation	  document	  and	  responses	  available	  
[online]	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/mifid_en.htm	  
156	  this	  proportion	  may	  have	  decreased	  however	  following	  the	  2010-­‐11	  allowance	  thefts	  	  
157	  European	  Commission	  (2010a)	  Towards	  an	  enhanced	  market	  oversight	  framework	  for	  the	  EU	  Emissions	  
Trading	  Scheme,	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council,	  Brussels,	  
Belgium.	  
158	  Ellerman	  [2010],	  supra	  n.5.	  
159	  In	  August	  2010	  France	  passed	  legislation	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  extension	  of	  regulated	  markets	  rules	  to	  the	  spot	  
carbon	  market;	  Germany	  already	  regulates	  commodity	  spot	  trades	  that	  take	  place	  through	  exchanges	  (EC,	  
2010);	  Romania	  defines	  emissions	  allowances	  as	  financial	  instruments.	  













Table	  5.	  :	  The	  EU-­‐level	  regulation	  of	  different	  trading	  entities	  [adapted	  from	  Prada,	  2010)]	  
	  
	  
7.3.	  Legal	  status	  of	  allowances	  
On	  top	  of	  the	  existing	  complex	  regulations,	  the	  market	  oversight	  framework	  surrounding	  
the	  EU	  ETS	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  and	  common	  legal	  definition	  of	  EU	  
emissions	  allowances.	  This	  has	  not	  only	  created	  decreased	  market	  confidence	  through	  the	  
associated	   lack	   of	   clarity	   surrounding	   ownership	   and	   liability	   rules,	   but	   may	   also	   detract	  
potential	  investors,	  especially	  from	  outside	  the	  EU,	  who	  are	  unsure	  whether	  they	  are	  legally	  
allowed	  to	  trade	  according	  to	  market	  oversight	  regulations.161	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Although	  narrowing	  these	  exemptions	  is	  being	  considered	  by	  the	  MiFID	  consultation.	  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mifid/consultation_paper_en.pdf	  
161	  IETA,	  “IETA	  response	  to	  MiFID	  consultation”,	  [2011]	  International	  Emissions	  Trading	  Association	  website,	  	  
[online]	  available	  at:	  
Type	  of	  entity	   Current	  regulation	  framework	  
Investment	  firms	  and	  credit	  institutions	   MiFID;	  Anti-­‐money	  laundering	  Directive	  
Spot	   and	   commercial	   futures	   activities	  
are	  not	  regulated	  
Traders	  specialising	  in	  commodities	  	   No	  EU-­‐level	  regulation	  160	  
Trading	   entities	   of	   electricity	   producers	  
and	   industrial	   players	   (i.e.	   trading	   arms	  
of	   compliance	   traders	   –	   provided	   this	   is	  
ancillary	  to	  their	  main	  business)	  
No	  EU-­‐level	  regulation	  	  
Brokers	   who	   intervene	   on	   financial	  
instruments	  markets	  
MiFID;	  Anti-­‐money	  laundering	  Directive;	  
Spot	   and	   commercial	   futures	   activities	  
are	  not	  regulated	  	  
Brokers	  and	  traders	  who	  intervene	  only	  
on	  the	  spot	  market,	  or	  with	  commercial	  
forward	   contracts	   (traded	   bilaterally	   –	  
not	   on	   regulated	   markets/multi-­‐lateral	  
trading	  facilities)	  
No	  EU-­‐level	  regulation	  
Credit	  originators	   No	  EU-­‐level	  regulation	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Although	  MiFID	  has	   established	   a	   legal	   framework	   for	   emissions	   allowance	  derivatives	   by	  
defining	  them	  as	  “financial	   instruments”,162	  this	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  comprehensive	  legal	  
approach	   and	   leaves	   the	   question	   open	   as	   to	   how	   emissions	   allowances	   that	   do	   not	   fall	  
under	   the	  MiFID	   definition	   of	   financial	   instruments	   (such	   as	   spot	   traded	   allowances,	   and	  
futures	  contracts)	  should	  be	  treated.	  With	  no	  guidance	  from	  the	  EU	  on	  this	  issue,	  Member	  
States	  have	  been	  left	  to	  decide	  for	  themselves	  how	  allowances	  are	  treated	  under	  their	  own	  
national	   jurisdiction,	   leading	   to	   a	   heterogeneous	   approach	   across	   Europe	   (see	   table	   2).	  
However,	  some	  level	  of	  legal	  harmonisation	  in	  the	  way	  emissions	  allowance	  transactions	  are	  
treated	  has	  been	  achieved	  by	   the	  reliance	  on	  standardised	  trading	  contracts,	   such	  as	   that	  
drawn	  up	  by	  IETA.163	  But	  both	  IETA	  and	  the	  Prada	  report	  (2010)164	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  
a	  common	  formal	  legal	  definition	  in	  ensuring	  the	  good	  functioning	  of	  the	  market	  and	  clarity	  
over	  how	  it	  is	  regulated.165	  166	  
7.4.	  Options	  for	  reform	  of	  market	  regulatory	  oversight	  
	  
Regulation	  of	  the	  trade	  of	  emissions	  allowance	  derivatives	  is	  extensive,	  and	  beyond	  changes	  
being	  proposed	  by	  the	  Commission’s	  on-­‐going	  revision	  of	  MiFID	  and	  MAD,	  additional	  rules	  
would	  not	  appear	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  the	  appropriate	  regulation	  of	  this	  segment	  of	  the	  EU	  
carbon	  market.	  Yet	  there	  is	  an	  evident	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  regulatory	  oversight	  of	  the	  spot	  
market,	   to	   which	   those	   pieces	   of	   EU	   legislation	   do	   not	   extend.	   This	   exposure	   has	   been	  
recognized	  by	  the	  Commission,	  who	  has	  subsequently	  launched	  a	  stakeholder	  consultation	  
to	  explore	  potential	  reforms	  of	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market’s	  oversight	   framework.167	  As	  part	  of	  
this	   review,	   the	   Commission	   has	   put	   forward	   two	   general	   proposals	   that	   aim	   to	   fill	   the	  
regulatory	  gaps,	  which	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  this	  section:	  	  
-­‐ the	  classification	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  as	  financial	  instruments;168	  or	  
	  
-­‐ the	  application	  of	  a	  bespoke	  regulatory	  regime	  for	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market.	  
	  
Option	  1	  -­‐	  Classification	  of	  allowances	  as	  financial	  instruments	  
Classification	   of	  all	   emissions	   allowances	   as	   “financial	   instruments”,would	   extend	   the	   full	  
scope	  of	  EU	  financial	  markets	  regulation	  to	  both	  the	  derivatives	  and	  spot	  markets.	  For	  this	  
to	  happen,	  emissions	  allowances	  would	  have	  to	  be	  included	  within	  Annex	  I	  of	  MiFID.	  As	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp?FormPrincipal:_idcl=FormPrincip
al:libraryContentList:pager&page=3&FormPrincipal_SUBMIT=1	  
162	  Directive	  2004/39/EC,	  Annex	  I,	  Section	  C.	  
163	  IETA,	  “Emissions	  trading	  master	  agreement	  for	  the	  EU	  emissions	  trading	  scheme,	  Version	  3.0”,	  [2008],	  IETA	  
website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=229&Itemid=137	  
164	  See	  note	  65.	  
165	  IETA	  [2011],	  above	  note	  171	  	  
166	  Prada	  [2010],	  above	  n.	  65.	  
167	  European	  Commission,	  “Towards	  an	  enhanced	  market	  oversight	  framework	  for	  the	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	  
Scheme”,	  [2010],	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council,	  Brussels,	  
Belgium.	  
168	  Romania	  is	  the	  only	  Member	  State	  to	  have	  independently	  applied	  this	  definition	  already.	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Directive	   has	   recently	   been	   subject	   to	   stakeholder	   consultation	   and	   is	   currently	   under	  
review	  by	  the	  Commission,	  the	  opportunity	  exists	  for	  this	   introduction.	   Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  
questions	   included	   in	   the	  MiFID	   consultation	   asks:	   ‘What	   is	   your	   opinion	   on	   whether	   to	  
classify	   emissions	   allowances	   as	   financial	   instruments?’. 169 	  	   However,	   the	   mixture	   of	  
responses	  received	  prove	  that	  stakeholders	  are	  divided	  on	  this	  issue.170	  
	  
The	  extension	  of	  EU	  market	  oversight	  regulations	  to	  the	  spot	  market	  would	  act	  to	  increase	  
investor	  protection	  and	  transparency,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  protection	  from	  future	  threats	  of	  
market	   abuse	   and	  money	   laundering.	   Some	   of	   the	   consultation	   respondents	   argued	   that	  
this	   is	   essential	   to	   supporting	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   ETS	   system	   as	   a	   whole.	  171	  MiFID	   and	  
associated	  Directives	  also	  constitute	  a	  well-­‐tried	  regime	  that	  has	  proved	  effective	   in	  other	  
markets.	   It	   was	   further	   argued	   that	   applying	   the	   same	   regulatory	   framework	   across	   the	  
market	  would	  provide	  a	  simpler	  regulatory	  landscape	  and	  a	  harmonised	  legal	  definition	  that	  
would	   be	   less	   confusing	   for	   new	   investors.172	  As	   trade	   in	   financial	   instruments	   is	   exempt	  
from	  VAT,	  the	  extension	  of	  EU	  financial	  regulations	  to	  trade	  in	  emissions	  allowances	  would	  
also	  provide	  a	  welcome	  market-­‐wide	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  VAT	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  
	  
Yet	  there	  is	  fear	  that	  the	  application	  of	  extensive	  EU	  financial	  market	  regulation	  to	  all	  trade	  
in	   emissions	   allowances	   would	   introduce	   a	   large	   administrative	   and	   financial	   burden	   on	  
compliance	   firms.	   The	   additional	   need	   for	   licensing,	   tighter	   contractual	   agreements,	   and	  
higher	   trade-­‐related	   reporting	  and	   supervisory	   requirements	  under	  MiFID	   (and	  associated	  
regulation)	  would	  significantly	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  trading	  for	  those	  firms	  that	  currently	  only	  
participate	  in	  the	  spot	  market.	  	  
	  
Economic	  studies	  have	  shown	  high	  trading	  costs	  within	  pollution	  permit	  markets	  can	  lead	  to	  
a	   decreased	  willingness	   to	   trade	   among	   compliance	   firms,	   as	   the	   inclusion	   of	   these	   costs	  
within	   firms’	   micro-­‐rational	   trading/abatement	   decisions	   may	   decrease	   the	   perceived	  
benefit	   of	   trading.173	  174	  Decreased	   trading	   leads	   to	   decreased	   market	   liquidity,	   which	   in	  
turn	  may	   hamper	   the	  market’s	   ability	   to	   efficiently	   signal	   an	   accurate	   price	   for	   pollution.	  
This	  results	  in	  an	  inefficient	  use	  of	  allowances,	  and	  an	  increased	  cost-­‐burden	  of	  abatement	  
for	   firms.	   However,	   the	   factors	   affecting	   the	   trading	   and	   abatement	   decisions	   of	   firms	  
specifically	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  are	  not	  very	  well	  understood	  and	  have	  not	  been	  
subject	   to	   extensive	   research.	   It	   is	   therefore	   difficult	   to	   accurately	   assess	   how	   increased	  
costs	   associated	   with	   strengthened	   market	   oversight,	   if	   adopted,	   might	   impact	   trading	  
decisions	  and	  market	  efficiency.	  Although	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  existing	  studies	  on	  EU	  ETS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  Question	  66	  of	  the	  MiFID	  consultation	  document	  (available	  at:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mifid/consultation_paper_en.pdf).	  
170	  all	  consultation	  responses	  available	  at:	  
https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp	  
171	  NASDAQ	  OMX,	  “European	  Commission	  Public	  Consultation	  on	  Review	  of	  Markets	  in	  Financial	  Instruments	  
Directive	  (MiFID),	  Reply	  from	  NASDAQ	  OMX”,	  [2011],	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp	  ;	  NASDAQ	  OMX	  run	  the	  Nordpool	  
exchange,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  EU	  emissions	  trading	  exchanges	  
172	  ibid	  
173	  Stavins,	  R.,	  “Transaction	  costs	  and	  tradable	  permits”,	  [1995],	  Journal	  of	  environmental	  economics	  and	  
management	  29:	  133-­‐148.	  
174	  Gangadharan,	  L.,	  “Transaction	  costs	  in	  pollution	  markets:	  an	  empirical	  study”,	  [2000],	  Land	  Economics,	  
76(4):	  601-­‐614.	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trading	  behaviour	  suggest	  that	  trading	  costs	  do	  not	  currently	  act	  as	  a	  prohibitive	  element	  to	  
trading	   decisions,175 	   176 	  these	   findings	   cannot	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   the	   assumption	   that	  
increased	   trading	   costs	   would	   not	   impact	   on	   cost-­‐efficiency,	   especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
Phase	  III	  of	  the	  scheme	  in	  which	  additional	  changes	  to	  the	  emissions	  trading	  landscape	  are	  
planned.	   With	   a	   tightened	   emissions	   cap	   in	   Phase	   III,	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   central	  
auctioning	  platform,	  more	  firms	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  to	  trade	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  their	  compliance	  
obligations.	   Thus	   uncertainty	   regarding	   the	   potential	   implications	   of	   increased	   market	  
oversight	   on	   the	   EU	   ETS	   requires	   that	   further	   research	   is	   carried	   out	   in	   order	   to	   inform	  
future	  decisions	  on	  the	  most	  effective	  market	  oversight	  measures	  that	  must	  be	  taken.	  
	  
These	  costs	  would	  be	  especially	  significant	  to	  small	  compliance	  firms	  who	  have	  no	  previous	  
experience	   of	   trading	   in	   financial	   instruments	   and	   have	   fewer	   resources	   with	   which	   to	  
absorb	   the	   increased	   cost	   burden.	   Although	   both	   small	   compliance	   firms	   and	   the	   trading	  
arms	   of	   larger	   operators	  would	   come	   under	   exemptions	   in	   the	   current	  MiFID	   framework	  
(see	  table	  4),	  these	  exemptions	  are	  subject	  to	  revision	  in	  the	  on-­‐going	  review	  process.	  It	  is	  
possible	   that	  as	  a	   result	  of	   this	   revision,	  compliance	  buyers	  and	   trading	  subsidiaries	  could	  
become	   subject	   to	   burdensome	   regulations.177	  Yet,	   according	   to	   the	   UK	   Treasury,	   these	  
participants	   are	   unlikely	   to	   pose	   any	   significant	   threat	   to	   the	   market.178	  Extensive	   and	  
burdensome	   regulatory	   requirements	   imposed	   by	   MiFID	   therefore	   seem	   wholly	  
disproportionate.	   As	   a	   result,	   most	   energy	   companies	   and	   compliance	   operators	   who	  
responded	   to	   the	  MiFID	   consultation	   understandably	   did	   not	   support	   the	   classification	   of	  
emissions	  allowances	  as	  financial	  instruments.179	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  potential	  negative	  impacts	  on	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  from	  extending	  the	  
application	   of	   EU	   financial	   regulations,	   even	   those	   respondents	   to	   the	   Commission	  
consultation	  who	  had	  fundamentally	  declared	  that	  they	  welcomed	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  more	  
extensive	   definition	   of	   emissions	   allowances	   as	   financial	   instruments	   (such	   as	   the	   Czech	  
ministry	  of	   finance	   and	   the	  Norwegian	  Ministry	  of	   Finance),	   stressed	  however	   that	   an	   in-­‐
depth	   study	   of	   the	   potential	   wider	   consequences	   is	   required	   before	   this	   regime	   is	  
implemented.180	  	  
	  
The	   extension	   of	   the	   full	   scope	   of	   EU	   financial	  market	   oversight	   regulation	   could	   also	   be	  
regarded	   as	   a	   disproportionate	   response	   to	   the	   impacts	   of	   fraud	   on	   the	   carbon	  market.	  
MiFID	   provisions	   for	   example	   mainly	   act	   to	   protect	   investors,	   and	   ensure	   market	  
transparency,	   with	   many	   of	   the	   associated	   safeguards	   focusing	   on	   the	   protection	   of	  
uninformed	  retail	  customers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  EU	  ETS	  spot	  market	  does	  not	  tend	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  Jaraite,	  J.,	  F.	  Convery	  and	  C.	  Di	  Maria,	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  10(2):	  190-­‐215	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  al.,	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[2011],	  Centre	  for	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  Occasional	  Paper	  27,	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  School	  of	  Economics,	  London	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  Above	  note	  180.	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  UK	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  response	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  Commission	  Services’	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  on	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  of	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  Markets	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  Consultation	  on	  
the	  review	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  example	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  European	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  trading;	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  available	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  above	  n.	  180	  
180	  Responses	  available	  at	  above	  n.	  180	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attract	   investment	   from	   the	   general	   public.	   According	   to	   Johnathan	   Herbst,	   financial	  
services	  Partner	  at	  the	  law	  firm	  Norton	  Rose,	   ‘it	   is	  questionable	  whether	  compliance	  firms	  
buying	   financial	   instruments	   on	   the	   spot	   market	   need	   the	   same	   level	   of	   investment	  
protection	  as	  that	  applied	  to	  members	  of	  the	  public	  buying	  financial	  instruments’.181	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   the	  EU	  ETS	  spot	  allowance	   is	  a	   relatively	   simple	  product	  when	  compared	   to	  
other	   complex	   derivative	   instruments.	   As	   such,	   many	   cross-­‐sector	   economic	   regulations,	  
such	   as	  MAD	   and	   the	   cash-­‐settlement	  Directive,	  would	   not	   seem	   as	   relevant	   to	   the	   spot	  
market.182	  More	   specifically,	  market	  abuse	   is	  not	   recognised	  as	  evident	   risk	   to	   the	   carbon	  
spot	   market.	   According	   to	   Stig	   Schjolset,	   Senior	   Analyst	   at	   Point	   Carbon	   market	  
manipulation	  has	  not	  materialised	  as	  a	  major	   issue	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  Unlike	   in	  the	  electricity	  
market,	   no	   operators	   in	   the	   EU	   ETS	  market	   find	   themselves	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   from	  
which	   to	   easily	   manipulate	   the	   market.	   Additionally	   Johnathan	   Herbst,	   financial	   services	  
Partner	  at	  Norton	  Rose	  LLP,	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  would	  actually	  constitute	  inside	  
information	  on	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market.	  Compared	  to	  the	  oil	  market,	  in	  which	  the	  non-­‐public	  
knowledge	   of	   the	   shutting	   down	   of	   an	   oil-­‐rig,	   for	   example,	   could	   be	   classified	   as	   inside	  
information,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  equivalent	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  It	  is	  therefore	  unclear	  how	  the	  
regulatory	  burdens	  involved	  with	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  MAD	  to	  emissions	  trading	  in	  the	  spot	  
market	  would	  benefit	  the	  system	  at	  all.183	  184	  	  
	  
Perhaps	   more	   significantly,	   as	   argued	   by	   the	   UK	   Treasury	   in	   their	   MiFID	   consultation	  
response,	  the	  measures	  imposed	  by	  this	  regulation	  do	  not	  even	  appropriately	  help	  prevent	  
the	   types	  of	   fraud	   that	  are	   currently	  major	   threats	   to	   this	  market,	   such	  as	  VAT	   fraud	  and	  
allowance	   thefts.185	  Although	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   the	   EU-­‐wide	   adoption	   of	   the	   financial	  
instrument	  definition	  to	  emissions	  allowances	  could	  clarify	  some	  important	  issues	  (such	  as	  
rules	  on	   liability	  and	  extent	  of	  application	  of	  VAT	   to	  emissions	   trading),	   these	  benefits	  on	  
the	  other	  hand	  could	  be	  offset	  by	  the	  costs	  of	  applying	  additional	  burdensome	  regulations.	  	  
	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  irrelevance	  of	  much	  of	  MiFID	  and	  related	  financial	  market	  oversight	  rules,	  
some	   stakeholders	   feel	   that	   defining	   emissions	   allowances	   as	   financial	   instruments	   is	  
inappropriate	   in	   itself.	   Although	   emissions	   allowances	   share	   some	   notable	   characteristics	  
with	   financial	   instruments,	  being	  both	  dematerialised	  and	  easily	   transferable,	   the	   two	  are	  
entirely	   distinguishable.	   As	   pointed	   out	   by	   one	   interviewee,	   awkwardly	   applying	   a	   false	  
classification	  may	  not	  necessarily	  help	  as	  much	  of	  the	  related	  case	   law	  will	  not	  be	  directly	  
applicable. 186 	  Similarly,	   the	   International	   Swaps	   and	   Derivatives	   Association	   expressed	  
concerns	  over	  this	  ‘false	  classification’.187	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  Johnathan	  Herbst,	  Norton	  Rose	  LLP,	  interview	  (29.07.2011)	  
182	  Prada	  [2010],	  supra	  n.65	  
183	  Anonymous,	  associate,	  leading	  UK	  law	  firm,	  interview	  (21.07.2011);	  Johnathan	  Herbst,	  Norton	  Rose	  LLP,	  
interview	  (29.07.2011):	  What	  inside	  information	  is	  there	  on	  the	  carbon	  market.	  There	  is	  no	  one	  with	  enough	  
market	  power	  to	  manipulate	  the	  market.	  
184	  Simone	  Ruiz,	  IETA,	  phone	  interview	  (15.07.2011):	  mentioned	  that	  market	  participants	  cannot	  think	  of	  
obvious	  instances	  of	  market	  manipulation	  or	  insider	  trading	  in	  the	  spot	  carbon	  market	  
185	  Anonymous,	  associate,	  leading	  UK	  law	  firm,	  interview	  (21.07.2011)	  
186	  Anonymous,	  associate,	  leading	  UK	  law	  firm,	  interview	  (21.07.2011)	  
187	  International	  Swaps	  and	  Derivatives	  Association,	  “ISDA’s	  response	  to	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  public	  
consultation	  on	  the	  review	  of	  the	  Markets	  in	  Financial	  Instruments	  Directive	  (MiFID)”,	  [2011],	  [online]	  
available	  at:	  https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp	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Option	  2	  -­‐	  A	  bespoke	  regulatory	  regime	  for	  emissions	  allowances	  
	  
An	  alternative	  option	   for	   carbon	  market	  oversight	   reform	  proposed	  by	   the	  Commission	   is	  
the	   design	   and	   application	   of	   a	   specific	   oversight	   framework	   for	   trade	   in	   emissions	  
allowances.	  This	  could	  either	  be	  achieved	  by	  separately	  extending	  the	  application	  of	  specific	  
existing	  MiFID	  and	  MAD	  rules,	  and/or	  by	  establishing	  an	  entirely	  new	  set	  of	  rules	  specifically	  
tailored	   to	   the	   carbon	  market.188	  Such	   a	   regime	   could	   enable	   a	   mechanism	   to	   be	   put	   in	  
place	  that	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  and	  the	  risks	  
present	   within	   the	   market.	   This	   could	   avoid	   unnecessary	   regulatory	   burdens	   and	   costs	  
falling	  on	  market	  participants	   that	  do	  not	  pose	   a	   significant	   risk	   to	   the	  market.	   For	   these	  
reasons	  some	  argue	  that	  this	  constitutes	  a	  more	  proportionate	  approach	  than	  the	  adoption	  
of	   a	   financial	   instruments	  definition,189	  whilst	   allowing	   room	   for	   the	   application	  of	   a	   legal	  
definition	  more	  fitting	  to	  emissions	  allowances.	  
	  
The	  implementation	  of	  regulatory	  changes	  outside	  of	  the	  MiFID	  regime	  could	  also	  be	  faster	  
and	  more	  focused.	   It	  can	  take	  up	  to	  four	  years	  for	  revisions	  to	  complex	  Directives	  such	  as	  
MiFID	   to	   be	   decided	   upon	   and	   implemented.	   Relying	   on	   the	   extension	   of	   MiFID	   could	  
therefore	   delay	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   market	   oversight	   framework	   for	   the	   EU	   carbon	   spot	  
market	  –	   leaving	   it	  exposed	   in	   the	  mean	  time.	   If	  eventually	  adopted,	   the	  market	   runs	   the	  
risk	   of	   being	   inappropriately	   regulated	   for	   a	   long	   period	   of	   time	   due	   to	   difficulties	   in	  
subsequently	   adapting	   provisions.	   Furthermore,	   carbon	   market	   concerns	   are	   unlikely	   to	  
receive	  the	  necessary	  level	  of	  attention	  within	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  surrounding	  the	  
MiFID	  review	  due	  to	  the	  range	  of	  other	  issues	  open	  to	  discussion.	  Establishing	  a	  targeted	  EU	  
carbon	   market	   oversight	   regulation	   through	   a	   bespoke	   regime	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   could	  
constitute	  a	  more	  rapid	  and	  focused	  approach	  that	  is	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  specificities	  
of	  the	  carbon	  market.	  	  
	  
The	  enhanced	  flexibility	  of	  a	  bespoke	  regime	   is	  especially	  attractive	   in	   light	  of	  adapting	  to	  
future	  threats	  that	  might	  emerge	  in	  this	  still	  maturing	  market.	  For	  example,	  phase	  III	  of	  the	  
EU	  ETS	  will	   see	   the	   introduction	  of	   a	   central	   auctioning	  platform	   through	  which	  a	   certain	  
proportion	   of	   emissions	   allowances,	   previously	   allocated	   for	   free,	   will	   be	   open	   for	  
purchase.190	  191	  Although	   this	   primary	   market	   will	   itself	   fall	   under	   the	   full	   extent	   of	   EU	  
financial	   regulation,	   the	  Commission	  will	  need	   to	  assess	  how	   its	   introduction	  might	  affect	  
risks	  of	  fraud	  and	  market	  abuse	  on	  the	  spot	  and	  derivatives	  markets,	  and	  adapts	  regulation	  
accordingly.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
188	  European	  Commission,	  “Discussion	  paper	  in	  view	  of	  a	  European	  Climate	  Change	  Programme	  (ECCP)	  
stakeholder	  meeting	  on	  carbon	  market	  oversight	  organised	  by	  the	  Commission	  services”,	  [2011],	  Brussels,	  
Belgium.	  
189	  Prada	  [2010],	  above	  n.	  65.	  
190	  European	  Commission,	  “Emissions	  trading:	  Questions	  and	  answers	  on	  enhanced	  market	  oversight	  for	  the	  
European	  carbon	  market”,	  [2010],	  European	  Commission	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/697	  
191	  Regulation	  1031/2010	  of	  12	  November	  2010	  on	  the	  timing,	  administration	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  auctioning	  
of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  allowances	  pursuant	  to	  Directive	  2003/87/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  
the	  Council	  establishing	  a	  scheme	  for	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  allowances	  trading	  within	  the	  Community	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Yet,	   if	   regulatory	   measures	   were	   to	   be	   decided	   upon	   outside	   of	   the	   MiFID	   framework,	  
decisions	  would	  be	  made	  by	  environmental	  policy	  makers	  (the	  Commission’s	  DG	  CLIMA	  and	  
DG	  Environment),	  many	  of	  whom	  may	  not	  have	  extensive	  knowledge	  of	  market	  supervisory	  
issues.	  To	  optimise	  the	  sharing	  of	  knowledge	  between	  experts,	  Johnathan	  Herbst,	  lawyer	  at	  
Norton	   Rose,	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   appropriate	   communication	   between	   the	  
Commission’s	   environmental	   (DG	   CLIMA	   and	   DG	   Environment)	   and	   financial	   market	   (DG	  
MKT)	  directorates.192	  	  
	  
There	   seems	   to	  be	   a	   large	  weight	  of	   support	   for	   this	   type	  of	  ad	  hoc	   approach	  within	   the	  
MiFID	   consultation	   responses.193	  However,	   the	  Commission	  would	   still	   need	   to	   assess	   the	  
specific	  rules	  that	  would	  be	  appropriate	  for	  a	  bespoke	  regime.	  This	  process	  itself	  could	  take	  
a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time,	  especially	  considering	  the	  range	  of	  different	  interest	  that	  exist	  
within	  this	  heterogeneous	  market.	  
7.5.	  Conclusions	  on	  extension	  of	  EU	  financial	  markets	  regulation	  to	  EU	  ETS	  
	  
Despite	  the	  evident	  drawbacks,	  the	  Commission	  appears	  to	  be	  advocating	  the	  adoption	  of	  
the	  definition	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  as	  financial	  instruments	  in	  order	  to	  close	  the	  gaps	  in	  
EU	  carbon	  market	  oversight.	  Whilst	  acknowledging	  the	  risks	  and	  potential	  drawbacks	  arising	  
from	  the	  extension	  of	  EU	  financial	  regulations	  to	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  the	  Commission	  seems	  to	  be	  
advocating	  a	  “better	  safe	  than	  sorry”	  approach	  aimed	  to	  prevent	  risks	  that	  may	  emerge	  in	  
the	   future.194	  	   Market	   participants	   remain	   concerned	   however	   that	   the	   extension	   of	   this	  
burdensome	  financial	  regulation	  would	  significantly	  increase	  trading	  costs,	  and	  thus	  would	  
be	  disadvantageous	  to	  small	  compliance	  entities	  and	  affect	   their	  willingness	  to	  trade.	  This	  
could	   compromise	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	  whole	   trading	   system.	   If	   the	   application	   of	  MiFID	  
were	   to	   be	   extended,	   the	   Commission	   would	   at	   least	   need	   to	   ensure	   that	   appropriate	  
exemptions	  were	   in	  place	   to	  avoid	   the	  disproportionate	   regulation	  of	  market	  participants	  
relative	  to	  the	  threat	  they	  pose.	  As	  stressed	  by	  Johnathan	  Herbst,	  “the	  Commission	  needs	  to	  
seriously	   consider	   what	   is	   proportional	   and	   what	   is	   relevant…”.	  195	  Hence	   in	   general	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  bespoke	  regime	  would	  be	  a	  more	  appropriate	  and	  proportionate	  response	  to	  
fraud	   in	   the	  EU	  carbon	  market	   than	  extending	   the	  application	  of	  existing	   financial	  market	  
regulations.	  	  
	  
	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  Johnathan	  Herbst,	  Norton	  Rose	  LLP,	  interview	  (29.07.2011)	  
193	  For	  example:	  HM	  Treasury,	  French	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  IETA	  all	  expressed	  support	  for	  a	  bespoke	  regime	  
within	  their	  MiFID	  consultation	  responses.	  	  
194	  Anonymous,	  EU	  ETS	  policy	  expert,	  interview	  (15.07.2011)	  
195	  Johnathan	  Herbst,	  Norton	  Rose	  LLP,	  interview	  (29.07.2011)	  
	   45	  




The	   methods	   by	   which	   fraudsters	   target	   markets	   are	   constantly	   evolving.	   It	   is	   therefore	  
unlikely	   that	   the	   EU	   ETS	   can	   be	   made	   entirely	   immune	   to	   criminal	   attacks.	   Even	   if	  
“immunity”	   were	   possible,	   the	   administrative	   and	   operational	   costs	   borne	   by	   both	   the	  
regulatory	   authorities	   and	   legitimate	   market	   participants	   could	   be	   uneconomical.	   It	   is	  
important	  therefore	  that	  effective	  mechanisms	  are	  in	  place	  through	  which	  Member	  States	  
can	  trace	  and	  prosecute	  criminal	  behaviour	  (such	  as	  the	  theft	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  and	  
VAT	  fraud).	  Moreover,	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  deterrent	  against	  ongoing	  criminal	  activity	  within	  
the	   EU	   ETS,	   Member	   States	   may	   be	   required	   to	   penalise	   fraud	   and	   related	   activities	  
affecting	  the	  carbon	  markets.	  	  
	  
Although	  there	  has	  already	  been	  some	  level	  of	  successful	  investigatory	  response	  to	  fraud	  on	  
the	  EU	  ETS,	  the	  cross-­‐border	  nature	  of	  these	  crimes	  make	  the	  coordination	  of	  investigations	  
and	  prosecutions	  between	  the	  different	  Member	  States	   involved	  difficult.	  EU	  criminal	   law	  
and	   the	   administrative	   structures	   implementing	   it	   are	   currently	   undergoing	   extensive	  
reform,	  and	  the	  resulting	  changes	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  help	  strengthen	  the	  coordination	  of	  
the	   fight	   against	   fraud	   and	   organised	   crime	   in	   the	   future,	   both	  within	   the	   EU-­‐ETS	   and	   in	  
other	  sectors.	  
8.2.	  The	  coordination	  of	  investigations	  and	  prosecutions	  in	  the	  EU	  	  
Traditionally,	   decisions	   as	   to	   what	   activities	   are	   deemed	   criminal	   and	   the	   associated	  
sanctions	   have	   been	  made	   at	   the	   national	   level.196	  However,	   since	   the	   ratification	   of	   the	  
Maastricht	  Treaty	   in	  1993,	   the	  EU	  Member	  States	  have	   found	  a	   forum	   for	   cooperation	   in	  
criminal	  matters	  and	  harmonisation	  of	  criminal	  legislation	  (then	  known	  as	  the	  ‘third	  pillar’).	  
As	  much	  of	  the	  serious	  criminal	  activities	  that	  have	  hit	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market,	  such	  as	  VAT	  
fraud	  and	  allowance	  thefts,	  are	  of	  a	  transnational	  nature	  i.e.	  involving	  individuals	  located	  in	  
more	   than	   one	   Member	   State	   coordinating	   cross-­‐border	   transactions,	   they	   call	   for	   the	  
effective	   criminal	   law	   cooperation	   and	   coordination	   between	   the	   Member	   States.	   As	   a	  
result	  of	  the	  discrepancies	  between	  individual	  Member	  States’	  criminal	  law	  and	  procedure,	  
problems	  often	  arise	  when	   investigating	  and	  prosecuting	   such	   cross-­‐border	   crimes.	   These	  
include	  obstacles	  to	  obtain	  evidence	  from	  other	  Member	  States,	  and	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  
by	  one	  Member	  State	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  made	  in	  another.197	  	  
	  
To	  help	  overcome	  some	  of	  these	  difficulties,	  the	  European	  Commission	  plays	  a	  key	  role	   in	  
proposing	   legislation	   on	   mutual	   recognition	   as	   well	   as	   aimed	   to	   harmonise	   laws	   and	  
procedures	   in	   the	   Member	   States	   against	   serious	   (transnational)	   criminal	   activity.198	  In	  
addition,	   the	   European	   Police	   Office	   (Europol),	   the	   European	   Judicial	   Cooperation	   Unit	  
(Eurojust)	   and	   the	  European	  Anti-­‐fraud	  Office	   (OLAF)	  play	   important	   roles	   in	   coordinating	  
the	  criminal	  policies	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  Steiner,	  J.	  and	  L.	  Woods,	  EU	  Law,	  (10th	  edition,	  2009),	  Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  	  
197	  European	  Commission,	  “The	  recognition	  of	  decisions	  between	  EU	  countries”,	  [2011],	  European	  Commission	  
Criminal	  Justice	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/recognition-­‐
decision/index_en.htm	  	  
198	  Steiner,	  J.	  and	  L.	  Woods	  [2009],	  supra	  n.	  206.	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The	  European	  Police	  Office	  (Europol),	  set	  up	  in	  1992,	  is	  the	  European	  Union’s	  law	  
enforcement	  agency.	  Its	  main	  role	  is	  to	  assist	  Member	  States	  in	  their	  fight	  against	  serious	  
international	  crime	  and	  terrorism.	  Europol	  acts	  to	  assist	  EU	  Member	  States	  through	  the	  
provision	  of	  expertise	  and	  technical	  support,	  the	  facilitation	  of	  the	  exchange	  of	  information	  
and	  data,	  and	  the	  coordination	  of	  cross-­‐border	  investigations.199	  Since	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  
Europol	  has	  concentrated	  much	  of	  its	  activities	  and	  resources	  to	  counter-­‐terrorism	  and	  
action	  against	  organised	  crime.	  In	  addition,	  the	  European	  Judicial	  Cooperation	  Unit	  
(Eurojust),	  established	  in	  2002,	  is	  responsible	  for	  facilitating	  coordination	  between	  judicial	  
authorities	  in	  the	  Member	  States	  regarding	  the	  prosecution	  of	  serious	  criminal	  behaviour.200	  
However,	  neither	  Europol	  nor	  Eurojust	  have	  the	  power	  to	  bring	  prosecutions	  or	  start	  
criminal	  investigations	  in	  the	  Member	  States,	  instead	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  coordinating	  the	  
action	  of	  national	  authorities.	  
	  
Particularly	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  fraud	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  the	  European	  
Anti-­‐fraud	  Office	  (OLAF),	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  
the	  European	  Union,	  by	  combatting	  fraud	  and	  corruption	  affecting	  the	  supply	  or	  
expenditure	  of	  the	  EU	  budget.	  Operationally	  independent	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  EU	  
organisations,	  OLAF	  acts	  to	  investigate	  fraud,	  corruption	  and	  any	  other	  illegal	  activities	  
affecting	  the	  EU	  financial	  interests,	  both	  internally	  (within	  EU	  institutions)	  and	  externally	  (	  in	  
Member	  States	  and	  further	  afield).201	  	  In	  addition	  to	  ‘coordination	  cases’	  in	  which	  OLAF	  
contributes	  to	  investigations	  carried	  out	  by	  national	  authorities	  or	  other	  Community	  
departments	  through	  the	  gathering	  and	  exchange	  of	  information	  and	  contacts,	  OLAF	  also	  
carries	  out	  external	  investigations	  in	  the	  Member	  States	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  detecting	  fraud	  
or	  other	  irregular	  conduct	  by	  natural	  or	  legal	  persons.	  	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   European	   Commission	   does	   not	   have	   independent	   investigative	  
powers.	   It	   is	  only	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  requests	  from	  the	  relevant	  Member	  State	  authorities	  
and,	  whether	  appropriate,	  to	  bring	  action	  before	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  under	  Article	  
258	  TFEU	  against	  a	  Member	  State	  for	  its	  failure	  to	  control	  fraudulent	  activities	  against	  the	  
EU	   budget	   or	   EU	   law.	   However,	   the	   Commission	   (as	   a	   rule)	   does	   not	   have	   the	   power	   to	  
apply	  penalties	  directly	  against	  individuals	  or	  corporations	  for	  violations	  of	  EU	  law.	  
	  
Alongside	   these	   coordination	   bodies,	   tools	   also	   exist	   on	   the	   EU-­‐level	   to	   aid	   in	   obtaining	  
evidence	  for	  use	  in	  cross-­‐border	  criminal	  investigations	  (see	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  
2008)202	  and	  for	   the	  surrender	  of	  citizens	  who	  have	  committed	  a	  serious	  crime	   in	  another	  
EU	   country	   (the	   European	   Arrest	   Warrant	   2002).203	  But	   current	   instruments	   to	   facilitate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  Art	  88	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  See,	  	  www.europol.europa.eu/;	  
http://europa.eu/agencies/pol_agencies/europol/index_en.htm.]	  	  	  	  
200	  Art	  85	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  
	  [source:	  http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/]	  
201	  [source:	  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/olaf/mission/index_en-­‐new.html.]	  
[Regulation	  1073/1999;	  2185/96;	  2988/95]	  
	  
202	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  2008/978/JHA	  of	  18	  December	  2008	  on	  the	  European	  evidence	  warrant	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters	  
203	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  2002/584/JHA	  of	  13	  June	  2002	  on	  the	  European	  arrest	  warrant	  and	  the	  
surrender	  procedures	  between	  Member	  States	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police	  and	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  in	  the	  EU	  are	  fragmentary,	  and	  significant	  
obstacles	   still	   exist	   to	   their	   effective	   operation.	   Moreover,	   the	   impact	   that	   these	  
instruments	  have	  on	  civil	  rights	  and	  liberties	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.204	  The	  Commission	  
itself	  has	  recognised	  this	  and	  expressed	  the	  need	  for	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  the	  way	  that	  cross-­‐
border	  crime	  is	  dealt	  with,205	  in	  particular	  when	  launching	  the	  Action	  plan	  to	  implement	  the	  
Stockholm	  Programme	  in	  April	  2010,	  which	  sets	  out	  the	  priorities	  of	  EU	  criminal	  law	  for	  the	  
following	  five	  years.206	  
	  
The	   transnational	  nature	  of	   the	  EU	  ETS	  has	  made	   it	   an	  attractive	   vehicle	   for	   cross-­‐border	  
crime.	   Although	   some	   of	   the	   criminals	   involved	   have	   been	   successfully	   prosecuted,	   both	  
VAT	  fraud	  and	  allowance	  thefts	  illustrate	  the	  obstacles	  that	  remain	  in	  the	  investigation	  and	  
prosecution	  of	  crime	  conducted	  over	  multiple	  jurisdictions.	  
8.3.	  Investigation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  VAT	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS	  
VAT	   fraud	   is	   difficult	   to	   detect	   and	   prosecute.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   carousel	   fraud,	   the	   crime	   is	  
quick	  to	  execute	  and	  leaves	  little	  evidence.	  The	  crime	  is	  often	  embedded	  within	  a	  complex	  
web	  of	  transactions,	  and	  therefore	  proof	  of	  fraudsters’	  failure	  to	  surrender	  VAT	  is	  difficult	  to	  
obtain	  and	   involves	   sifting	   through	  a	   large	  amount	  of	  documentary	  evidence.207	  Since	   the	  
criminals	  involved	  are	  often	  based	  across	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  or	  use	  foreign	  companies	  as	  
vehicles	   for	   their	   fraudulent	   transactions,	   it	   can	   be	   difficult	   and	   time-­‐consuming	   to	   get	  
access	  to	  this	  evidence.208	  209	  Some	  Member	  States	  also	  place	  limits	  on	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  
that	   has	   been	   collected	   from	   foreign	   jurisdictions,210 	  although	   the	   European	   Evidence	  
Warrant	  adopted	  in	  2008	  aims	  to	  facilitate	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  evidence	  between	  the	  
Member	   States.	   Furthermore,	   if	   suspects	   are	   located	   in	   countries	   that	   have	   not	   directly	  
suffered	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  crime,	  the	  prosecution	  services	  of	  these	  States	  often	  do	  not	  have	  
sufficient	   incentive	   to	  prosecute	  VAT-­‐fraud	   cases,	   or	   aid	   in	   other	   States’	   investigations.211	  
212As	   neither	   Europol	   nor	   Eurojust	   have	   the	   means	   to	   initiate	   criminal	   investigations	   or	  
prosecutions	   themselves,	   the	  decision	  as	   to	  whether	  or	  not	   to	  bring	  prosecutions	  or	   start	  
investigations	   is	   left	   the	   discretion	   of	   the	   national	   authorities	   in	   the	  Member	   States,	   and	  
criminals	  often	  go	  unpunished.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  There	  is	  growing	  discontent	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  impact	  on	  civil	  liberties	  arising	  from	  the	  application	  of	  
mutual	  recognition	  instruments,	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  (see	  below).	  	  
205	  European	  Commission,	  “Recognition	  of	  decisions	  between	  EU	  countries:	  Evidence”,	  [2011],	  European	  
Commission	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/recognition-­‐
decision/evidence/index_en.htm	  
206	  See	  COMMUNICATION	  FROM	  THE	  COMMISSION	  TO	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  PARLIAMENT,	  THE	  COUNCIL,	  THE	  
EUROPEAN	  ECONOMIC	  AND	  SOCIAL	  COMMITTEE	  AND	  THE	  COMMITTEE	  OF	  REGIONS	  Delivering	  an	  area	  of	  
freedom,	  security	  and	  justice	  for	  Europe's	  citizens:	  Action	  Plan	  Implementing	  the	  Stockholm	  Programme,	  
COM(2010)	  171	  final	  
207	  Price	  Waterhouse	  Coopers,	  “How	  does	  organised	  crime	  misuse	  EU	  funds?”,	  [2011],	  Study	  for	  Directorate	  
General	  for	  Internal	  Policies,	  Policy	  Department	  D,	  European	  Parliament,	  Brussels,	  Belgium.	  
208	  Crown	  Prosecution	  Service,	  “Central	  Fraud	  Group	  Frequently	  Asked	  Questions”,	  [2011],	  Crown	  Prosecution	  
Service	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/your_cps/our_organisation/cfg/our_work/frequently_asked_questions.html#a07	  
209	  Eurojust	  [2011],	  above	  note	  23.	  
210	  European	  Commission,	  “Communication	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
by	  criminal	  law	  and	  by	  administrative	  investigations”,	  [2011],	  COM(2011)293	  final,	  Brussels,	  Belgium.	  	  
211	  ibid	  
212	  Eurojust,	  “Annual	  Report	  2010”,	  [2011],	  Eurojust,	  The	  Hague,	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  Netherlands.	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In	  order	  to	  help	  overcome	  obstacles	  to	  the	  prosecution	  of	  VAT	  fraudsters,	  in	  2010	  Eurojust	  
established	   a	   strategic	   project	   to	   enhance	   information	   exchange	   and	   judicial	   cooperation	  
between	  Member	   States	   in	   cross-­‐border	   VAT	   fraud	   cases,	   and	   hosted	   a	   meeting	   on	   the	  
subject	   in	  March	  2011.213	  Europol	  has	  also	  been	  heavily	   involved	   in	  gathering	   information	  
and	  data	  to	  help	  Member	  States	  target	  VAT	  fraudsters	  in	  the	  European	  carbon	  market,	  and	  
has	  contributed	  to	  the	  coordination	  of	  successful	  investigations	  throughout	  the	  EU.	  In	  April	  
2010	  a	  series	  of	  synchronised	  raids	  were	  conducted	  across	  Europe	  in	  coordination	  with	  the	  
national	  authorities	  targeting	  VAT	  fraudsters	  operating	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  The	  raids	  took	  place	  
in	  the	  UK,	  France,	  Spain,	  Denmark	  and	  Holland,	  resulting	   in	  the	  arrest	  of	  over	  100	  people.	  
Various	  other	  more	  localised	  arrests	  have	  also	  occurred	  in	  the	  UK,	  France	  and	  Italy.	  	  	  
	  
Despite	   these	  successful	  operations	  tackling	  EU	  ETS	   fraud,	  many	  significant	  difficulties	  still	  
exist	  in	  coordinating	  action	  against	  cross-­‐border	  VAT	  fraud	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  A	  recent	  analysis	  
by	   Price	   Waterhouse	   Coopers	   found	   that	   the	   coordination	   between	   Member	   States	   in	  
criminal	   proceedings	   targeting	   VAT	   fraud	   is	   still	   insufficient.214	  A	   similar	   conclusion	   was	  
found	  by	  a	  recent	  EU	  Commission	  Communication.215	  
8.4.	  Investigation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  allowance	  thefts	  	  
Following	  the	  initial	  allowance	  thefts	  from	  the	  Romanian	  registry	  in	  November	  2010,	  DIICOT	  
(Romania’s	  equivalent	  to	  the	  UK’s	  Serious	  and	  Organised	  Crime	  Agency	  (SOCA))	  announced	  
in	   January	   2011	   that	   they	   were	   conducting	   international	   investigations	   into	   the	   registry	  
attacks.216	  Europol	  has	  also	  been	  coordinating	  investigations	  between	  other	  Member	  States	  
affected	  by	  or	  involved	  in	  registry	  hacks,	  such	  as	  the	  UK,217	  Greece	  and	  Estonia.	  But	  despite	  
these	   efforts	   in	   coordinating	   investigations	   against	   fraud,	   it	   appears	   that	   no	   arrests	   have	  
been	  made.	  Details	  of	  on-­‐going	  investigations	  are,	  quite	  understandably,	  not	  easy	  to	  obtain	  
as	  they	  are	  not	  always	  publicly	  available,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  measure	  the	  extent,	  
effectiveness	  and	  level	  of	  coordination	  of	  these	  investigations.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  paper	  does	  
not	  aim	  to	  give	  full	  account	  of	  the	  present	  levels	  of	  police	  and	  judicial	  cooperation	  between	  
the	  Member	  States	  against	  EU	  ETS	   fraud.	  Yet	   there	  are	  evident	  barriers	   to	   the	   success	  of	  
such	  investigations	  that	  are	  worth	  discussion.	  	  	  
	  
Thefts	   of	   emissions	   allowances	   were	   a	   result	   of	   cyber-­‐hacking	   attacks	   on	   accounts	   held	  
within	  national	  registries.	  Since	  such	  cyber-­‐attacks	  can	  be	  conducted	  remotely,	  the	  criminals	  
responsible	   for	   these	   thefts	   could	   have	   easily	   been	   located	   in	   a	   different	   country	   to	   the	  
registry	  victim	  of	  an	  attack.	  As	  with	  VAT	  fraud,	  this	  transnational	  element	  creates	  problems	  
relating	  to	  investigatory	  and	  judicial	  cooperation.	  Authorities	  of	  countries	  in	  which	  criminals	  
are	  located	  have	  no	  incentive	  to	  allocate	  resources	  to	  the	  investigation	  of	  a	  crime	  that	  may	  
not	   have	   directly	   affected	   them.	   And,	   even	   if	   criminals	   responsible	   for	   the	   theft	   of	  
allowances	  are	  traced	  and	  caught,	  discrepancies	  between	  national	  criminal	  law	  may	  hamper	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  Eurojust	  [2011],	  above	  n.23.	  
214	  Price	  Waterhouse	  Coopers	  [2011],	  above	  n.	  217	  
215	  European	  Commission	  [2010],	  ‘Towards	  an	  Enhanced	  Market	  Oversight	  Framework	  for	  the	  EU	  Emissions	  
Trading	  Scheme.’	  	  
216	  Ziare,	  “Romanian	  hackers	  attack	  the	  EU	  emissions	  trading	  system”,	  [2011],	  [translation]	  Ziare	  news	  website,	  
[online]	  available	  at:	  http://www.ziare.com/articole/romania+certificate+emisii+gaze	  
217	  SOCA	  has	  been	  working	  with	  Europol	  to	  coordinate	  investigations	  in	  which	  operatives	  at	  SOCA	  are	  posing	  as	  
carbon	  traders	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  expose	  fraudulent	  players	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS	  market	  involved	  in	  both	  allowance	  
thefts	  and	  VAT	  fraud	  (BussinessGreen,	  2011).	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the	   resulting	   judicial	   proceedings.	   Criminal	   liabilities	   and	   sanctions	   relating	   to	   phishing,	  
cyber-­‐hacking	   and	   theft	   differ	   between	   Member	   State	   jurisdictions.	   These	   legal	  
discrepancies	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  amplified	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  common	  EU-­‐wide	  legal	  definition	  of	  
emissions	   allowances,	   creating	   further	   problems	   relating	   to	   the	   mutual	   recognition	   of	  
judicial	  decisions	  in	  cross-­‐border	  prosecutions.	  	  
8.5.	   Recent	   developments	   in	   EU	   criminal	   law	   and	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  
proceedings	  
  
In	  December	  2009,	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  came	  into	  force.218	  It	  introduced	  substantial	  reforms	  to	  
the	  Treaty	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  Treaty	  Establishing	  the	  European	  Community	  that	  
acted	   to	   abolish	   the	   previous	   “pillar”	   structure	   of	   European	   Community	   law, 219 	  thus	  
abolishing	  discrepancies	   in	   competencies	  of	   the	  European	  Union	   in	   regulating	   the	  area	  of	  
“freedom,	   security	   and	   justice”	   (previously	   falling	   under	   the	   “third	   pillar”).220	  Under	   the	  
reformed	  and	  newly	  named	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  (TEU)	  and	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  
of	   the	   European	   Union	   (TFEU),	   legislative	   acts	   relating	   to	   European	   police	   and	   judicial	  
cooperation	   as	   well	   as	   substantive	   criminal	   law,	   previously	   in	   the	   form	   of	   “Framework	  
Decisions”	   and	   “Conventions”	   under	   the	   third	   pillar,	   now	  will	   be	   adopted	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
“Regulations”,	  “Directives”	  and	  “Decisions”.221	  	  
	  
The	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   extended	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Commission	   to	   bring	   infringement	  
proceedings	   against	   a	   Member	   State’s	   non-­‐implementation	   of	   EU	   legislation	   before	   the	  
European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  to	  the	  area	  of	  freedom	  security	  and	  justice,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  
the	   European	   Parliament	   in	   the	   adoption	   of	   EU	   criminal	   legislation,	   thus	   enhancing	   the	  
judicial	   scrutiny	   and	   democratic	   legitimacy	   of	   future	   and	   existing	   legislation	   in	   this	   field.	  This	  means	  that	  measures	  under	  all	  aspects	  of	  EU	  criminal	   law	  (the	   ‘Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	   and	   Justice)	   will	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   ordinary	   legislative	   procedure	   of	  qualified	   majority	   voting	   and	   co-­‐decision	   between	   the	   Council	   and	   European	  Parliament,	  unless	  otherwise	  specified.	  	  	  
The	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   also	   introduced	   additional	   tools	   to	   help	   overcome	   some	   of	   the	   main	  
procedural	   deficiencies	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   cross-­‐border	   crime,	   by	   strengthening	   the	   legal	  
framework	  for	  mutual	  recognition	   in	  all	  Member	  States	  of	   judicial	  decisions	  and	  measures	  
taken	   in	  one	  Member	  State,	  and	   in	   cases	  of	   fraud	  against	   the	  Union	  budget,	   the	  possible	  
introduction	   of	   a	   European	   Public	   Prosecutor.	   Moreover,	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty222	  provides	   a	  
specific	   legal	   basis	   for	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   substantive	   criminal	   law	   (including	   the	  
harmonisation	  of	  definition	  of	  offences	  and	  penalties)	  and	  procedural	  law.	  The	  instruments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  2007,	  amending	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  Treaty	  establishing	  the	  European	  
Community,	  signed	  at	  Lisbon,	  13	  December	  2007.	  (OJ	  C	  306,	  13.12.2007)	  	  
219	  The	  first	  pillar	  consisted	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty;	  the	  second	  pillar:	  foreign	  and	  security	  matters;	  and	  the	  third	  
pillar:	  the	  area	  of	  freedom	  security	  and	  justice.	  	  	  
220	  Herlin-­‐Karnell	  ,E.,	  “The	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  and	  the	  Area	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  Justice”,	  [2008],	  European	  Policy	  
Analysis	  3:	  1-­‐10,	  Swedish	  Institute	  for	  European	  Policy	  Studies	  
221	  Davoli,	  A.,	  “Judicial	  Cooperation	  in	  Criminal	  Matters”,	  [2010],	  European	  Parliament	  website,	  [online]	  
available	  at:	  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en//FTU_4.12.6.pdf	  
222	  The	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  was	  signed	  on	  13	  December	  2007	  by	  the	  heads	  of	  government	  and	  state	  of	  the	  Member	  
States	  and	  was	  ratified	  in	  November	  2009,	  following	  the	  Irish	  second	  referendum	  and	  the	  Czech	  and	  Polish	  
ratifications.	  It	  came	  into	  force	  in	  December	  2009	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adopted	  before	  the	  entering	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  including	  Framework	  Decisions,	  
are	  preserved	  until	  they	  are	  repealed,	  annulled	  or	  amended.223	  
	  
8.6.	  Developments	  in	  substantive	  criminal	  law	  
The	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   provides	   enhanced	   competencies	   by	   which	   the	   EU	   can	   “establish	  
minimum	  rules	  concerning	  the	  definition	  of	  criminal	  offenses	  and	  sanctions	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  
particularly	   serious	   crime	  with	   a	   cross-­‐border	   dimension…”	   (Article	   83	   (1)	   TFEU).224	  These	  
serious,	   cross-­‐border	   crimes	   are	   listed	   to	   include	  organised	   crime	  and	   computer	   crime.225	  
The	   legal	   basis	   for	   criminalisation	   of	   cybercrime	   and	   organised	   crime	   potentially	   covers	  
instances	  of	  EU	  ETS	   fraud.	  Yet	   it	  must	  be	  noted	   that	   the	   list	  of	  offences	  under	  Art.	  83	   (1)	  
TFEU	  is	  exhaustive,	  and	  does	  not	  include	  fraud	  to	  the	  EU	  budget	  or	  allowances	  theft	  as	  such.	  
Yet	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   developments	   in	   crime,	   the	   Council	  may	   adopt	   a	   unanimous	   decision	  
identifying	  other	  areas	  of	  crime	  that	  meet	  the	  criteria	  specified	  in	  paragraph	  1.226	  Given	  the	  
seriousness	  and	  cross-­‐border	  dimension	  of	  EU	  ETS	  fraud,	  some	  of	  the	  related	  crimes	  would	  
appear	  to	  fit	  the	  criteria	  specified	  in	  Article	  83	  (1).	  	  	  
	  
	  
Moreover,	  the	  approximation	  of	  criminal	  law	  is	  also	  possible	  under	  paragraph	  2	  of	  Article	  83	  
TFEU:	  
If	   the	  approximation	  of	  criminal	   laws	  and	  regulations	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  proves	  
essential	   to	  ensure	  the	  effective	   implementation	  of	  a	  Union	  policy	   in	  an	  area	  which	  
has	   been	   subject	   to	   harmonisation	   measures,	   directives	   may	   establish	   minimum	  
rules	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   criminal	   offences	   and	   sanctions	   in	   the	   area	  
concerned.	   Such	   directives	   shall	   be	   adopted	   by	   the	   same	   ordinary	   or	   special	  
legislative	   procedure	   as	   was	   followed	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   harmonisation	  
measures	  in	  question,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  Article	  76.	  (emphasis	  added)	  
	  
Thus	   all	   criminal	   provisions	   aimed	   at	   achieving	   the	   political	   objectives	   of	   the	   EU	   (which	  
might	   include	   the	  environmental	  protection	  and	  economic	   imperatives	  of	   the	  EU	  ETS)	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  harmonisation	  under	  Article	  83	  (2)	  TFEU.	  The	  rules	  covered	  by	  Article	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  Art.	  9	  of	  the	  Protocol	  No.	  36	  on	  Transitional	  Provisions	  
224	  Art	  83	  (1),	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (TFEU),	  2010,	  Consolidated	  versions	  of	  the	  
Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  
Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (OJ	  C	  83,	  30.3.2010),	  	  
225	  Paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  83	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  on	  the	  European	  Union	  states	  that:	  The	  European	  
Parliament	  and	   the	  Council	  may,	  by	  means	  of	  directives	  adopted	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  ordinary	   legislative	  
procedure,	  establish	  minimum	  rules	  concerning	  the	  definition	  of	  criminal	  offences	  and	  sanctions	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  
particularly	  serious	  crime	  with	  a	  cross-­‐border	  dimension	  resulting	  from	  the	  nature	  or	  impact	  of	  such	  offences	  
or	  from	  a	  special	  need	  to	  combat	  them	  on	  a	  common	  basis.	  These	  areas	  of	  crime	  are	  the	  following:	  terrorism,	  
trafficking	   in	  human	  beings	  and	  sexual	  exploitation	  of	  women	  and	  children,	   illicit	  drug	  trafficking,	   illicit	  arms	  
trafficking,	  money	  laundering,	  corruption,	  counterfeiting	  of	  means	  of	  payment,	  computer	  crime	  and	  organised	  
crime	  (emphasis	  added)..	  	  
	  
226	  The	  Council	  must	  obtain	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament.	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83	   (2)	  are	  not	  ends	   in	   themselves	  but	  a	  way	  to	  ensure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  Union	  policies	  
and	  further	  its	  political	  objectives.227	  	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  strengthened	  criminal	  law	  approximation	  capabilities,	  the	  Commission	  has	  
released	  a	  proposal	  in	  2010	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  attacks	  against	  information	  systems,	  repealing	  
the	   previous	   2005	   Framework	   Decision.228	  If	   adopted,	   the	   Directive	   could	   help	   in	   the	  
coordination	   of	   investigations	   and	   prosecutions	   relating	   to	   cyber-­‐crime	   and	   the	   hacking	  
attacks	   on	   the	   EU	   ETS	   registry	   system	   by	   criminalising	   and	   harmonising	   the	   definition	   of	  
offences.	  The	  Directive	  maintains	  the	  main	  key	  features	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision,	  namely	  
the	  criminalisation	  of	  illegal	  access,	  illegal	  system	  interference	  and	  illegal	  data	  interference,	  
but	   also	   contains	   new	   elements	   aimed	   at	   strengthening	   the	   previous	   regulatory	  
framework.229	  Furthermore,	  the	  proposed	  Directive	  raises	  the	  level	  of	  criminal	  penalties	  to	  a	  
maximum	   term	   of	   imprisonment	   of	   at	   least	   two	   years	   (or	   a	   maximum	   of	   5	   years	   under	  
aggravated	   circumstances).230	  Instigation,	   aiding,	   abetting	   and	   attempt	   of	   those	   offences	  
will	  need	  to	  be	  penalised	  as	  well.	  
Moreover,	   under	   the	   Framework	   Decision	   2001/413/JHA	   of	   28	   May	   2001	   on	   combating	  
fraud	   and	   counterfeiting	   of	   non-­‐cash	  means	   of	   payment,	  Member	   States	   are	   required	   to	  
criminalise	   the	   following	   offences	   related	   to	   computer	   when	   committed	   intentionally:	  
performing	   or	   causing	   a	   transfer	   of	   money	   or	   monetary	   value	   and	   thereby	   causing	   an	  
unauthorised	   loss	   of	   property	   for	   another	   person,	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   procuring	   an	  
unauthorised	  economic	  benefit	  for	  the	  person	  committing	  the	  offence	  or	  for	  a	  third	  party,	  
by:	  without	  right	  introducing,	  altering,	  deleting	  or	  suppressing	  computer	  data,	  in	  particular	  
identification	   data;	   or	   without	   right	   interfering	   with	   the	   functioning	   of	   a	   computer	  
programme	  or	  system.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  criminal	  organizations	  are	  infiltrated	  in	  fraud	  to	  the	  EU	  
carbon	  market,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  2008	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  fight	  against	  
organized	  crime231	  -­‐	  setting	  out	  definitions	  of	  offenses	  relating	  to	  the	  participation	  in	  
criminal	  organisations232	  and	  the	  associated	  minimum	  sanctions	  -­‐	  is	  applicable.233	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  Fletcher,	  Loof	  and	  Gilmore,	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  Justice,	  	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2008)	  	  	  
228	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  attacks	  against	  information	  
systems	  and	  repealing	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  2005/222/JHA,	  Brussels,	  COM(2010)	  517	  
229	  The	   following	   new	   elements	   are	   proposed	   under	   the	  Directive:	   Penalisation	   of	   the	   use	   of	   tools	   (such	   as	  
malicious	   software	   –	   e.g.	   'botnets'	   –	   or	   unrightfully	   obtained	   computer	   passwords)	   for	   committing	   the	  
offences;	   Introduction	  of	   'illegal	   interception'	  of	   information	   systems	  as	  a	   criminal	  offence;	   Improvement	  of	  
European	   criminal	   justice/police	   cooperation	  by	   strengthening	   the	  existing	   structure	  of	  24/7	   contact	  points,	  
including	  an	  obligation	  to	  answer	  within	  8	  hours	  to	  urgent	  request	  and;	  and	  including	  the	  obligation	  to	  collect	  
basic	  statistical	  data	  on	  cybercrimes	  
230	  Aggravated	  circumstances	  under	  the	  Directive	  proposal	  occur	  when:	  (i)	  committed	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  
a	  criminal	  organisation;	  (ii)	  committed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  tool	  conceived	  to	  launch	  either	  attacks	  affecting	  a	  
significant	   number	   of	   information	   systems,	   or	   attacks	   causing	   considerable	   damage,	   such	   as	   in	   terms	   of	  
disrupted	   system	   services,	   financial	   cost	   or	   a	   loss	   of	   personal	   data.	   This	   provision	   would	   be	   particularly	  
relevant	  to	  tackle	  the	  spread	  of	  malicious	  software	  that	   is	  now	  used	  widely	  to	   launch	  most	  dangerous	  cyber	  
attacks.(iii)	  committed	  by	  concealing	  the	  real	  identity	  of	  the	  perpetrator	  and	  causing	  prejudice	  to	  the	  rightful	  
identity	  owner.	  
231	  Framework	  Decision	  2008/841/JHA	  of	  24	  October	  2008	  on	  the	  fight	  against	  organised	  crime	  
232	  ibid,	  Art	  1	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Framework	  Decision	  does	  not	  draw	  a	  list	  of	  offences;	  instead,	  it	  states	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  
criminal	  organisation	  must	  be	  to	  commit	  a	  ‘serious	  offence’	  (of	  a	  maximum	  of	  at	  least	  four	  
years)234	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  pursuing	  a	  financial	  or	  other	  material	  benefits.	  Since	  
legislation	  relating	  to	  organised	  crime	  varies	  greatly	  between	  Member	  States,	  with	  some	  
States	  not	  providing	  for	  offenses	  relating	  to	  organized	  crime	  specifically,	  but	  instead	  having	  
offenses	  relating	  to	  “conspiracy”	  and	  “joint	  enterprise”,235	  the	  approximation	  of	  national	  
laws	  relating	  to	  organized	  crime	  will	  help	  improve	  police	  and	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  relation	  
to	  cross-­‐border	  organized	  crime.236	  However,	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  offers	  the	  Member	  
States	  the	  option	  of	  criminalising	  either	  participation	  in	  a	  criminal	  organisation,	  or	  
conspiracy,237	  which	  means	  that	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  may	  continue	  to	  criminalise	  
conspiracy	  instead	  of	  participation	  in	  a	  criminal	  organization.238	  	  This	  means	  that	  
criminalisation	  of	  organised	  crime	  is	  far	  from	  harmonised	  at	  EU	  level,	  which	  could	  hinder	  
the	  cooperation	  between	  national	  judicial	  and	  police	  authorities	  across	  the	  EU	  given	  the	  
substantial	  transnational	  dimension	  of	  organised	  crime.239	  	  
	  
As	  a	  Framework	  Decision	  adopted	  under	  the	  third	  pillar,	  non-­‐implementation	  of	  this	  
legislation	  was	  not	  until	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  subject	  to	  infringement	  
proceedings	  via	  the	  ECJ.240	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  was	  not	  implemented	  (or	  
correctly	  implemented)	  in	  all	  Member	  States.	  However,	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  provides	  that	  
Framework	  Decisions	  in	  existence	  prior	  its	  adoption	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  full	  ECJ	  jurisdiction	  
after	  a	  5-­‐year	  period	  following	  the	  coming	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Treaty.241	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  
increase	  the	  level	  of	  implementation	  of	  this	  framework	  decision	  and	  thus	  the	  harmonization	  
of	  the	  Member	  States’	  rules	  on	  organised	  crime.	  	  
Therefore,	   the	   potential	   for	   further	   harmonisation	   of	   substantive	   criminal	   law	   in	   other	  
relevant	   areas,	   such	   as	   cybercrimes,	   financial	   crimes	   and	   organised	   crime,	   could	   help	  
overcome	   discrepancies	   in	   national	   laws	   relating	   to	   both	   carbon-­‐based	   VAT	   fraud	   and	  
registry	  hacking.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  also	  that	  although	  the	  directive	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  
environment	  through	  criminal	  law	  adopted	  in	  2008	  requires	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  a	  number	  
of	  environmental	  offences,242	  none	  of	  the	  pollution	  offences	  in	  the	  directive	  relate	  to	  GHG	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233	  ibid,	  Art	  3	  
234	  This	  four-­‐year	  threshold	  is	  also	  found	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  against	  Organised	  Transnational	  
Crime	  
235	  Mitsilegas,	  V.,	  “The	  third	  wave	  of	  third	  pillar	  law:	  which	  direction	  for	  EU	  criminal	  justice?”,	  [2009],	  European	  
Law	  Review,	  34:	  p.523	  
236	  The	  Framework	  Decision	  creates	  two	  offences	  that	  need	  to	  be	  criminalised	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  (Article	  
2):	  
a) Directing	  a	  criminal	  organisation,	  which	  must	  be	  punishable	  by	  a	  maximum	  term	  of	  imprisonment	  of	  
at	  least	  ten	  years	  (Article	  3	  (1)).	  
b) Actively	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  organisation’s	  activities,	  which	  incurs	  a	  maximum	  term	  of	  imprisonment	  
which	  is	  no	  lower	  than	  five	  years.	  
237	  (Art.	  2),	  
238	  Mitsilegas,	  V.,	  EU	  Criminal	  Law,	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2009),	  p.	  96.	  
239	  Moreover,	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  organised	  crime	  offences	  is	  central	  to	  the	  mandate	  of	  Union	  criminal	  
justice	  bodies	  such	  as	  Europol	  and	  Eurojust.	  (Mitsilegas	  2009,	  supra)	  
240	  Prior	  to	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  a	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  have	  submitted	  declarations	  
granting	  the	  ECJ	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  validity	  of	  Framework	  Decisions	  adopted	  under	  the	  third	  pillar.	  
241	  Subject	  to	  transitional,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UK,	  Ireland	  and	  Denmark,	  opt-­‐in	  arrangements.	  See	  10th	  
Report	  of	  Session	  2007-­‐2008,supra	  note	  83.	  
242Directive	  2008/99/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  19	  November	  2008	  on	  the	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emissions	   or	   fraud	   to	   an	   environmental	   scheme	   such	   as	   the	   EU	   ETS,243	  and	   the	   EU	   ETS	  
Directive	  is	  not	  listed	  in	  Annex	  A	  or	  B	  as	  one	  of	  the	  pieces	  of	  EU	  environmental	  legislation,	  
serious	  violations	  of	  which	  would	  need	  to	  be	  criminalised	   if	   falling	  under	   the	  definition	  of	  
one	  of	  the	  offences	  under	  the	  directive.	  	  
8.7.	  Developments	  in	  procedural	  and	  jurisdictional	  cooperation	  	  	  
Under	   Article	   82	   TFEU,	   judicial	   and	   police	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   shall	   include	  
approximation	  of	   laws	  and	  regulations	  of	  Member	  States	   in	  the	  following	  areas:	  a)	  mutual	  
admissibility	  of	  evidence,	  b)	  the	  rights	  of	   individuals	   in	  criminal	  procedure,	  c)	  the	  rights	  of	  
victims,	  d)	  and	  any	  other	  specific	  aspects	  of	  criminal	  procedures	  among	  Member	  States	   in	  
addition	   to	   aligning	   their	   substantive	   laws.	  Moreover,	   Art	   82(2)	   of	   the	   TFEU	   enables	   the	  
establishment	  of	  minimum	  rules	  “[t]o	  the	  extent	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  mutual	  recognition	  
of	   judgments	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  police	  and	  judicial	  cooperation	   in	  criminal	  matters	  
having	  a	  cross-­‐border	  dimension…”.	  This	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  improvements	  in	  how	  remaining	  
discrepancies	  between	  Member	  States’	  legal	  systems	  are	  dealt	  with	  in	  cross-­‐border	  criminal	  
cases.	   The	   Commission	   is	   currently	   exploring	   the	   possibility	   of	   proposals	   for	   instruments	  
aimed	   at	   strengthening	   mutual	   recognition	   and	   establishing	   minimum	   rules	   for	   the	  
admissibility	  of	  evidence	  in	  Member	  States’	  criminal	  courts.244	  
	  
More	   specifically,	   in	   October	   2010	   the	   ‘Regulation	   on	   administrative	   cooperation	   and	  
combating	   fraud	   in	   the	   field	   of	   VAT’	   came	   into	   force.245	  This	   introduces	   VAT	   information	  
exchange	   obligations,	   and	   establishes	   the	   “Eurofisc”	   network.	   This	   network	   of	   national	  
officials	   is	   designed	   to	   facilitate	   the	   swift	   exchange	   of	   VAT	   information	   between	   EU	  
countries	   to	   aid	   in	   the	   early	   detection	   of	   VAT	   fraud	   and	   improve	   the	   administrative	  
cooperation	   between	   EU	   States	   in	   cross-­‐border	   VAT	   fraud	   investigations.246	  This	  measure	  
could	   enhance	   information-­‐sharing	   and	   help	   overcome	   the	   administrative	   obstacles	   that	  
exist	  in	  detecting	  and	  obtaining	  evidence	  in	  cases	  of	  cross-­‐border	  VAT	  fraud.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
protection	  of	  the	  environment	  through	  criminal	  law	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance)	  For	  comments	  on	  the	  directive	  
and	  the	  original	  proposal,	  see	  e.g.	  Pereira,	  The	  Legal	  Basis	  for	  Harmonisation	  of	  Environmental	  Criminal	  
Law	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  Past	  and	  Future	  Challenges’,	  in	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  of	  Harmonisation,	  Andenas	  
and	  Anderson	  eds.	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2012);	  	  Faure,	  M.,	  (2010)	  Effective,	  Proportional	  and	  Dissuasive	  Penalties	  in	  
the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Environmental	  Crime	  and	  Ship-­‐source	  Pollution	  Directives:	  Questions	  and	  
Challenge,	  European	  Energy	  and	  Environmental	  Law	  Review,	  vol.	  19	  issue	  n.	  6,	  	  Hedemann-­‐Robinson,	  Martin	  
(2008)	  The	  emergence	  of	  European	  Union	  environmental	  criminal	  law:	  a	  quest	  for	  solid	  foundations,	  Part	  II.	  
Environmental	  Liability,	  16	  (4).	  pp.	  111-­‐136.	  Pereira,	  R.	  ‘Environmental	  Criminal	  Law	  in	  the	  First	  Pillar:	  A	  
Positive	  Development	  for	  Environmental	  Protection	  in	  the	  European	  Union?’	  (2007)	  16	  European	  
Environmental	  Law	  Review. 
243	  The	  environmental	  crime	  directive	  requires	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  the	  discharge,	  emission	  or	  introduction	  of	  
a	  quantity	  of	  materials	  or	  ionising	  radiation	  into	  air,	  soil	  or	  water,	  which	  causes	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  cause	  death	  or	  
serious	  injury	  to	  any	  person	  or	  substantial	  damage	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  air,	  the	  quality	  of	  soil	  or	  the	  quality	  of	  
water,	  or	  to	  animals	  or	  plants.	  	  
244	  European	  Commission,	  “The	  recognition	  of	  decisions	  between	  EU	  countries”,	  [2011],	  European	  Commission	  
Criminal	  Justice	  website,	  [online]	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/recognition-­‐
decision/index_en.htm	  	  
245	  Council	  Regulation	  (EU)	  no	  904/2010	  of	  7	  October	  2010	  on	  administrative	  cooperation	  and	  combating	  fraud	  
in	  the	  field	  of	  value	  added	  tax	  (recast)	  
246	  Reg	  904/2010,	  Art	  33-­‐37	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Although	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   is	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   police	   and	   judicial	  
criminal	  law	  cooperation	  in	  the	  EU,	  it	  often	  requires	  a	  degree	  of	  harmonisation	  of	  criminal	  
offences	  and	  penalties	  so	  that	  mutual	  recognition	  measures	  are	  successful.	  Even	  though	  the	  
European	   Arrest	   Warrant	   (EAW) 247 	  abolishes	   ‘double	   criminality’	   in	   the	   issuing	   and	  
executing	  states	  for	  a	  list	  of	  32	  offences	  (which	  includes	  fraud,	  computer-­‐related	  crime	  and	  
organised	  crime),248	  the	  issuing	  of	  an	  EAW	  is	  only	  possible	  (unless	  the	  sentence	  has	  already	  
been	   passed)249 	  for	   acts	   punishable	   in	   the	   issuing	   state	   by	   a	   custodial	   sentence	   or	   a	  
detention	   order	   for	   a	   maximum	   of	   at	   least	   three	   years	   imprisonment.	   Therefore,	   the	  
successful	  operation	  of	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  more	  recent	  similar	  
developments	   in	   the	  area	  of	  European	   judicial	   and	  police	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters	  
(e.g.	   the	   European	   Evidence	   Warrant250)	   could	   arguably	   be	   weakened	   by	   the	   present	  
disparate	  sanctions	  presently	  adopted	  by	  Member	  States	  against	  EU	  ETS-­‐related	  crime.	  
	  
As	   regards	   jurisdiction	  allocation	   in	  criminal	  matters	   in	   the	  European	  Union,	  a	  Framework	  
Decision	  on	  Prevention	  and	  Settlement	  of	  Conflicts	  of	  Jurisdiction	  in	  the	  EU	  was	  adopted	  in	  
2009251	  aimed	   at	   preventing	  multiple	   prosecutions	   for	   the	   same	   offence.	   The	   Framework	  
Decision	   is	  closely	   linked	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  double	   jeopardy,	   i.e.	  which	  prohibits	  a	  person	  
being	  prosecuted	  twice	  for	  the	  same	  facts.	  Yet	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  does	  not	  require	  the	  
centralization	  of	  prosecution	  in	  one	  Member	  States,252only	  that	  the	  competent	  authorities	  
in	   the	  Member	   States	   enter	   into	   ‘direct	   consultations’	  when	   parallel	   proceedings	   exist.	   It	  
could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  coordination	  for	  jurisdiction	  allocation	  will	  result	  in	  the	  worsening	  
of	   the	   position	   of	   the	   defendant,	   by	   aiming	   at	   allocating	   jurisdiction	   to	   investigate	   and	  
prosecute	  to	  the	  Member	  States	  where	  it	  is	  easiest	  to	  obtain	  conviction.253	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  of	  13	  June	  2002	  on	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  and	  the	  Surrender	  of	  
Procedures	  between	  Member	  States,	  OJ	  2002	  L	  190.	  The	  Framework	  Decision	  was	  amended	  by	  Council	  
Framework	  Decision	  2009/299/JHA	  of	  26	  February	  2009	  amending	  Framework	  Decisions	  2002/584/JHA,	  
2005/214/JHA,	  2006/783/JHA,	  2008/909/JHA	  and	  2008/947/JHA,	  thereby	  enhancing	  the	  procedural	  rights	  of	  
persons	  and	  fostering	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  to	  decisions	  rendered	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  the	  person	  concerned	  at	  the	  trial	  
248	  See	  Alegre	  S.	  and	  Leaf,	  M.	  ‘Mutual	  Recognition	  in	  European	  Judicial	  Cooperation:	  A	  Step	  too	  Far	  too	  Soon?	  
Case	  Study	  –	  The	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant’,	  European	  Law	  Journal,	  (2004)	  10.	  
249	  In	  this	  case	  the	  threshold	  is	  of	  at	  least	  four	  months.	  	  
250	  See	   generally	   Vervaele,	   J.A.E.	   European	   Evidence	   Warrant:	   Transnational	   Judicial	   Inquiries	   in	   the	   EU,	  
Intersentia	  2005.	  	  
251	  	   COUNCIL	   FRAMEWORK	  DECISION	  2009/948/JHA	  of	  30	  November	  2009	  on	  prevention	  and	   settlement	  of	  
conflicts	  of	  exercise	  of	  jurisdiction	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  L	  328/42	  15.12.2009	  
252	  For	   comments	   on	   the	   original	   proposal	   see	   Peers,	   Steve.	   Statewatch	   Analysis	   ‘The	   proposed	   Framework	  
Decision	   on	   conflict	   of	   jurisdiction	   in	   criminal	   proceedings:	  Manipulating	   the	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial?’	   12	  March	  
2009,	   available	   at	   http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-­‐76-­‐conflict-­‐of-­‐jurisdiction.pdf	   [accessed	   on	   13	  
March	  2009]	  Mechanisms	  and	  criteria	  for	  allocation	  of	  jurisdiction	  also	  exist	  in	  sectoral	  third	  pillar	  instruments	  
–	  e.g.	  the	  Framework	  on	  combating	  terrorism	  stipulates,	  when	  an	  offence	  falls	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  more	  
than	  one	  Member	  State	  and	  when	  any	  of	  the	  States	  concerned	  can	  prosecute	  validly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  
facts,	   the	  Member	  States	  concerned	  must	  cooperate	   in	  order	   to	  decide	  where	   to	  prosecute,	  with	   the	  aim	   if	  
possible	  to	  centralize	  the	  prosecution	  in	  one	  member	  state.	  
253	  Mitsilegas	  (2009),	  above	  n.	  254.	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8.8.	  Action	  against	  fraud	  affecting	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  the	  Union	  	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  current	  economic	  climate	  and	  the	  Union’s	  corresponding	  budgetary	  austerity,	  
the	   protection	   of	   EU	   taxpayers’	   money	   from	   fraudulent	  misuse	   is	   a	   high	   priority	   for	   the	  
European	   Union.254	  This	   is	   reflected	   by	   many	   of	   the	   provisions	   introduced	   by	   the	   Lisbon	  
Treaty.	   Article	   310(6)	   of	   the	   TFEU	   states	   that	   “[t]he	   Union	   and	   the	   Member	   States,	   in	  
accordance	  with	  Article	  325,	  shall	  counter	  fraud	  and	  any	  other	  illegal	  activities	  affecting	  the	  
financial	   interests	   of	   the	   Union”.	   Article	   325(4)	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   lay	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  
enactment	   of	   legislation	   to	   protect	   the	   financial	   interest	   of	   the	   Union,	   with	   equal	   effect	  
across	   all	   Member	   States.	  Whereas	   prior	   to	   the	   ratification	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	   the	   EC	  
Treaty	   appeared	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   of	   harmonization	   of	   measures	   affecting	   the	  
financial	  interests	  of	  the	  EU	  or	  customs	  cooperation,	  a	  clear	  legal	  basis	  for	  harmonization	  is	  
now	  present	  for	  this	  under	  the	  TFEU.	  Indeed,	  following	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  
Art.	  325	  TFEU	  provides	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  competent	  to	  seek	  the	  harmonization	  of	  criminal	  law	  
against	  fraud	  to	  the	  EU	  budget.255	  
	  
Since	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  EU’s	  own	  resources	  are	  financed	  by	  taking	  a	  percentage	  cut	  of	  the	  
VAT	  collected	   in	  Member	  States,256	  by	   intercepting	  the	  flow	  of	  VAT	  to	  national	   treasuries,	  
VAT	  fraudsters	  not	  only	  take	  away	  a	  source	  of	  tax	  revenue	  from	  Member	  States,	  but	  also	  
interfere	   with	   a	   source	   of	   the	   EU’s	   budget	   income.257	  VAT	   fraud	   can	   be	   therefore	   be	  
classified	  as	  fraud	  against	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  the	  Union.	  Extending	  EU-­‐level	  anti-­‐VAT-­‐
fraud	  legislation	  under	  the	  remit	  of	  Article	  325	  could	  therefore	  be	  used	  to	  harmonise	  legal	  
measures	  against	  VAT	  fraud	  across	  the	  EU.	  	  
Article	   86(1)	  of	   the	  TFEU	  allows	   for	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   European	  Public	   Prosecutor’s	  Office	  
(EPPO)	  with	  the	  role	  of	  combating	  “crimes	  affecting	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  the	  Union…”.	  If	  
established	   the	   EPPO	  would	   be	   responsible	   for	   investigating,	   prosecuting	   and	   bringing	   to	  
judgment,	   “perpetrators	   of,	   and	   accomplices	   in,	   offences	   against	   the	   Union’s	   financial	  
interests”	   and	   shall	   ‘exercise	   the	   functions	   of	   prosecutor	   in	   the	   competent	   courts	   of	   the	  
Member	  States	  in	  relation	  to	  such	  offences”.258	  Moreover,	  the	  European	  prosecutor	  is	  likely	  
to	   be	   itinerant,	   hence	   action	   against	   fraudsters	   would	   need	   to	   be	   brought	   before	   the	  
national	  courts	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  
	  
The	  problems	  discussed	  involving	  judicial	  cooperation	  and	  the	  reluctance	  of	  Member	  States	  
to	   take	   investigatory	  and	  punitive	  action	  against	  VAT	   fraud	  within	   their	   jurisdictions	  could	  
be	   alleviated	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   EPPO,	   which	   would	   be	   able	   to	   initiate	   criminal	  
proceedings	   itself,	   rather	   than	   leaving	   this	   to	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   Member	  
States.	   Although	   practically	   this	  may	   facilitate	   bringing	   cross-­‐national	   criminals	   to	   justice,	  
potential	   conflicts	   arise	   concerning	   the	   creep	   of	   the	   EU’s	   power	   disrupting	   national	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  European	  Commission,	  “Communication	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
by	  criminal	  law	  and	  by	  administrative	  investigations”,	  [2011],	  COM(2011)293	  final,	  Brussels,	  Belgium.	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  See	  Mitsilegas	  (2008)	  at	  168.	  
256	  In	  2010	  this	  contribution	  totalled	  14	  billion	  Euros	  (Price	  Waterhouse	  Coopers	  [2011]).	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  Price	  Waterhouse	  Coopers	  [2011],	  supra	  note	  237	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sovereignty	   and	   applying	   penalties	   within	   individual	   Member	   States’	   criminal	   justice	  
system.259	  	  
	  
The	   Commission	   is	   currently	   calling	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   EPPO	   and	   in	   a	   recent	  
communication	  claiming	   that	   it	  would	  “establish	  a	  common	   level	  playing	   field	  by	  applying	  
common	  rules	  on	   fraud	   (…)	   in	  a	  consistent	  and	  homogenous	  way”.260	  Although	  this	  would	  
help	  simplify	  cross-­‐border	  criminal	  proceedings,	  the	  precise	  remit	  of	  this	  body,	  the	  limits	  of	  
its	   involvement,	   its	   operational	   structure	   within	   Eurojust	   and	   relationship	   with	   other	   EU	  
bodies	   are	   all	   yet	   to	   be	   articulated.	   It	   is	   therefore	   not	   clear	   exactly	   how	   an	   EPP	   would	  
function	  and	  thus	  what	  contribution	  it	  could	  make	  to	  the	  fight	  against	  fraud	  at	  an	  EU	  level.	  	  
	  
Article	  86(4)	  of	  the	  TFEU	  enables	  the	  future	  extension	  of	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  EPPO	  to	  include	  
serious	  crimes	  with	  a	  cross-­‐border	  dimension.	  This	  would	  allow	  the	  inclusion	  of	  crimes	  that,	  
although	   not	   directly	   affecting	   the	   financial	   interests	   of	   the	  Union,	   are	   deemed	   “serious”	  
and	  affect	  more	  than	  one	  Member	  State.	  This	  could	  potentially	   include	   investigations	  and	  
prosecutions	  involving	  large	  allowance	  thefts	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS	  if	  they	  were	  to	  reoccur.	  	  Such	  an	  
extension	  would	   depend	  upon	  unanimous	   action	   by	   the	   Council,	   as	  well	   as	   consent	   from	  
both	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   the	   Council;	   which	   is	   by	   no	   means	   an	   easy	   or	   rapid	  
process.	  
8.9.	  Conclusions	  on	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  Developments	  	  
Although	   some	   successful	   convictions	   have	   been	  made	   against	   fraud	   on	   the	   EU	   ETS,	   the	  
transboundary	   nature	   of	   both	   VAT	   fraud	   and	   allowance	   thefts	   have	   exposed	   existing	  
obstacles	   to	   cross-­‐border	   investigations	   and	   prosecutions	   within	   the	   EU.	   Although	   some	  
level	   of	   administrative	   and	   judicial	   cooperation	   is	   facilitated	   by	   existing	   EU	   bodies	   and	  
instruments,	   these	   tools	   remain	   fragmentary.	  Major	  problems	   in	  criminal	   law	  cooperation	  
still	   result	   from	   differences	   between	  Member	   States’	   definitions	   of	   criminal	   offenses	   and	  
sanctions.	  This	  highlights	   the	  divergence	  between	  the	   increasingly	  co-­‐ordinated	  regulation	  
of	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS	   and	   the	   very	   different	   national	   rules	   determining	   the	  
sanctions	  applicable	  in	  the	  event	  of	  fraud.261	  
	  
To	  overcome	  such	  obstacles,	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  
higher	  common	  standards	   relating	   to	  serious	  cross-­‐border	  crime,262	  as	  well	  as	  strengthens	  
the	   applicability	   of	   existing	   relevant	   legislation.	   The	   creation	   of	   a	   European	   Public	  
Prosecutor’s	  Office	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  overcome	  problems	  relating	  to	  the	  initiation	  of	  
investigations	   into	   crime	   affecting	   the	   financial	   interests	   of	   the	  Union,	   such	   as	   VAT-­‐fraud	  
and	   possibly	   also	   allowances	   theft.	   However,	   Member	   States’	   historical	   reluctance	   to	  
transfer	   further	   powers	   to	   the	   Community,	   and	   eagerness	   to	   preserve	   peculiarities	   of	  
national	   legal	  systems	  may	  still	  hamper	  agreements	  on	  common	  definitions	  and	  minimum	  
sanctions.	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  Herlin-­‐Karnell,	  E.,	  “What	  principles	  drive	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  European	  Commission	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  [2011],	  above	  n.	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  Ibid.	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Moreover,	  although	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  substantive	  rules	  relating	  to	  EU	  ETS-­‐related	  crime	  
and	  the	  strengthening	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  instruments	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  improvement	  of	  
police	  and	  judicial	  criminal	  law	  cooperation,	  the	  successful	  prosecution	  and	  investigation	  of	  
cross-­‐border	  offences	  requires	  additionally	  that	  such	  bodies	  as	  Europol,	  Eurojust,	  OLAF	  and	  
a	  future	  EPP	  are	  able	  to	  coordinate	  their	  activities	  among	  themselves	  and	  with	  the	  Member	  
States.	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IX.	  Final	  conclusions	  and	  recommendations	  	  
Although	   neither	   VAT	   fraud	   nor	   emissions	   allowance	   thefts	   have	   directly	   affected	   the	  
environmental	   integrity	   of	   the	   EU	   ETS,	   both	   these	   forms	   of	   fraud	   have	   had	   negative	  
financial,	  market	   function	   and	   public	   confidence	   implications	   which	   ultimately	   impact	   on	  
the	  operation	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  Due	  to	  poor	  implementation	  of	  the	  reverse-­‐
charge	  VAT	  treatment	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  across	  Member	  States,	  parts	  of	  the	  market	  
are	  still	  vulnerable	  to	  VAT	  fraud.	  Although	  a	  central	   registry	  under	  Phase	   III	  of	   the	  EU	  ETS	  
would	  avoid	  individual	  national	  security	  weaknesses,	  the	  Union	  registry	  will	  not	  necessarily	  
itself	   be	   immune	   to	   cyber	   attacks.	   Being	   larger	   than	   individual	   national	   registries,	   it	  may	  
even	   be	   a	   more	   attractive	   target	   for	   criminals,	   therefore	   requiring	   that	   high	   security	  
standards	  are	  implemented	  in	  the	  Union	  Registry	  upon	  its	  creation.	  	  
	  
The	  current	  regulation	  of	  the	  registries	  systems	  also	   leaves	  the	  EU	  ETS	  a	  vulnerable	  target	  
for	   to	   both	   emissions	   allowance	   thefts	   and	   VAT	   fraud.	   The	   main	   weaknesses	   include:	  
insufficient	   account	   security;	   the	   ability	   of	   almost	   anyone	   to	   open	   up	   an	   account;	   near	  
immediate	   transfer	   of	   allowances	   on	   the	   spot	   market;	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   harmonised	  
treatment	  of	  stolen	  allowances	  that	  exacerbates	  the	  effects	   that	  fraud	  has	  on	  the	  market.	  
The	   draft	   registries	   Regulation	   recently	   proposed	   by	   the	   Commission,	   if	   adopted,	   would	  
certainly	  strengthen	  the	  system	  against	  fraud.	  Yet	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  irrevocability	  of	  
allowance	  transfers,	  as	  proposed	  under	  the	  draft	  regulation,	  is	  uncertain	  given	  the	  potential	  	  
incompatibility	  with	  the	  national	  laws	  in	  some	  Member	  States.	  
	  
Moreover,	  the	  current	  gap	  in	  market	  oversight	  of	  the	  EU	  emissions	  allowance	  spot	  market	  
poses	   important	   regulatory	   challenges.	   To	   fill	   this	   gap	   the	   Commission	   is	   currently	  
considering	   the	   classification	   of	   emissions	   allowances	   as	   financial	   instruments.	   Many	  
stakeholders	   however	   hold	   deep	   concerns	   regarding	   the	   adoption	   of	   this	   definition.	   Not	  
only	  does	  the	  associated	  regulation	  fail	  to	  target	  the	  main	  forms	  of	  fraud	  to	  which	  the	  spot	  
market	   is	   vulnerable,	   but	   the	   associated	   increased	   regulatory	   burden	   imposed	  on	  market	  
participants	   risks	   increasing	   significantly	   trading	   costs.	   This	   may	   in	   turn	   decrease	  
participants’	   willingness	   to	   trade	   and	   thus	   compromise	   the	   market’s	   ability	   to	   facilitate	  
lowest-­‐cost	  emissions	  abatement.	  	  
	  
The	  transboundary	  nature	  of	  both	  VAT	  fraud	  and	  emissions	  allowance	  thefts	  coupled	  with	  
discrepancies	   between	   national	   definitions	   of	   criminal	   offenses	   and	   applicable	   penalties	  
lead	  to	  difficulties	  in	  the	  coordination	  of	  criminal	  investigations	  and	  prosecutions.	  Yet	  recent	  
reforms	  to	  the	  way	  that	  criminal	  law	  is	  legislated	  in	  the	  EU	  following	  the	  coming	  into	  force	  
of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  could	  help	  overcome	  some	  of	  the	  current	  obstacles	  to	  the	  investigation	  
and	   prosecution	   of	   cross-­‐border	   fraud	   on	   the	   EU	   ETS.	   Under	   Lisbon,	   further	   powers	   are	  
given	   to	   the	   Commission	   and	  Member	   States	   to	   seek	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   definitions	   of	  
criminal	  offenses	  and	  sanctions	  relating	  to	  serious	  (cross-­‐border)	  crime,	  thus	  paving	  the	  way	  
for	  improved	  cooperation	  between	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  crime	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  
The	   potential	   to	   establish	   a	   European	   Public	   Prosecutor’s	   office	   (EPPO),	   capable	   of	  
investigating,	  prosecuting	  and	  bringing	  to	   judgment	  perpetrators	  of	   fraud	  against	  the	  EU’s	  
financial	   interests,	   could	   overcome	   problems	   relating	   to	   Member	   States’	   reluctance	   to	  
initiate	   investigations	   and	   judicial	   proceedings	   against	   those	   responsible	   for	   VAT-­‐fraud	   in	  
particular.	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Beyond	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  present	  regulatory	  framework,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  
proliferation	  of	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS	  has	  had	  a	  dramatic	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  public	  
perception	  of	  the	  EU	  carbon	  market	  and	  the	  perceived	  effectiveness	  of	  emissions	  trading	  as	  
a	  whole.	  Financial	  institutions	  are	  likely	  to	  find	  that	  trade	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  is	  too	  risky	  and	  stop	  
trading	  in	  this	  market.	  This	  effect	  has	  been	  exacerbated	  by	  other	  uncertainties	  present	  both	  
internationally	  and	  within	  the	  EU,	  such	  as	  concerns	  about	  deadlock	  in	  international	  climate	  
negotiations	  in	  Durban	  in	  late	  2011;	  concerns	  over	  the	  introduction	  of	  auctioning	  of	  
emissions	  allowance	  in	  Phase	  III	  of	  the	  scheme;	  as	  well	  as	  the	  inclusion	  of	  aviation	  into	  the	  
EU	  emissions	  trading	  scheme	  from	  January	  2012.	  Despite	  this	  blow	  to	  confidence,	  most	  
stakeholders	  interviewed	  still	  believed	  that	  “the	  only	  way	  was	  emissions	  trading”,	  and	  
despite	  the	  problems	  experienced	  so	  far,	  a	  EU-­‐wide	  industrial	  carbon	  tax	  is	  unrealistic.263	  
Many	  stressed	  that	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  the	  market	  to	  fraud	  and	  its	  effects	  are	  not	  
unsolvable	  and	  that	  solutions	  could	  be	  implemented	  to	  reduce	  the	  risks	  of	  the	  market	  to	  
fraud.	  
	  
As	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	   watches	   eagerly	   to	   assess	   whether	   the	   EU	   ETS	   template	   is	   a	  
successful	   one	   with	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   implemented	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   world,	   Mr	  
Schjolset	  believes	  that	  loss	  of	  confidence	  as	  a	  result	  of	  market	  fraud	  ‘could	  be	  damaging	  to	  
emissions	  trading	  on	  a	  more	  global	  scale’.264	  Not	  only	  do	  these	  criminal	  activities	  endanger	  
the	  credibility	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  but	  also	  the	  credibility	  of	  emissions	  trading	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  has	  
not	   helped	   policy	  makers	   in	   countries	   such	   as	   South	   Korea	  who	   are	   already	   experiencing	  
industrial	   resistance	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   emissions	   trading	   policies.265	  As	   stated	   by	   a	  
senior	   representative	  of	  a	   leading	   financial	  EU	  ETS	  participant,	   ‘if	   you	  are	  on	  a	  knife	  edge	  
politically	  [between	  a	  carbon	  tax	  and	  emissions	  trading]	  –	  you	  will	  be	  pushed	  over	  the	  edge	  
towards	   taxation	   by	   fraud	   and	   criminality…’266	  However,	   many	   others	   dispute	   this	   and	  
believe	   that	   cap	   and	   trade	   is	   here	   to	   stay.	   According	   to	   Stig	   Schjolset	   of	   Point	   Carbon,	  
‘despite	   the	   initial	   teething	   problems,	   and	   recent	   security	   issues,	   there	   is	   no	   feasible	  
alternative	   to	   EU	   emissions	   trading	   scheme,	   as	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   carbon	   tax	   is	   still	  
unrealistic.’267	  	  
	  
For	  the	  successful	  operation	  of	  the	  proposed	  registries	  regulation,	  some	  of	  the	  significant	  
gaps	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  harmonised	  legal	  definition	  of	  
emissions	  allowances,	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  This	  was	  an	  important	  shortcoming	  in	  the	  	  
registries	  regulation	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  greatly	  underestimated	  by	  the	  Commission.	  Yet	  
there	  are	  evident	  difficulties	  in	  reaching	  an	  appropriate	  common	  definition	  applicable	  
across	  the	  EU,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  as	  to	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  an	  emissions	  
allowance.	  As	  the	  Prada	  report	  states,	  “…allowances	  constitute	  a	  hybrid	  instrument,	  halfway	  
between	  intangible	  assets	  and	  ordinary	  commodities…”.	  268	  As	  a	  result,	  finding	  an	  answer	  to	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how	  these	  “dual	  purpose”	  instruments	  should	  be	  treated	  legally	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  one.	  Further	  
exploration	  of	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  different	  potential	  definitions,	  such	  as	  “administrative	  
rights”,	  or	  “property”	  is	  therefore	  urgently	  needed.269	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  open-­‐market	  regime	  that	  has	  governed	  the	  EU	  ETS	  so	  far	  has	  played	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  attracting	  liquidity	  and	  fostering	  the	  market’s	  maturation,	  it	  has	  also	  
opened	  the	  market	  to	  risks	  of	  fraud	  and	  misuse.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  decisions	  regarding	  
further	  future	  restrictions	  on	  those	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  an	  appropriate	  balance	  
between	  the	  minimisation	  of	  systemic	  risk	  and	  the	  maximisation	  of	  free	  market	  competition	  
needs	  to	  be	  found.	  Hence	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  increased	  regulation	  to	  counter	  EU	  carbon	  
markets	  fraud,	  the	  Commission	  may	  need	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  liquidity	  
brought	  by	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  participant	  sectors	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  outweighs	  the	  risks	  that	  the	  
increased	  number	  of	  participants	  pose.270	  
	  
9.1.	  Suggestions	  for	  further	  reforms	  to	  EU	  ETS	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  research	  paper,	  the	  authors	  argue	  that	  the	  following	  reforms	  
could	  decrease	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  to	  fraud:	  
	  
• Immediate	  implementation	  of	  EU-­‐wide	  obligatory	  VAT	  reverse	  charge	  mechanism	  
for	  emissions	  allowances.	  	  
This	  would	  be	  a	  relatively	  simple	  measure	  to	  implement	  and	  would	  effectively	  block	  
MTIC	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  
	  
• Clarification	  of	  the	  title	  transfer	  rules	  in	  the	  draft	  registries	  Regulation.	  	  
Indeed,	  rules	  regarding	  the	  acquisition	  of	  good	  title	  and	  irrevocability	  of	  allowances	  
is	   integral	   to	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   this	  measure	  as	  a	  way	  to	  minimise	   the	  effects	  of	  
fraud.	  
• An	  EU	  consultation	   to	  explore	   the	  most	  appropriate	   legal	  definition	  of	  emissions	  
allowances.	  	  
The	   subsequent	   adoption	   of	   a	   harmonised	   legal	   definition	  would	   overcome	  many	  
regulatory	  uncertainties	  regarding	  the	  applicable	  legislation	  to	  allowances	  transfers.	  
	  
• Integration	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   compensation	   regime	   within	   the	   registries	  
Regulation.	  	  
By	   providing	   compensation	   for	   inadvertent	   purchasers	   of	   stolen	   emissions	  
allowances,	   the	   financial	   risks	   for	   those	   participating	   in	   a	   market	   in	   which	   stolen	  
allowances	   are	   circulating	  will	   be	  minimised,	   and	   thus	   the	  major	  market-­‐disabling	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270	  The	  difficulties	  and	  delays	  experienced	   in	  the	   implementation	  of	  anti-­‐fraud	  measures	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS	  have	  
also	   exposed	   deeper	   running	   EU	   governance	   questions.	   To	   what	   level	   is	   it	   practicable	   or	   appropriate	   to	  
harmonise	  Member	  States’	  national	  laws	  and	  procedures?	  And	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  
these	  policies?	  Such	  issues	  will	  pose	  even	  more	  significant	  obstacles	  to	  the	  successful	  linking	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  to	  
the	  Californian	  or	  Australian	   emissions	   trading	   scheme	  as	   is	   currently	   being	   proposed	   (The	  Guardian,	   2011;	  
Point	  Carbon,	  2011)	  and	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  global	  emissions	  trading	  scheme	  that	  may	  be	  developed	  for	  a	  
post-­‐Kyoto	  commitment	  period	  (Ellerman,	  2009).	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impacts	   of	   allowance	   thefts	   avoided.	   At	   least	   in	   the	   short	   term,	   a	   compensation	  
regime	  could	  be	  a	  more	  appropriate	  and	  proportionate	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  
allowance	  thefts	  than	  the	  adoption	  of	  EU-­‐wide	  harmonisation	  of	  title	  transfer	  rules	  
or	  the	  extension	  of	  EU	  financial	  regulations	  to	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  
	  
• Design	  of	  a	  bespoke	  market	  oversight	  regime	  for	  the	  EU	  emissions	  trading	  market.	  
This	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  avoid	  the	  unnecessary	  regulatory	  burdens	  associated	  with	  
the	  classification	  of	  emissions	  allowances	  as	  financial	  instruments	  whilst	  specifically	  
addressing	  the	  risks	  of	  fraud	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  To	  ensure	  the	  specific	  measures	  adopted	  
within	   this	   regime	   are	   both	   proportional	   and	   relevant,	   its	   design	   would	   have	   to	  
incorporate	  an	  in-­‐depth	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  regulatory	  cost	  burdens	  on	  the	  
trading	  behaviour	  of	  different	  market	  participants,	  and	  the	  risks	   that	   those	  market	  
participants	  pose.	  An	  associated	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   could	   subsequently	  help	   find	  




• Strengthened	   efforts	   to	   establish	   the	   European	   Public	   Prosecutor’s	   Office,	   and	  
clarification	  of	  what	  the	  precise	  remit	  of	  this	  body	  would	  be.	  	  
	  
If	   there	   is	  political	  will	   for	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  EU	  Public	  Prosecutor,	   the	  role	  of	  
the	  prosecutor	  should	  include	  the	  power	  to	  bring	  prosecutions	  in	  the	  Member	  States	  
against	  VAT-­‐fraud,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  fraud	  to	  the	  EU	  budget.	   If	   the	  regulatory	  measures	  
against	  allowance	  thefts	  discussed	  in	  the	  paper	  do	  not	  prove	  to	  be	  effective,	  it	  might	  
be	   necessary	   for	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   prosecutor	   to	   be	   extended	   in	   future	   to	   cover	  
theft	   in	   emissions	   allowances	   as	  well	   as	   other	   forms	  of	   cross-­‐border	   fraud-­‐related	  
crime.	  
	  
	  
	  
